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“A lie keeps growing and growing until it’s as plain as the 
nose on your face” 
The Blue Fairy, Pinocchio (1940) 
iii 
 
General Abstract 
Police interviewers require a new investigative interviewing tool to facilitate the 
discrimination between children’s true and false reports.  This thesis investigated whether 
cognitive lie detection techniques could fill this gap in current practice.  Chapter 1 
introduces the cognitive lie detection paradigm, highlighting the lack of research within the 
child deception literature and the paradigm’s potential as a means for detecting deceit in 
children.  Chapter 2 explores imposing cognitive load through the use of gaze maintenance 
to exaggerate differences between child truth-tellers and child lie-tellers.  In Experiment 1, 
maintaining gaze (either with the interviewer’s face or a teddy bear’s face) resulted in 
truth-tellers providing significantly more detailed reports than lie-tellers. This finding was 
not apparent for the control condition where children were given no gaze instruction.  In 
Experiment 2, this exaggerated difference between the accounts of the truth- and lie-tellers 
facilitated deception detection when the children were instructed to look at interviewer’s 
face, but not at the teddy bear’s face.  Poor discrimination for the latter group was 
discussed with regard to the gaze behaviour of the children being regarded as ‘fishy’ by the 
evaluators.  Chapter 3 investigates whether playing an example of a detailed free recall 
provided by a peer (referred to as another child’s model statement, AMS) elicits longer 
statements that contain more cues to deceit in an eyewitness context than when no model 
statement is used.  Both child truth-tellers and child lie-tellers provided more details and 
more new information following AMS.  However, truth-teller accuracy decreased.  In 
Chapter 4, interview clips from Chapter 3 were judged by adult evaluators who found it 
difficult to differentiate between children’s true and false reports.  This could be a 
consequence of quantity of detail not being a reliable indicator of veracity for this sample 
of interviews.  Chapter 5 tests the use of children’s practice interviews as their own model 
statements (OMS) compared to AMS and having no model statement (NMS).  Only AMS 
iv 
 
encouraged children to include more details and more new information in their post-model 
statement true and false reports.  Further research is required to understand the socio-
cognitive mechanisms that create this behavioural difference.  Chapter 6 describes a field 
study that presented the cognitive lie detection techniques investigated in the previous 
chapters to police officers who interview child witnesses regularly.  Of all the techniques, 
OMS was considered to be the most viable option, although police officers suggested that 
all of the interview techniques would require adaptation for use in the real world.  The 
practitioners provided an insightful look at the current child-interviewing context in the 
UK, which provides a basic framework that could be considered when designing child 
deception detection strategies in the future.  Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the main 
findings of this doctoral thesis, discusses their theoretical and practical implications, and 
puts forward ideas for future research. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction to Thesis 
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1.1 Introduction 
Since the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (1999), young children and other 
vulnerable witnesses have received more support, via special measures, prior to and during 
their investigative interviews and, subsequently, during any resultant court proceedings. 
These special measures include video-recorded interviews, which can be played in court 
and live link facilities whereby vulnerable witnesses can give their evidence in a room 
away from the main courtroom. 
In the UK, all professionals who interview child witnesses as part of a police 
investigation are trained and advised to follow guidance entitled, Achieving Best Evidence 
in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance on interviewing victims and witnesses, and guidance 
on using special measures (ABE, Ministry of Justice, 2011).  The main objective of this 
guidance is to enable vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to achieve the highest possible 
standard of testimony (i.e. to give their best evidence).  This is in line with the primary aim 
of any investigative interview, which is to elicit reliable information (Vrij, Hope & Fisher, 
2014).  The credibility of the information elicited is also covered within the guidance.  
Originally conceived to replace the oath taken by adult witnesses in court, ABE tackles the 
issue of child credibility by recommending that interviewers perform a competency test to 
evaluate a children’s conceptual understanding of truths and lies.  It also suggests that 
interviewers should remind child witnesses of the importance of telling the truth.  
However, in a recent joint inspection of child sexual abuse cases, conducted by Her 
Majesty’s Inspector of Constabularies and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service 
Inspectorate (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014), it was reported that the competency 
test was used in less than 60% of interviews, with only 36.2% of those interviews using the 
correct protocol.  Krähenbühl, Blades and Cherryman (2015) also found a lack of 
consistency in the implementation of the ‘truths and lies’ discussion in a separate sample of 
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child witness transcripts.  At face value, poor compliance appears to be a serious issue.  
However, empirical findings show that performing a competency test does not necessarily 
deter children from deception (Lyon, Malloy, Quas & Talwar, 2008).  That is, children’s 
knowledge of the duty to tell the truth is not predictive of their subsequent lie- or truth-
telling behaviour (Talwar, Lee, Bala & Lindsay, 2002), and neither is their performance on 
moral reasoning tasks predictive of their later behaviour (Bala, Lee, Lindsay & Talwar, 
2010).  The only pre-interview instruction that does significantly decrease the frequency of 
lying (Talwar et al., 2002) and influences children’s decision to tell the truth/lie (Evans & 
Lee, 2010) is promising to tell the truth.  If these findings are considered alongside the 
problem of non-compliance, then a different issue presents itself; namely, that a new 
credibility tool is required, which is empirically tested and that child interviewers will use. 
The strength of the above findings, primarily collected by the Child Witness Project 
based at Queen’s University in Canada, led to Canadian officials significantly reforming 
the country’s laws governing the process for determining the competence of child 
witnesses (Bala et al., 2010).  In force since January 2006, the Canada Evidence Act now 
states under section 16.1 that children will be required to promise to tell the truth but will 
not be questioned regarding their understanding of the nature of the promise to tell the 
truth.  In this sense, the promise has the same effect as swearing an oath if the evidence is 
later presented as evidence in court.  This level of reformation may not, however, be 
possible in the UK, as ABE guidance clearly states that “there should be no attempt to get 
the witness to swear an oath, either before or after an interview” (Ministry of Justice, 2011, 
p. 72).  The only recommendation that can currently be used is to remind children of the 
importance of telling the truth; the effect of which has yet to be empirically tested.  There 
is, however, another line of research that has shown promise in uncovering adult’s deceit 
and could also be effective with children: cognitive lie detection. 
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1.1.1 Cognitive lie detection 
During interviews, lying can be more mentally taxing than truth-telling (e.g. Christ, 
Essen, Watson, Brubaker & McDermott, 2009; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall & Kronkvist, 
2006; Mann & Vrij, 2006).  Increased cognitive effort for lie-tellers may be due to 
increased information-processing demands associated with telling a convincing lie.  As lie-
tellers can’t take their credibility for granted as much as truth-tellers can, they have to 
perform multiple tasks simultaneously to increase the likelihood that they will be believed.  
These include monitoring and regulating their behaviour in response to interviewer 
feedback as well as constructing and maintaining a consistent lie that does not leak truthful 
information that might give them away (Vrij, 2008).  Cognitive lie detection techniques 
aim to tax lie-tellers’ cognitive systems even further to allow for greater behavioural 
(verbal and nonverbal) differences to occur between true and false reports.  A recent meta-
analysis (Vrij, Fisher & Blank, 2015) demonstrated the benefits of using cognitive lie 
detection (CLD) techniques to detect adults’ truths (67% accuracy with CLD, 57% 
accuracy without CLD) and lies (67% accuracy with CLD, 47% accuracy without CLD).  
Such improvement is in line with Hartwig and Bond’s (2011) review of human lie 
judgments.  They found that detecting lies is more readily facilitated by increasing these 
behavioural differences than by training lie detectors about actual cues to deceit. 
1.1.2 A gap in the literature 
Cognitive lie detection techniques manipulate cognitive load through three different 
strategies: (1) imposing cognitive load, (2) encouraging interviewees to say more, and (3) 
asking unanticipated questions (Vrij, 2015).  In their review of the child deception 
literature, Talwar and Crossman (2012) highlighted that child lie-tellers, whose ability to 
lie is closely associated with their developing cognitive abilities, could be particularly 
susceptible to cognitive lie detection methods.  Children with under-developed cognitive 
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skills are more likely to reveal their deceit (e.g. Evans & Lee, 2011; Talwar & Crossman, 
2011; Williams, Leduc, Crossman & Talwar, 2016) so putting additional strain on these 
cognitive systems might decrease their ability to maintain a lie and, therefore, increase the 
likelihood that their lie will be uncovered. 
Liu et al. (2010) were the first to manipulate cognitive load with children using 
unanticipated questions.  If lie-tellers correctly anticipate which questions will be asked at 
interview, then they can prepare responses that contain fewer cues to their deceit and lie-
telling becomes easier (DePaulo et al., 2003).  Asking the unanticipated exploits this 
forward planning by obliging the interviewee to come up with a plausible answer on the 
spot or risk looking suspicious (Vrij, 2015).  Children might be even more susceptible to 
the effects of spontaneous responding (compared to adults) because they have less well-
developed planning abilities (Talwar & Crossman, 2012).  In other words, there may be a 
greater number of questions for which they have not already planned a response.  Indeed, 
when children are asked unanticipated questions, this can have a negative impact on the 
verbal content of their lies (Vredeveldt & Wagenaar, 2013).  Liu et al. (2010) asked 
children aged 10 to 12 years old to answer either anticipated (event-relevant; e.g. where did 
the event take place?) or unanticipated (event-irrelevant; e.g. what did you have in your 
pocket when it happened?) questions about either a life event they had (truth-tellers) or had 
not (lie-tellers) experienced.  It should be noted that this manipulation of anticipation is not 
in line with adult research where unanticipated questions are always related to the core 
event (Vrij, 2015).  They found that deceptive children were more likely to answer 
unanticipated questions than truthful children.  In summary, asking the unexpected 
revealed a behavioural difference in responding between truth-tellers and lie-tellers.  
However, response length was not affected.  The lack of an effect on verbosity could be 
explained by the fact that Liu et al. (2010) tested older children (10 to 12 years) with well-
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developed planning abilities.  Another explanation could be the use of a between-subjects 
design for question type.  Liu et al. (2010) may have benefited from having type of 
question as a within-subjects variable: Differences elicited between adults’ truths and lies, 
using this method, have been found when comparing the level of detail in their responses 
for both anticipated and unanticipated questions (Lancaster, Vrij, Hope & Waller, 2013).  
In spite of these disappointing results, more research with children was required to 
investigate whether manipulating cognitive load could facilitate the discrimination between 
children’s true and false reports. 
Roos af Hjelmsäter, Öhman, Granhag and Vrij (2014) conducted the next 
investigation of cognitive load with adolescents.  In their study, young adolescents in 
groups of three either experienced (truth-tellers) or imagined that they had experienced 
(lie-tellers) an encounter with a stranger.  When interviewed individually, each adolescent 
was asked to perform two recall tasks; an anticipated verbal description of what happened 
and an unanticipated spatial description by making marks on a sketch.  Adult evaluators (N 
= 200) then judged the consistency of the descriptions from children in the same triad.  For 
the anticipated verbal description, there were no perceived differences between children’s 
true and false reports.  However, for the unanticipated spatial description, truth-telling 
triads were perceived to be significantly more consistent than lie-telling triads.  Eliciting 
this spatial difference strengthens the support for using cognitive lie detection with 
children, notably with groups of adolescents, to determine their veracity.  It demonstrates 
that, even if child lie-tellers can spontaneously respond to an unanticipated task, there are 
still other nonverbal markers that might highlight their deceit. 
Nonetheless, at the start of this doctoral programme of research, there were no 
published studies, with children, on the use of imposing cognitive load or encouraging 
interviewees to say more: this was the gap in the literature that I endeavoured to fill. 
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1.1.3 Child deception 
 1.1.3.1 Type of lie 
Lying is defined as “a successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without 
forewarning, to create in another a belief, which the communicator considers to be untrue” 
(Vrij, 2008, p. 15).  People can lie through omission of true information, known as false 
denials, or through the commission of false information, otherwise known as false 
allegations (Lyon et al., 2008).  The prevalence of children’s false denials in forensic 
investigations is difficult to measure because, unless there is sufficient physical evidence to 
prove that an incident has occurred (but that a child is denying), then false denials are hard 
to classify.  Laboratory research has, however, highlighted children’s willingness to 
conceal information (i.e. keep secrets) about their own wrongdoing (e.g. Polak & Harris, 
1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002) and the wrongdoing of an adult (e.g. Talwar, Lee, Bala & 
Lindsay, 2004; Tye, Amato, Honts, Devitt & Peters, 1999).  Studies into the prevalence of 
children’s false allegations in forensic investigations suggest low rates based on clinical 
judgments (2-6% Everson & Boat, 1989; 2%, Jones & McGraw, 1987) and more rigorous 
review processes of case files (8% Anthony & Watkeys, 1991; 1.5%, Oates et al., 2000; 
4%, Trocmé & Bala).  However, it does appear that in court cases, and even with regard to 
allegations as serious as sexual abuse, some children do lie.  Although prevalence rates 
may be relatively low, just one case of a false allegation can have far-reaching 
consequences for both child witnesses and the defendants (O’Donohue, Benuto & Fanetti, 
2010).  The current thesis investigates the effects of using cognitive lie detection 
techniques on false allegations to prevent these serious legal implications. 
It is also important to take into consideration that a frequent strategy for reducing 
the cognitive load of lying is to incorporate truthful elements of unrelated events into the 
lie; these are called embedded lies (Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010).  This means that most 
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lies that people tell are not complete fabrications.  Children have reported including real-
life components in their false reports as the most frequent verbal strategy that they employ, 
which could explain adults’ poor deception detection accuracy (Strömwall, Granhag & 
Landström, 2007).  Embedded lies are particularly difficult to detect because they can be 
rich in detail, which could confuse verbal lie detection tools (Vrij et al., 2010).  Referred to 
in the adult literature as ‘temporal displacement’ (Michael, 2013), embedded lies are most 
commonly used when the lie-teller must create a false story about a familiar event.  In this 
doctoral thesis, the events about which the children were interviewed ranged in familiarity.  
However, for all events, the children could have, to some degree, included truthful 
information (whether based on their own experience or the experience of another) from a 
different event into their false reports.  This provided a more realistic challenge for the 
cognitive lie detection techniques to overcome. 
Finally, lies can be classified according to their perceived stakes: high versus low.  
Most laboratory research has focused on low-stakes lies with children, although it has been 
argued that what appears low stakes to adults might not be low stakes for children (Talwar 
& Crossman, 2012).  Nevertheless, only a few studies have considered more ecologically 
relevant scenarios such as being ‘touched’ by an adult (Goodman, Luten, Edelstein & 
Ekman, 2006) and reporting the theft of an expensive item to a ‘police officer’ (Tye et al., 
1999).  In these scenarios, it could be considered that the stakes are perceived to be higher, 
resulting in an increase in stress.  Brunet et al. (2013) showed, using a within-subjects 
design to control for individual differences, that children’s reports regarding highly 
stressful events were longer than those regarding less stressful events.  As longer 
statements increase the opportunity for more cues to veracity to occur (Vrij, Mann, Kristen 
& Fisher, 2007), the benefit of using highly stressful events could be that the effects of 
veracity are further magnified.  However, it is important to consider the ethics of inducing 
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high stress in children (i.e. a sensitive population).  Brunet et al. (2013) used occasions 
where children had been bullied and reported feeling stressed in their study, thus stress was 
naturally occurring rather than induced.  To avoid ethical complications in this doctoral 
thesis, non-stressful events were used with the view that any veracity effects would be 
further enhanced, if later investigated with stressful events. 
 1.1.3.2 Age of children 
 The term ‘children’ can refer to any person under the age of eighteen.  Child 
deception research has primarily divided into testing young children aged 2 to 7-years-old 
(e.g. Ahern, Lyon & Quas, 2011; Evans & Lee, 2013, Talwar & Lee, 2002) and older 
children aged 7 to 14-years-old (e.g. Akehurst, Köhnken & Hofer, 2001; Brunet et al., 
2013, McCarthy & Lee, 2009).  The reason for this division around 7 years of age could be 
due to the finding that children find it difficult to successfully conceal this deceit before 
this age (Talwar & Lee, 2002), which may be associated with their ongoing development 
of certain cognitive and social skills (Talwar & Crossman, 2011).  Talwar and Lee (2008) 
tested children aged 3 to 8 years-old and found that 77% of the older children were able to 
conceal their deceit compared to only 29% of the younger children.  This ability to conceal 
information successfully was also related to their cognitive development of executive 
functions, such as working memory and inhibitory control, which improved with age.  In 
their lifespan study, Debey, De Schryver, Logan, Suchotzki and Verschuere (2015) 
investigated patterns in lying behaviour and inhibitory control performance in persons aged 
6 to 77-years-old.  Their findings showed that both variables followed the same pattern, 
increasing over the course of childhood, peaking at adolescence and then decreasing again 
in adulthood.  Thus, the ongoing development of certain cognitive skills across the entire 
lifespan is related to people’s propensity to deceive. 
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 The development of certain social skills could also present a reason for a division in 
age groups.  Lying requires a sense of self as well as an understanding of others’ mental 
states, also known as theory of mind.  To create a false belief in the mind of another, a 
child must understand that a person’s mental perspective has an effect on his/her actions 
and emotions (Talwar & Crossman, 2011).  Theory of mind further divides into first-order 
belief understanding and second-order belief understanding.  First-order belief 
understanding refers to creating a belief that is simply false with regard to the true state of 
affairs (for example in a temptation resistance paradigm, if the child peeked and then said 
they didn’t, then this would be a false statement).  Second-order belief understanding refers 
to children’s ability to sustain a lie and provide responses that are in line with what the 
interlocutor believes to be the truth.  With regard to age, first-order belief understanding 
usually develops by the age of 3 years whereas second-order belief understanding is not 
developed until 6 to 7 years of age (Talwar & Crossman, 2011).  Moreover, when it is 
developed, it has been linked to better lie maintenance (Talwar & Lee, 2008).  Thus, 
studying children from 7-years-old onwards would provide more of a challenge for any 
study aiming to test new detection techniques. 
Another social factor to be considered when interviewing children of different ages 
is children’s awareness of the impressions they make, referred to in the literature as self-
monitoring or self-presentation (Eder & Jones, 1989) and their ability to manipulate these 
impressions.  Although not studied in relation to child deception, self-monitoring could 
theoretically contribute to children using more verbal and nonverbal strategies to produce 
an honest impression, when in fact they are acting dishonestly.  Furthermore, individual 
differences in children’s social evaluation concerns could explain why some child lie-
tellers are more motivated to be believed than others because they would better practised in 
regulating their behaviour in response to social cues (Banerjee, 2002).  In other words, they 
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would be better at adjusting their behaviour in response to the verbal and nonverbal 
feedback provided by the interviewer who they are attempting to convince. 
In this doctoral thesis, the term ‘child/children’ refers to persons aged 7 to 11-
years-old.  This age group was chosen because the children would have sufficient verbal 
skills to provide longer deceptive narratives that would test the cognitive lie detection 
techniques (i.e. no ceiling effect due to generally poor lie-telling performance) but would 
not make it too challenging for this preliminary investigations (i.e. no floor effect due to 
general very good lie-telling performance). 
It is, however, important to note that age remains a continuous variable and that 
individual differences in children’s development may result in different rates of 
development.  For example, one seven-year-old might have a better false belief 
understanding than one eleven-year-old, and one nine-year-old might have a better 
working memory than one ten-year-old.  We cannot, therefore, assume a linear relationship 
between children’s age and their lie-telling performance in the experiments in this thesis, 
and so it will be necessary to conduct preliminary analyses for each statistical test to 
uncover any age effects.  Furthermore, where possible, we will endeavour to use within-
subjects designs so that children’s lie-telling performance post-interview technique is 
compared to their lie-telling performance pre-interview technique.  This will reduce 
grouping children into specific age groups and be based on their own level of development. 
 As well as considering the effects of cognitive lie detection on children’s lie-telling 
ability between 7 to 11-years-old, it is vital to consider whether these interview strategies 
could have adverse effects on their ability to provide truthful accounts of eyewitness 
events.  Talwar and Crossman (2012) advocated the investigation of cognitive lie detection 
with children with the proviso that it did not affect truth-tellers.  Any interview technique 
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should first and foremost have either a neutral, or preferably a positive effect on eliciting 
truthful information, and then an additional negative effect on deterring or uncovering lie-
tellers.  This is in line with the primary aim of information gathering during an 
investigation (Vrij et al., 2014).  It was, therefore, important across all the studies in this 
doctoral research to pay close attention to the effect of the technique on truth-tellers, as 
well as lie-tellers. 
1.2 Thesis outline 
The central aim of this PhD thesis was to explore two cognitive lie detection 
interview techniques with child interviewees, namely imposing cognitive load and 
encouraging interviewees to say more, as potential means for facilitating truth-tellers and, 
thus, improving the detection of children’s false reports.  This PhD thesis constitutes six 
studies described across five chapters.  It is important to note that there is some repetition 
throughout the thesis.  This is because some of the chapters have been written so that they 
are independent of all other chapters and so can be read and understood individually (i.e. as 
standalone journal articles).  This means that there is a reference section at the end of each 
chapter. 
Chapter 2: ‘Look this way’: Using gaze maintenance to facilitate the detection of 
children’s false reports 
This chapter includes two experiments that investigate imposing cognitive load 
through gaze maintenance to facilitate child deception detection.  As lie-telling requires 
more cognitive resources than truth-telling (Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981), lie-
tellers will have fewer cognitive resources leftover, when compared to truth-tellers, to 
complete other tasks.  Imposing cognitive load taxes lie-tellers’ cognitive resources further 
by adding in a secondary task to be performed whilst answering questions at interview 
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(Vrij, 2015).  The cognitive load experienced by lie-tellers when managing both tasks may 
exceed that of truth-tellers putting even more strain on their attentional resources.  Thus, it 
makes the interview setting itself more difficult.  With adults, secondary tasks, such as 
telling a story backwards (Evans, Michael, Meissner & Brandon, 2013; Vrij, Leal, Mann & 
Fisher, 2012; Vrij et al., 2008), or telling a story whilst maintaining eye contact (Vrij, 
Fisher, Mann & Leal, 2010), have magnified differences between truth-tellers and lie-
tellers as well as improving detection accuracy.  Indeed, a meta-analysis by Vrij et al. 
(2015) demonstrated that imposing cognitive load is the most effective lie detection 
technique for improving lie detection accuracy (34% for standard techniques versus 63% 
for imposing cognitive load techniques) compared to encouraging interviewees to say more 
(69% for standard techniques versus 74% for ‘encouraging interviewees to say more’ 
techniques) and unexpected questions (53% for standard techniques versus 67% for 
unexpected questioning techniques).  As imposing a secondary task puts additional strain 
on the interviewee’s working memory system, it is anticipated that child lie-tellers would 
be particularly vulnerable to its effects.  Children whose under-developed working memory 
can already reveal their deceit (Talwar & Crossman, 2011) may be put under further 
pressure to stop themselves from leaking more cues to their deception.  Since the 
beginning of this doctoral programme, only one very recent study has explored imposing 
cognitive load through reverse order recall with children (Saykaly, Crossman, Morris & 
Talwar, 2016).  This chapter investigated an alternative secondary task, namely gaze 
maintenance. 
Chapter 3: ‘Truly crime-relevant’: Using a model statement in an eyewitness context to 
differentiate between children’s true and false reports 
In this chapter, child eyewitnesses were played an example of a detailed statement 
(i.e. a model statement), provided by another child, to investigate whether it would elicit 
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verbal differences in their true and false accounts.  Encouraging interviewees to say more 
taxes lie-tellers’ cognitive resources further by challenging them to provide more detailed 
statements (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham & Fisher, 2015).  Providing a model 
statement encourages truth-tellers to become more talkative and causes lie-tellers to re-
evaluate their tactics (Vrij, 2015).  On the one hand, lie-tellers could stick to their original 
story, but this puts them at risk of looking suspicious.  On the other hand, lie-tellers could 
embellish their story and rise to the interviewers’ standards, but this puts them at risk of 
revealing cues to their deceit.  For child lie-tellers, longer statements may put further strain 
on their verbal working memory systems that are closely associated with their ability to 
maintain lies (Alloway, McCallum, Alloway & Hoicka, 2015), decreasing their lie-telling 
performance.  This experiment builds on the only previous study conducted, which was 
conducted with adult insurance claimants (Leal et al., 2015), by investigating the effects of 
a model statement in an eyewitness context and with a baseline comparison measure. 
Chapter 4: ‘Don’t mess with the detail’: Increasing interviewee productivity using a 
model statement hinders child credibility judgments 
This chapter uses the interview clips from Chapter 3 to see whether the exaggerated 
verbal differences between truth-tellers and lie-tellers that were found using a model 
statement made it easier for human observers to distinguish between children’s true and 
false eyewitness accounts.  With adults, cognitive lie detection techniques that elicit longer 
responses have resulted in significant improvements in truth detection accuracy: 57% for a 
standard technique and 81% for ‘encouraging interviewees to say more’ technique (Vrij et 
al., 2015).    More specifically, Leal et al. (2015) found, using discriminant analyses, that 
observers’ plausibility ratings could correctly classify 75% of false accounts and 85% of 
truthful accounts when a model statement had been played.  The data analysis in Chapter 4 
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goes further to use lens modelling to understand observers’ decision-making processes 
when faced with video stimuli. 
Chapter 5: ‘Own vs. other’: The effects of modelling on verbal cues to children’s false 
reports 
This chapter continues to investigate the use of a model statement, provided by 
another child, with children and, in particular, tests the social proof/social comparison 
theory behind its effects (Cialdini, 1993; Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham & Brankaert, 2015).   
Furthermore, this study investigates the transformation of children’s practice interviews 
into their own model statements (i.e. a model statement provided by themselves) as a 
‘truth-teller friendly’ substitute to hearing another child’s model statement.  Practice 
interviews are conducted as part of the pre-substantive phase of the National Institute of 
Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) Investigative Interview protocol (Lamb, 
Orbach, Hershkowitz, Esplin & Horowitz, 2007) and have been shown to elicit longer and 
more accurate narratives from child witnesses than when no practice interview is used 
(Price, Roberts, & Collins, 2013; Roberts, Brubacher, Powell & Price, 2011; Sternberg et 
al., 1997).  Unlike model statements given by a peer, practice interviews have received 
much support for their beneficial effects on truth-tellers.  The effects of using model 
statements compared to no model statement, and then another child’s model statement 
(AMS) compared to a child’s own model statement (OMS) were tested.   It was anticipated 
that the potential negative effects of social comparison, that may occur when children hear 
AMS, could be avoided by introducing a self-comparison with the ‘OMS’ condition, 
leading to more exaggerated verbal differences between children’s true and false reports in 
this interview condition. 
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Chapter 6: Elicit, Evaluate, Empower and End product:  A basic framework for 
designing interview strategies to uncover children’s false reports 
In this chapter, a qualitative methodology was used to gather practitioner feedback 
on the viability of the techniques researched in Chapters 2 to 5.  Presented as a knowledge 
exchange workshop, police officers who currently interview child witnesses in their job 
role were invited to take part in focus group discussions regarding the three interview 
strategies: (i) imposing cognitive load through gaze maintenance (Chapter 2), (ii) 
encouraging interviewees to say more using another child’s model statement (Chapters 3 
& 4), and (iii) encouraging interviewees to say more using a child’s own model statement 
(Chapter 5). The focus group discussions were recorded and transcribed. Transcripts were 
thematically analysed to reveal the participants’ evaluation of each of the three techniques 
as well as providing an overview of ‘real world’ child interviewing processes in the UK 
today.  Participants provided insightful feedback on the advantages and disadvantages of 
each interview technique as well as suggestions for use in future practice.  The latter 
thematic analysis uncovered a basic framework of four themes (the 4Es) that could be 
taken into consideration when designing lie detection strategies for use with children; the 
interview techniques should (1) elicit as much information as possible, (2) allow the 
recipients of that information (i.e. police officers, judges, jurors) to evaluate its credibility, 
(3) empower the interviewees to give their ‘best evidence’, and (4) result in an end product 
that will stand up to criticism in court. 
Chapter 7: General Discussion 
The final chapter discusses the main findings of this PhD thesis, reflects on both the 
theoretical and practical implications of this doctoral research, and puts forward 
suggestions for future research. 
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2.1 Abstract 
In two experiments, we investigated whether imposing a secondary task is an effective 
technique for detecting child deceit. Firstly, 85 children aged 8 to 11 years old provided 
either a true or false report of a recent school event. At interview, some children were 
asked to gaze towards either the interviewer’s face (IF) or a teddy bear’s face (TF), 
whereas some children were given no gaze instruction. In both the IF and TF conditions, 
lie-tellers provided significantly fewer details than truth-tellers. 192 adult evaluators then 
judged the credibility of ten children’s reports from one of the three ‘gaze’ conditions with 
and without guidance on level of detail. Evaluators discriminated truths from lies 
successfully when judging children instructed to look at IF, but not when children were 
asked to gaze towards TF. Evaluators who received guidance demonstrated better 
discrimination between true and false reports than evaluators who received no such 
information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
2.2 Introduction 
Child deception research has focused on both the developmental origins of 
children’s lie-telling behaviours, and the forensic implications of deceptive child 
testimonies going undetected (see Talwar & Crossman, 2012 for a review).  Past research 
has painted a bleak picture: Children not only have the potential to lie in forensic 
interviews (Tye, Amato, Honts, Devitt & Peters, 1999), but, when the video-recordings of 
their statements are presented to legal professionals (e.g. police officers, judges), they 
experience great difficulty in uncovering false testimonies (Bala, Ramakrishan, Lindsay & 
Lee, 2014; Leach, Talwar, Lee, Bala & Lindsay, 2004).  Thus, if children do decide to 
provide deceptive reports, then they could easily slip through the net resulting in 
miscarriages of justice that are damaging to both the victims and defendants (O’Donohue, 
Benuto & Fanetti, 2010).  Clearly, more effective deception detection strategies are 
needed. 
 Cognitive processing is an important factor in deception (Zuckerman, DePaulo & 
Rosenthal, 1981), particularly for children whose growing cognitive abilities are closely 
related to their ability to maintain false reports (Talwar & Crossman, 2011).  Indeed, 
children’s development of global executive functioning (Gordon, Lyon & Lee, 2014) as 
well as their development of specific executive functions, such as inhibitory control, 
working memory, executive planning and forward search planning, significantly contribute 
to their ability to conceal incriminating information when questioned (Alloway, 
McCallum, Alloway & Hoicka, 2015; Evans & Lee, 2011; Talwar & Lee, 2008; Williams, 
Leduc, Crossman & Talwar, 2016).  Furthermore, lie-telling proficiency follows the 
developmental patterns of cognitive processes, such as inhibitory control (Debey, De 
Schryver, Logen, Suchotzki & Verschuere, 2015).  This suggests that child lie-tellers, who 
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are still developing certain cognitive skills that might facilitate their lie-telling, might be 
affected by any interview technique that impacts upon these skills. 
Growing research into adult deception has highlighted cognitive lie detection 
(CLD) as a promising strategic tool.  Based on the well-established premise that lying is 
more cognitively demanding than truth-telling (e.g. Christ, Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker 
& McDermott, 2009; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall & Kronkvist, 2006; Mann & Vrij, 
2006), CLD manipulates cognitive load, which refers to information-processing demands 
associated with attentional and working memory (Block, Hancock & Zakay, 2010), and 
transforms it into a system variable (Vrij, 2015).  As a result, CLD techniques exaggerate 
behavioural differences between truth-tellers and lie-tellers, ultimately leading to 
impressive improvements in correct judgements of truths: 57% for standard approach to 
67% for CLD approach, and correct judgments of lies: 47% for standard approach, 67% for 
CLD (Vrij, Fisher & Blank, 2015).  By taxing cognitive load further, CLD decreases lie-
telling performance.  Children should be particularly susceptible to the negative effects of 
increased cognitive demand because their developing cognitive abilities, which already 
reveal their deceit, would be put under further strain. 
2.2.1 Imposing cognitive load 
Imposing cognitive load transforms the cognitive demand experienced by 
interviewees into a system variable through the addition of a secondary task (Vrij, 2015).  
Knowles (1963) proposed that each person has a limited pool of attentional resources that 
are differentially allocated to tasks according to difficulty.  A difficult task, such as lie-
telling, would draw more resources from this pool than a less difficult task, such as truth-
telling.  Lie-tellers would, therefore, have fewer resources (than truth-tellers) remaining if 
the pool were finite. 
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This asymmetry in the availability of cognitive resources for truth-tellers and lie-
tellers has two consequences for lie-tellers when a secondary task is imposed.  First, lie-
tellers experience an overall increase in cognitive demand, working at or near to full 
attentional capacity.  This means that lie-tellers exhibit more behavioural cues indicative of 
cognitive load compared to truth-tellers.  Second, interference between the tasks may arise.  
When working at cognitive capacity, performance will depend on a person’s ability to 
divide his or her attention in accordance with task demands.  Attention can be flexibly 
allocated from moment to moment (Kahneman, 1973): As the secondary task becomes 
more difficult, additional resources can be allocated.  If the tasks share a particular pool of 
resources, then diverting resources from the primary task to the secondary task should 
result in a trade-off (i.e. decreasing performance for the primary task and increasing 
performance for the secondary task).   
Imposing cognitive load in order to detect deception could be particularly effective 
with a younger population whose ability to manage their attentional resources has not yet 
fully matured.  Before the age of 11 years, children find it difficult to differentially allocate 
their attention in dual-task processing (Irwin-Chase & Burns, 2000).  Furthermore, 
research has shown that the increase in cognitive load experienced, when moving from 
single tasks to dual-tasks, is greater for children than it is for adults (Karatekin, 2004).  
Although 10-year-olds can allocate their attention similarly to adults, their control over 
attention management in response to task difficulty is not yet fully developed.  In the 
context of the current study, this suggests that child lie-tellers may overcompensate for the 
rising demands of a secondary task, diverting too many resources away from the primary 
task of lie-telling, thus decreasing their performance on this task.  It is also possible that 
children may prioritise the primary task, sacrificing their performance on the secondary 
task. 
31 
 
To date, two studies have examined the effects of cognitive lie detection techniques 
on children.  Firstly, Liu et al. (2010) asked unanticipated questions of children aged 10 to 
12 years old about a non-experienced life event.  They found that, compared to truth-
tellers, child lie-tellers were more likely to respond to unexpected questions.  Secondly, 
Saykaly, Crossman, Morris and Talwar (2016) imposed cognitive load by asking children 
to falsely allege or deny play with a certain toy using the ‘reverse order’ interview 
instruction. Their results revealed that reverse order recall made it harder for child lie-
tellers to maintain their reports compared to child truth-tellers, suggesting that telling a 
story backwards does increase cognitive demands.  In summary, both these studies 
indicated that, when children have to perform a secondary task (i.e. answering a difficult 
question) at the same time as maintaining their false reports, their ability to maintain the lie 
is negatively affected.  In the current experiment, the secondary task, introduced at 
interview, was an instruction to maintain gaze with either the interviewer’s face or a teddy 
bear’s face:  A secondary task that has yet to be investigated with children. 
2.2.2 Gaze maintenance 
Using a systematic approach, Glenberg, Schröder and Roberston (1998) 
demonstrated that as the cognitive demands (i.e. cognitive difficulty) of a task increase, 
adults naturally avert their gaze.  This cognitive strategy of gaze aversion is functional, as 
adults performed better on moderately difficult questions when they disengaged from (i.e. 
closed their eyes), rather than engaged with (i.e. looked at the interviewer’s nose), 
disruptive visual components in their environment.  Looking towards a visual/social 
stimulus, therefore, interfered with their task performance when the cognitive demands of 
the task were moderate. This behavioural response to avoid cognitive overload has also 
been investigated with children.  Doherty-Sneddon, Bruce, Bonner, Longbotham and 
Doyle (2002) compared gaze aversion behaviour in children aged 5 and 8 years old in 
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response to easy (low cognitive load) and difficult (high cognitive load) questions.  Results 
revealed that the older children averted their gaze away from the questioner’s face more 
frequently in response to rising question difficulty (i.e. cognitive effort), but that this gaze 
pattern was only observed for younger children for certain types of questions.  This 
suggests that gaze aversion is used as an overt response to cognitive effort more 
consistently with increasing age.  In addition, there is evidence to support that the primary 
function of gaze aversion is to manage cognitive demands rather than as a response to 
social difficulty.  Doherty-Sneddon and Phelps (2005) measured gaze aversion in 8-year-
old children who were questioned either face-to-face or via live video link.  Results 
revealed that question difficulty strongly influenced gaze aversion in both interview 
conditions.   In the current study, it was anticipated that, as children’s ages ranged from 8 
to 11 years old, they would attempt to use gaze aversion to reduce cognitive effort more so 
in the ‘lie-telling’ condition where cognitive load is higher than in the ‘truth-telling’ 
condition.  Requiring interviewees to maintain gaze during questioning, as was the case for 
this study, would disable this coping mechanism for lie-tellers and maintain the increased 
cognitive demands of providing a false report.  Furthermore, as maintaining gaze is not a 
natural behaviour, it would be necessary for interviewees in this experiment to 
intentionally remind themselves to comply with our gaze instruction, creating additional 
cognitive load. 
In a previous study, maintaining eye contact was used to impose cognitive load on 
adult interviewees (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010). The researchers found that requiring 
eye contact elicited two cognitive cues (out of 14 cues) that discriminated lie-tellers from 
truth-tellers; namely, deceitful accounts contained fewer spatial details and were more 
chronological compared to truthful accounts.  No significant differences were elicited 
between truth-tellers and lie-tellers when interviewees were given no ‘eye contact’ 
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instruction.  In terms of detection accuracy, the small difference in elicited cues only 
improved lie detection accuracy from 44% in the ‘control’ condition to 53% in the ‘eye 
contact’ condition.  If an improvement in accuracy rates is dependent on the exaggeration 
of behavioural differences between truth-tellers and lie-tellers, then eliciting two cognitive 
cues did not suffice.  Vrij et al. (2010) suggest that these findings may be the product of 
anxiety for lie-tellers rather than increased cognitive load.  Alternatively, previous research 
has shown that, even when adults find maintaining gaze with a person’s face to be more 
difficult than either looking at the floor or closing their eyes, this does not result in them 
performing worse in the former condition compared to the latter two gaze conditions 
(Doherty-Sneddon, Bonner & Bruce, 2001).   
On the contrary, the difficulty that children experience when instructed to direct 
their gaze does translate into poorer performance compared to a control condition 
involving no gaze instruction.  In their first experiment, Doherty-Sneddon et al. (2001) 
compared the effect of gaze instruction (look at the speaker vs. look at the floor vs. close 
your eyes) on both adults’ and 10-year-old children’s task performance.  Like adults, most 
children (83%) found looking at the floor or closing their eyes to be the easiest (least 
cognitively demanding) conditions.  Results showed that, when children looked at the 
floor, this reported ease translated into them performing significantly better than when they 
looked at the speaker.  This difference in task performance was also found across Doherty-
Sneddon et al.’s subsequent experiments for different tasks and for a younger age group (6 
years old).  Children, therefore, experienced great difficulty in moderating the negative 
effects of gaze maintenance, with looking towards a face resulting not only in increased 
levels of cognitive demand for children, but also diminished task performance (Doherty-
Sneddon et al., 2001).  Thus, it was anticipated, for the current study, that children’s 
interview performance would be affected by gaze maintenance. 
34 
 
2.3 Experiment 1 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether an instruction to maintain gaze 
would exaggerate differences between children’s true and false reports.  With a view to the 
future practical value of this research, it was important to consider how appropriate an 
instruction to maintain gaze would be with a child population.  As maintaining gaze has 
already been linked to anxiety (Vrij et al., 2010), asking a child to look at an interviewer’s 
face may intimidate some interviewees.  In this study, we instructed some of the children 
to look at a face stimulus considered to be less intimidating; a teddy bear’s face.  It should 
be noted that toys can be useful in child witness interviews (Wilson & Powell, 2001), and a 
teddy bear was chosen because it has a face and is non-gender specific. 
In this experiment, we predicted that lie-tellers would experience more dual-task 
interference than truth-tellers when instructed to maintain gaze.  That is, lie-tellers’ ability 
to provide a detailed account would be more negatively associated with their level of gaze 
compliance, compared to truth-tellers (Hypothesis 1).  Secondly, we anticipated that this 
dual-task interference would exaggerate subtle differences in level of detail between true 
and false reports.  Thus, it was expected that child lie-tellers would provide reports that 
were significantly less detailed than those provided by child truth-tellers, and this 
difference in detail would be greater for children instructed to maintain gaze compared to 
children given no gaze instruction (Hypothesis 2). 
2.3.1 Method 
2.3.1.1 Participants 
Eighty-five children (37 boys, 48 girls) aged 8 to 11 years old (M = 10.46 years, SD 
= .81 years) were recruited from four primary schools in the United Kingdom.  Participant 
information sheets were sent home to children’s legal guardians who returned a signed 
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written consent form.  The general procedure was outlined to the children to obtain their 
verbal assent to participation, but they were naïve to the specific purpose of the study and 
to the anticipated effect of maintaining gaze.  All children, who were asked to lie, complied 
with the request to lie.  Verification was sought from teachers that they had not taken part 
in the event that they were interviewed about.  All children received a certificate and a 
stationery set in exchange for taking part. 
2.3.1.2 Procedure 
The experiment took place in two quiet areas of each school and involved the 
Principal Investigator (PI) who ran the study and a Research Assistant who conducted all 
interviews and was blind to the aims and hypotheses of the study.  All children were tested 
individually. 
The PI invited each child to take part in a short interview about a recent event at 
their school, thus events differed across schools.  These events included a school sports 
day, a visit to the local cathedral, a school play, and a music concert.  Children were 
randomly assigned to a Veracity condition within each year group in each school so that 
there were roughly equal numbers of truth-tellers and lie-tellers for each of the four events.  
Truth-tellers (n = 39, Mage = 10.28 years, SDage = .83 years) were interviewed after they 
had experienced the event and were asked to provide a truthful recollection of what 
happened.  Lie-tellers (n = 46, Mage = 10.43 years, SDage = .81 years), on the other hand, 
were interviewed about an event that they had not experienced and were asked to convince 
the interviewer that they had already taken part in the event, when in fact they had not.  
This is similar to the veracity allocation carried out by other researchers interested in 
eliciting false allegations from children (e.g. Akehurst, Köhnken & Höfer, 2001; Brunet et 
al., 2013; Lyon, Malloy, Quas & Talwar, 2008). 
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Within their veracity groups, children were also randomly assigned to a Gaze 
Instruction condition: Look at the interviewer’s face (IF, n = 28, Mage = 10.25 years, SDage 
= .80 years) or Look at the teddy bear’s face (TF, n = 29, Mage = 10.52, SDage =.74 years) or 
No gaze instruction (Control, n = 28, Mage = 10.32 years, SDage = .91 years).  The teddy 
bear was seated on the interviewer’s lap throughout all interviews (i.e. for all conditions).  
Prior to the interview, children in the IF and TF conditions were instructed by the PI to 
maintain gaze with the relevant face stimulus as much as they possibly could throughout 
the interview (i.e. to look at it as much as they could remember to do so).  All children then 
received a sheet listing general themes that they could tell the interviewer about (e.g. talk 
about who was there, what happened, when it happened).  This does not constitute 
coaching as neither truth-tellers nor lie-tellers were told exactly what they should say and 
they did not rehearse their story with the PI.  Providing children with these themes was 
anticipated to elicit longer statements, allowing for more cues to deceit to occur (Leal, Vrij, 
Warmelink, Vernham & Fisher, 2015; Vrij, 2015).  All participants were given 
approximately three minutes to prepare themselves before the PI escorted them to the 
interview room.  Before entering the interview room, children in the IF and TF condition 
were given a final reminder by the PI to maintain gaze with the relevant face stimulus.  
This was done out of earshot of the interviewer so that she remained blind to the aims and 
hypotheses of the study. 
The interview protocol reflected the initial stages of a Cognitive Interview (Fisher 
& Geiselman, 1992): A rapport-building phase (that took place off-camera) was followed 
by two open-ended questions.  First, an invitation to provide a free, uninterrupted narrative 
(e.g. tell me everything that happened when you took part in your school sports day), and 
then, secondly, a request, to all interviewees, to provide one additional piece of 
information about an aspect of the event that they had not already mentioned.  No other 
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questions were asked.  All children were video-recorded, and their interviews later 
transcribed.  All interviewees were asked the following question, which served as a 
manipulation check: Where were you instructed to look during the interview? The response 
options were ‘interviewer’s face’, ‘teddy bear’s face’ or ‘no instruction given’. 
2.3.1.3 Coding for detail 
Two independent coders rated the children’s interview transcripts for number of 
details included.  To make the coding more precise, all transcripts were coded for five 
different types of details; visual details (e.g. “white clay head” contains three visual 
details), auditory details (e.g. “the teacher told us to take deep breaths” contains one 
auditory detail), spatial details (e.g. “he stood behind the curtain” contains one spatial 
detail), temporal details (e.g. “at the end we left” contains one temporal detail), and action 
details (e.g. “we played football” contains one action detail).  One coder coded all of the 
transcripts for the current study, whilst the second coder rated a random sample of 20 
transcripts.  Considering that general level of detail is a reliable indicator of veracity 
(DePaulo et al., 2003), total number of details was calculated for each interviewee, by 
adding together the scores for all five detail types.  Intra-class correlation coefficients 
(ICCs) were calculated for the two coders.  Inter-rater reliability was high, with all ICCs 
demonstrating high levels of agreement between coders (visual details, ICC = .96; auditory 
details, ICC = .98; spatial details, ICC = .94; temporal details, ICC = .96; action details, 
ICC = .92; and total number of details, ICC = .98). 
2.3.1.4 Coding for gaze maintenance 
To provide an objective measure of gaze behaviour, two different independent 
judges, using INTERACT 14.0 software (Mangold, 2015), coded all interviews (from start 
to end) for the amount of time (in seconds) that the child interviewees gazed towards the 
interviewer’s face (IF) and the teddy bear’s face (TF).  The duration of these gaze patterns 
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for both face stimuli were then added together to give the total number of seconds spent 
gazing at the IF and the TF for each child.  Percentage of time spent gazing towards both 
the IF and the TF were calculated by taking the total number of seconds spent gazing 
towards each face stimuli, dividing it by the total length of the interview in seconds and 
multiplying it by 100.  Percentage of time spent gazing elsewhere was calculated by adding 
together the percentages for IF and TF and subtracting this total from 100.  First, both 
raters coded 17 interviews (20% of the total) to check for inter-rater reliability.  Inter-rater 
reliability was high for time spent looking at the interviewer’s face (ICC = .99) and at the 
teddy bear’s face (ICC = .91). Rater 1 then coded the next 40% of the video recordings (n 
= 34) and Rater 2 coded the remaining 40% of the video recordings (n = 34).  Percentage 
of time spent gazing at each face stimulus was calculated for each child by dividing the 
time spent gazing at the stimulus (in seconds) by the total duration of the interview (in 
seconds) and multiplying the result by 100. 
2.3.2 Results 
2.3.2.1 Manipulation checks 
All 85 children correctly indicated where they had been asked to look during the 
interview.  To test level of compliance more objectively, two-way ANOVAs were 
performed with Veracity and Gaze Instruction as the between-subjects factors. These were 
conducted to investigate differences in percentage of time spent gazing at (a) the 
interviewer’s face, (b) the teddy bear’s face, and (c) elsewhere (i.e. towards neither face 
stimulus).  Figure 2.1 displays the distribution of gaze behaviour across ‘veracity’ 
conditions and Figure 2.2 across ‘gaze instruction’ conditions. 
 In terms of gazing towards the interviewer’s face, there was a significant main 
effect of Veracity, F(1, 79) = 5.78, p = .019.  Children providing a false report (M = 
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45.80%, SD = 22.41) spent a higher percentage of their interviews looking at the 
interviewer’s face than children providing a true report (M = 35.24%, SD = 23.72), d = .46, 
95% CI [.03, .89].  There was also a significant main effect of Gaze Instruction, F(2, 79) = 
10.50, p<.001.  Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment showed that children 
instructed to look at the interviewer’s face (M = 55.93%, SD = 24.97) spent a greater 
portion of the interview gazing at the interviewer’s face than children instructed to look at 
the teddy bear’s face (M = 31.61%, SD = 23.41, p<.001, d = .98, 95% CI [.42, 1.52], or 
given no gaze instruction (M = 28.71%, SD = 17.49, p = .001, d = 1.04, 95% CI [.47, 
1.59]).  There was no difference between these latter conditions, p = 1.00.  There was no 
significant interaction effect, F(2, 79) = 1.10, p = .34. 
 
Figure 2.1Average percentage of time spent gazing at each face stimulus as a 
function of veracity 
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In terms of gazing towards the teddy bear’s face, there was no significant main 
effect of Veracity, F(1, 79) = .32, p = .57.  There was, however, a significant main effect of 
Gaze Instruction, F(2, 79) = 9.50, p<.001.  Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni 
adjustment showed that instructing children to gaze at the teddy bear’s face (M = 16.77%, 
SD = 18.77) resulted in a higher percentage of time looking at the teddy bear’s face than 
instructing children to look at the interviewer’s face (M = 5.22%, SD = 5.21, p = .001, d = 
.83, 95% CI [.29, 1.37]), or giving no gaze instruction (M = 4.66%, SD = 2.66, p<.001, d = 
.90, 95% CI [.35, 1.44]).  There was no difference between these latter conditions, p = 
1.00.   There was no significant Veracity X Gaze Instruction interaction effect, F(2, 79) = 
.28, p = .76. 
 
Figure 2.2 Average percentage of time spent gazing at each face stimulus as a 
function of gaze instruction 
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Finally, in terms of gazing elsewhere, there was a significant main effect of 
Veracity, F(1, 79) = 7.15, p = .009.  Truth-tellers (M = 56.66%, SD = 24.22) spent a higher 
proportion of the interview looking elsewhere compared to lie-tellers (M = 44.48%, SD = 
21.37), d = .54 (95% CI [.10, .97]).  There was also a significant main effect of Gaze 
Instruction, F(1, 79) = 7.99, p = .001.  Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment 
showed that children given no gaze instruction (M = 61.73%, SD = 17.74) spent more time 
looking elsewhere compared to children instructed to look at the interviewer’s face (M = 
38.85%, SD = 24.21), p<.001, d = 1.08 (95% CI [.51, 1.64]).  Percentage of time looking 
elsewhere did, however, not differ between children in the ‘control’ condition and those in 
the ‘teddy bear’s face’ condition (M = 49.63%, SD = 22.61), p = .10.  There was also no 
significant difference in percentage of time spent gazing elsewhere between children in the 
‘interviewer’s face’ condition and child in the ‘teddy bear’s face condition, p = .20.  There 
was no significant interaction effect, F(2, 79) = .80, p = .45. 
In sum, children were able to comply with the instruction to look at the 
interviewer’s face or the teddy bear’s face.  That said, although our instructions did 
increase time spent gazing toward a specific face stimulus, overall compliance was 
relatively poor as the average participant complied with their gaze instruction for less than 
50% of their interview.  Furthermore, children in the ‘teddy bear’s face’ condition only 
spent 16% of the time looking at their specified stimulus and just as much time looking at 
the interviewer’s face and elsewhere as children in the ‘control’ condition.  This lack of 
compliance may be because gazing at a static toy when responding to a person is an 
unnatural behaviour.  It could also be because the location of the teddy bear was 
problematic; staring at the interviewer’s lap may have seemed strange. 
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2.3.2.2 Hypotheses-testing 
Preliminary analyses revealed no significant effects of child age, child gender, or 
specific activity reported (e.g. sports day, school trip) during the interview, on any of the 
dependent variables.  The data for all participants were, therefore, combined for 
subsequent analyses. 
2.3.2.2.1 Dual task interference 
We investigated whether lie-tellers experienced more dual-task interference than 
truth-tellers, when given the secondary task of maintaining gaze with either the 
interviewer’s face or the teddy bear’s face whilst being questioned.  The ‘performance 
operating characteristic’ (POC, Norman & Bobrow, 1975) of truth-tellers and lie-tellers 
was calculated separately for children in both ‘gaze instruction’ conditions.  By calculating 
Pearson’s correlations between the total number of details included in the interviewee’s 
account (i.e. level of detail) and the time they spent gazing towards either the interviewer’s 
or the teddy bear’s face (i.e. level of gaze compliance), we were able to examine to what 
extent the two tasks interfered with one another.  High levels of interference would be 
characterised by a strong negative correlation between performances on both tasks (i.e. 
increasing compliance with the gaze instruction resulting in decreasing level of detail in 
responses). 
First, when the secondary task required interviewees to look at the interviewer’s 
face, findings revealed a weak, negative correlation for truth-tellers, r = -.28, p = .40, and a 
small to moderate, positive correlation for lie-tellers, r = .39, p = .16.  Although these 
correlations are not significant, this may be due to the effect of a limited sample size.  
Following the suggestion of Ferguson (2009), we therefore looked at the effect size of 
these correlations as “effect sizes are resistant to sample size influence, and thus provide a 
truer measure of the magnitude of effect between variables” (p. 532).  Interpreting these r 
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values as effect sizes (Field, 2013), the data showed that there was a small effect for truth-
tellers and a medium effect for lie-tellers.  This suggests that there was mild interference 
between truth-tellers’ ability to provide detailed answers and their compliance with the 
gaze instruction.  However, it also shows that there was no interference for lie-tellers, 
whose level of detail in fact increased with their level of compliance with the gaze 
instruction.  Second, when interviewees were instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face, 
there was no correlation between level of detail and compliance with the gaze instruction 
for truth-tellers, r = -.04, p = .91, nor for lie-tellers, r = .08, p = .78. 
2.3.2.2.2 Level of detail 
Preliminary analyses showed that true reports (M = 750.79, SD = 670.31) contained 
significantly more words than false reports (M = 508.33, SD = 560.88), t(83) = 1.82, p = 
.037, d = .40 (95% CI [-.37, .82]).  As longer reports allow for more details to occur, length 
of statement would have an effect on our analysis of total detail.  To take this effect into 
account, length of statement (in words) was entered as a covariate in our analyses.  This is 
similar to previous work by Strömwall and Granhag (2005) when analysing reality 
monitoring scores. 
First, a 2 (Veracity) x 3 (Gaze Instruction) ANCOVA was performed with total 
number of details as the dependent variable.  There was a significant main effect of 
Veracity, F(1, 78) = 8.44, p = .005, a significant main effect of Gaze Instruction, F(2, 78) = 
3.16, p = .048, and a significant Veracity X Gaze Instruction interaction effect, F(2, 78) = 
4.22, p = .018.  Descriptive statistics for each of the experimental cells are displayed in 
Table 2.1. 
Of interest for the hypotheses is the Veracity X Gaze Instruction interaction effect.  
Separate ANCOVAs were conducted: first, for each of the Gaze Instruction conditions 
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with Veracity as the independent variable, and second, for each of the Veracity conditions 
with Gaze Instruction as the independent variable.  When children were instructed to gaze 
at the interviewer’s face, truth-tellers provided significantly more details compared to lie-
tellers, F(1, 25) = 8.53, p = .007, d = .92 (95% CI [.13, 1.70]).  Similarly, when children 
were instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face, truth-tellers provided more details in their 
statements than lie-tellers, F(1, 26) = 5.88, p = .023, d = .83 (95% CI [.058, 1.59]). 
Veracity did not have a significant effect on the number of details provided by children 
who were given no gaze instruction, F(1, 25) = .24, p = .63.   Irrespective of whether they 
were providing a true report or a false report, children in the control condition included the 
same amount of detail. 
Table 2.1 
Mean and Standard Deviations for Total Number of Details as a Function of Veracity and 
Gaze Instruction  
 True Report False Report Total 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Interviewer's face 178.77 152.50 79.00 42.91 125.32 117.72 
Teddy bear's face 152.46 86.93 92.94 56.81 119.62 76.65 
Control 117.15 99.39 114.80 119.17 115.89 108.42 
Total 95.52 79.27 149.46 116.21 120.27 101.03 
 
For children who provided a truthful account, there was a significant effect of Gaze 
Instruction condition, F(2, 35) = 4.04, p = .026.  Post-hoc testing using Bonferroni 
adjustment revealed that truth-tellers who looked at the interviewer’s face provided more 
details than truth-tellers who were given no gaze instruction, p = .03, d = .48 (95% CI [-
.31, 1.25]).  There was no difference in quantity of detail between truth-tellers looking at 
the interviewer’s face and those looking at the teddy bear’s face, p = 1.00, and no 
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difference between truth-tellers looking at the teddy bear’s face and those in the control 
condition, p = .14.  For children who provided a fabricated account, there was no 
significant effect of Gaze Instruction, F(2, 35) = .55, p = .58. 
2.3.3 Discussion 
The analysis of the association between providing a detailed account and 
complying with the gaze instruction revealed a small positive effect for lie-tellers in the 
‘interviewer’s face’ condition.  That is, the more the lie-tellers looked at the interviewer’s 
face the more details they gave.  This was contrary to Hypothesis 1.  Furthermore, the 
instruction to look at the teddy bear’s face did not elicit dual task interference for the lie-
tellers nor for the truth-tellers.  Our theoretical assumption posited that lie-tellers, who 
have a more cognitively demanding primary task compared to truth-tellers, would reach 
the limit of their resources when a secondary task was imposed (Knowles, 1963), and, 
therefore, experience a high level of dual-task interference (Kahneman, 1973).  However, 
our analysis of lie-tellers’ dual-task interference does not support this theoretical 
assumption.  Indeed, the positive relationship between level of detail and gaze compliance 
for lie-tellers instructed to look at the interviewer’s face completely contradicts our 
hypothesis.  This could be due to the cognitive resources required for each task originating 
from separate (limited) resources.  Multiple resource theory (Wickens, 2002) posits that 
tasks that are structurally dissimilar, such as answering interview questions (verbal) and 
maintaining gaze (visual/social), will interfere less.  This may explain why imposing 
cognitive load through constructing/maintaining a lie (verbal) and telling the lie in reverse 
order (verbal) had greater success in previous studies (Saykaly et al., 2016; Vrij et al., 
2008) because the two tasks use similar cognitive processes. 
An alternative explanation could be that the effect of gaze maintenance on task 
performance can vary dependent on the relevance of the visual stimulus to the primary task 
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(Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2001).  It could be the case, in the current study, that child lie-
tellers instructed to look towards the interviewer’s face found the information 
communicated by her face more task-relevant than truth-tellers.  Lie-tellers, who are more 
concerned with appearing honest than truth-tellers (Vrij, 2015), might have monitored the 
interviewer’s face for feedback on how their deception was being received and used this to 
modify their responses (e.g. to say more to appear honest).  However, this tactic works to 
their disadvantage, as longer statements are more likely to contain cues to deceit (Vrij et 
al., 2015).  This would particularly be the case for child interviewees who tend to reveal 
their deceit verbally (Talwar & Lee, 2002).  Furthermore, these unanticipated findings 
might be explained by differences in children’s developing cognitive capabilities that are 
associated with lie-telling ability, such as executive functioning (Talwar & Crossman, 
2011).  Child lie-tellers in our study may have had good working memory skills that 
allowed them to look at the interviewer’s face whilst telling their false report.  Future 
research should investigate whether the effects of imposing cognitive load are moderated 
by children’s growing cognitive development. 
Interestingly, truth-tellers instructed to look at the interviewer’s face did experience 
some dual-task interference.  This unexpected finding requires further investigation.  As 
memory can be data-limited (i.e. limited by a person’s ability to recall a past experience), it 
could be that factors other than gaze compliance influenced our child truth-tellers’ ability 
to provide a detailed account.  Finally, the absence of dual-task interference for children 
instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face could be explained by the teddy bear’s face not 
being as cognitively effortful to look at as the interviewer’s face.  As the teddy bear’s face 
did not provide any relevant feedback, it was not necessary for the interviewees to monitor 
it for suspicion.  Nevertheless, we suggest caution in interpreting these correlations due to 
their non-significant nature.  
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 Irrespective of the findings for dual-task interference, significant differences in 
level of detail between child truth-tellers and child lie-tellers were only elicited when a 
secondary task was imposed.  For children instructed to look at the interviewer’s face, 
these findings are in line with previous work with adults (Vrij et al., 2010), which has also 
found exaggerated behavioural differences between truths and lies when gaze was 
maintained.  For children instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face, these findings extend 
current knowledge and demonstrate that gazing towards a non-human stimulus could act as 
a less threatening, but still effective, substitute in practice.  Although exaggerated 
differences occurred when a dual-task was imposed, it remains unclear from a theoretical 
standpoint why this was the case.  The dual-task processes involved in providing a 
narrative and maintaining gaze require further examination to understand the theory behind 
this effect.  Indeed, further probing of the significant interaction suggests that using 
different gaze instructions does not have an effect on false reports but rather has an effect 
on true reports.  Thus, these exaggerated differences could be due to gaze maintenance 
facilitating longer truthful accounts rather than inhibiting false accounts.  Our findings 
suggest that the request to look at the interviewer’s face elicited true reports that were 
significantly more detailed than when no gaze instruction was provided.  This may be due 
to the demeanour of our interviewer; supportive interviewers have been shown to elicit 
longer reports (Vrij, 2015).  However, it is not within the scope of this research to draw 
any firm conclusions regarding these results.  Furthermore, these findings should be 
interpreted with caution.  Due to small experimental cell sizes, there is a risk of Type I 
error.  This study, therefore, requires replication with a larger sample size to verify that the 
interaction effect remains significant. 
 In this study we were not able to examine the memory accuracy of the truth-tellers’ 
detailed reports.  Based on the information provided by the schools, we were only able to 
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establish whether the children had taken part in the events or not, but, due to the scope of 
the events, we were unable to capture all of the information regarding the events to code 
for correct and incorrect details.  Future research is required to explore the relevance and 
accuracy of the reports provided by truth-tellers in the ‘gaze instruction’ conditions to 
understand the specific benefits of eliciting more details in true reports. 
In the current study the interview protocol was short and non-elaborative.  Using 
open-ended questions did allow us to go beyond the majority of past research, which has 
primarily focused on forced-choice questions using temptation resistance paradigms, to 
examine how gaze maintenance would affect children’s longer narratives.  However, this 
does not reflect interview protocols in real-life police investigations with child witnesses, 
where a variety of question types are used.  We can, therefore, not generalize these 
findings to a whole police interview, but only to the beginning of the police interview 
where an uninterrupted free narrative is requested.  Finally, our study represents a ‘best 
case scenario’ in which a child provides a long narrative.  As we reduced our interview 
protocol to focus on two open-ended questions, it was important to facilitate long 
responses by providing all of the children with examples of the type of information they 
could provide and some time to prepare.  Child witnesses typically provide shorter 
statements than both their adolescent and adult counterparts (Jack, Leov & Zajac, 2014); 
this may be due to them not knowing what level of detail is required at interview (Lamb, 
Orbach, Hershkowitz, Esplin & Horowitz , 2007). Future research should continue to test 
the generalizability of these findings by using a procedure where no examples are 
provided. 
Despite the exaggerated difference in level of detail elicited between child truth-
tellers and child lie-tellers in the dual-task gaze condition (compared to the single-task 
control condition), the major concern still remained whether evaluators would be able to 
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discriminate between lie-tellers and truth-tellers more effectively when child interviewees 
were instructed to maintain gaze compared to when no gaze instructions were given.  We 
investigated this issue in Experiment 2. 
2.4 Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we tested the prediction that evaluators would discriminate better 
between truth-tellers and lie-tellers instructed to maintain gaze, than truth-tellers and lie-
tellers who were given no gaze instruction (Hypothesis 3). 
We also examined whether telling evaluators that truth-tellers provide more detail 
in their reports than lie-tellers would improve discrimination accuracy.  Previous research 
into training to improve lie detection has shown that informing evaluators about 
empirically-supported verbal cues to deceit has the largest effect on their detection 
accuracy (Hauch, Sporer, Michael & Meissner, 2014).  Overall, level of detail has been 
found to be a key indicator of veracity (DePaulo et al., 2003).  It is also one of the general 
characteristics coded for in Criteria-Based Content Analysis (Steller & Köhnken, 1989) 
that has received the most support for distinguishing between child truth-tellers and child 
lie-tellers in the predicted direction (Vrij 2005).  It was, therefore, anticipated that 
evaluators who received this guidance regarding detail would demonstrate better 
discrimination than evaluators who received no guidance (Hypothesis 4).  It was further 
predicted that an improvement in discrimination, as a result of guidance, would be most 
pronounced when judging the credibility of children instructed to maintain gaze, due to a 
greater difference in detail being elicited in these conditions in Experiment 1 (Hypothesis 
5). 
Successful discrimination depends on whether evaluators can interpret behavioural 
cues correctly.  It was, therefore, important to recognise that gaze aversion can be 
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perceived as a strong indicator of deception (Global Deception Research Team, 2006), 
even though this cue is non-diagnostic (DePaulo et al., 2003).  We could not rule out the 
possibility that gaze behaviour perceived to be somewhat ‘strange’ might impact on 
evaluators’ judgments of credibility.  Half of the evaluators were, therefore, played visual-
audio clips of the children’s interviews, and the other half were played audio-only clips.  
We anticipated that evaluators who watched the visual-audio presentations displaying the 
gaze maintenance behaviour would demonstrate a truth bias because gaze maintenance 
might be interpreted as a sign of truthfulness (Vrij et al., 2010) (Hypothesis 6). 
2.4.1 Method 
2.4.1.1 Participants 
A sample of 192 adult evaluators (89 males, 103 females) with an age range of 18 
to 76 years (M = 27.14 years, SD = 11.71 years) was recruited.  One hundred and ten 
participants (52% of the total sample) were undergraduate students who received 0.5 
course credit for their participation.  The further 82 participants were members of the 
general public recruited via convenience sampling.  The non-student participants were not 
compensated for their participation. 
2.4.1.2 Interview clips 
A total of 30 interview clips were selected from the sample of 85 children in 
Experiment 1. There were ten clips per ‘Gaze Instruction’ condition; within each of those 
three sets of ten clips, there were five truth-tellers and five lie-tellers.  In the first round of 
the interview clip selection process, all recordings that contained noise interference (e.g. 
school bell, road traffic) were excluded (n = 20).  Second, clips in which the first free recall 
lasted longer than 300 seconds were removed (n = 7).  This criterion was chosen to limit 
the total duration of the study (50 minutes maximum), reducing potential fatigue effects on 
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evaluators’ performance.  The remaining 58 clips were divided by Gaze Instruction 
condition (IF, n = 22; TF, n = 16; CONTROL, n = 20), and five truth-tellers and five lie-
tellers were randomly selected for each condition.  The final thirty clips were edited down 
so that they only contained the child interviewee’s first free recall.  This selection process 
resulted in an even distribution of gender (3 boys to 2 girls, or 2 boys to 3 girls) in each 
Veracity x Gaze Instruction cell, except for the false reports in the ‘control’ condition, 
which were all provided by boys.  It was not anticipated that this would bias results as no 
response bias has been previously found for adults judging boys’ credibility (Talwar, 
Crossman, Gulmi, Renaud & Williams, 2009).  Interview clips lasted from 53 seconds to 
239 seconds (M = 135.67 seconds, SD = 56.16 seconds).  A 2 (Veracity) x 3 (Gaze 
Instruction) ANOVA was performed to ensure that there were no significant differences in 
length of clip across conditions.  There was no significant main effect of Veracity, F(1, 24) 
= .13, p = .72, no significant main effect of Gaze Instruction, F(2, 24) = .05, p = .96, and 
there was no significant Veracity X Gaze Instruction interaction effect, F(2, 24) = .62, p = 
.55.  For each ’gaze instruction’ condition, four random rotations of the ten clips were 
created to reduce order effects. 
2.4.1.3 Guidance on detail 
Evaluators who received guidance were provided with a sheet stating that truth-
tellers provided more detail overall in their accounts compared to lie-tellers, as this has 
been reported in previous deception research (DePaulo et al., 2003) and was also found in 
Experiment 1.  To help evaluators understand what the experiment meant by the term 
‘detail’, five different types of detail were presented in a table.  For each type of detail, a 
description and an example of that detail were provided (i.e. ‘visual detail refers to what 
the interviewee said that they saw.  For example, a red hat contains two visual details’).  
Participants were advised to refer back to the guidance sheet as much as they found useful 
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when watching/listening to the interview clips and were able to ask the experimenter for 
clarification on these types of detail before and during the experiment. 
2.4.1.4 Procedure 
The study took place in a quiet environment with few distractions.  In order to 
prevent evaluators from working on the assumption that they would be presented with 
equal numbers of truth-tellers and lie-tellers, two steps were taken.  First, participants were 
informed that they would be asked to evaluate the veracity of twelve child interviews in 
turn (actually they only evaluated ten clips in total).  Second, they were told that it was just 
as likely for a child to be telling the truth as it was for them to be telling a lie. 
First, evaluators were randomly assigned to a Gaze Instruction condition.  That is, 
they judged the credibility of ten interview clips (five truth-tellers and five lie-tellers) from 
only one of the Gaze Instruction conditions in Experiment 1 (IF vs. TF vs. Control).  
Evaluators who were provided with guidance on detail received this at the beginning of the 
experiment.  Half of the evaluators watched all of the interview clips in visual-audio 
format, whilst the other half listened to all interview clips in audio-only format.  
Participants who watched visual-audio presentations of the interviewees in the 
‘interviewer’s face’ and the ‘teddy bear’s face’ conditions were informed that the child 
interviewees had been asked by the experimenter to direct their gaze during the interviews.  
Evaluators then watched and/or listened to the clips, one at a time, via a computer.  
Headphones were provided.  To record their credibility judgments, evaluators were given a 
hard copy answer booklet.  Following each interview clip, evaluators were asked to decide 
if the child interviewee was lying or telling the truth. 
Participants’ dichotomous judgments (truth or lie) for each clip were used to 
measure hits (proportion of deceitful clips correctly identified as deceitful) and false alarms 
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(proportion of truthful clips incorrectly identified as deceitful) for subsequent signal 
detection analysis. 
2.4.2 Results 
2.4.2.1 Accuracy 
Overall accuracy (M = 51.72%, SD = 16.23) was not significantly different from 
chance, t(191) = 1.47, p = .14, but truth accuracy (M = 60.62%, SD = 20.56) was 
significantly above chance, t(191) = 7.16, p<.001, d = .52 (95% CI [.37, .67]), and lie 
accuracy (M = 42.81%, SD = 21.23) was significantly below chance, t(191) = -4.69, 
p<.001, d= .34 (95% CI [.19, .48]).  When evaluators judged the credibility of children 
instructed to look at the interviewer’s face (M = 58.91%, SD = 16.44), they performed 
significantly better than chance, t(63) = 4.33, p <.001, d = .54 (95% CI [.28, .80]).  When 
judging children instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face (M = 47.97%, SD = 15.45) or 
children given no gaze instruction (M = 48.28% SD = 14.54), they were no better than 
chance (ps>.05).  Moreover, when evaluators were guided to look out for differences in 
detail (M = 53.96%, SD = 17.07), they were better than chance, t(95) = 2.27, p = .025, d = 
.23 (95% CI [.03, .43]), but not when no guidance was provided (M = 49.48%, SD = 
15.11), t(95) = -.34, p = .74. 
2.4.2.2 Signal detection analysis 
The application of signal detection theory to deception detection research has been 
largely recommended because it provides an opportunity to measure two conceptually 
different parameters of accuracy (Meissner & Kassin, 2002); discrimination accuracy - 
ability to discriminate lie-tellers from truth-tellers (in this experiment, referred to as d’), 
and response bias – tendencies to favour a particular response (truth or lie), in this 
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experiment, referred to as β.  Means and standard deviations for discrimination accuracy 
and response bias across all conditions are displayed in Table 2.2. 
2.4.2.2.1 Discrimination accuracy 
A 3 (Gaze Instruction) x 2 (Guidance Provision) ANOVA was performed with 
participants’ sensitivity scores (d’) as the dependent variable to examine their ability to 
discriminate between truth- and lie-tellers. 
First, there was a significant main effect of Gaze Instruction, F(2, 180) = 10.84, 
p<.001.  Post-hoc analyses using Bonferroni adjustment revealed that evaluators 
discriminated better between children’s truthful and deceptive accounts when the 
interviewees were instructed to look at the interviewer’s face compared to when the 
interviewees were instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face, p<.001, d = .66 (95% CI [.30, 
1.02]), and when the interviewees were given no particular gaze instruction, p<.001, d = 
.67 (95% CI [.32, 1.03]).  Evaluators’ performance did not differ significantly between 
those instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face and for those given no instruction (p = 
1.00). 
Second, there was a significant main effect of Guidance Provision, F(1, 180) = 
4.20, p = .042.  Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment showed that evaluators 
who received guidance discriminated better between veracity groups than evaluators who 
received no guidance, d = .27 (95% CI [-.014, .55]). 
Finally, there was a significant Gaze Instruction X Guidance Provision interaction 
effect, F(2, 180) = 4.88, p = .009.  We performed univariate analyses to test the effect of 
providing guidance within each Gaze Instruction condition.  There was a significant main 
effect of Guidance Provision for evaluators judging the credibility of child interviewees 
instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face, F(1, 62) = 12.10, p = .001. For evaluators in the 
‘teddy bear’s face’ condition, those who received guidance (M = .22, SD = .76) were able 
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to discriminate better than those who received no guidance (M = -.38, SD = .63), d = .87 
(95% CI [.35, 1.38]).  There was no significant main effect of Guidance Provision for 
evaluators assigned to the ‘interviewer’s face’ condition, F(1, 62) = 1.27, p = .26, or the 
‘control’ condition, F(1, 62) = 1.15, p = .29.  There were no other significant interaction 
effects (p-values >.05). 
In a second level of analysis, d’ values were compared to 0 (no ability to 
differentiate between children’s truths and lies) using one-sample t tests.  With regard to 
Gaze Instruction, evaluators could reliably discriminate child truth-tellers from child lie-
tellers in the ‘interviewer’s face’ condition, t(63) = 4.32, p<.001, d = .54 (95% CI [.28, 
.80]), but not in the ‘teddy bear’s face’ condition, t(63) = -.87, p = .39, nor the ‘no gaze 
instruction’ condition, t(63) = -.87, p = .38. For Guidance Provision, evaluators were able 
to discriminate reliably when provided with guidance, t(95) = 2.30, p = .024, d = .23 (95% 
CI [.03, .44]), but not when guidance was withheld, t(95) = -.20, p = .84. 
Finally, we compared d’ scores to 0 for the significant interaction between Gaze 
Instruction and Guidance Provision.  When evaluators judged the credibility of children 
instructed to look at the interviewer’s face, they were able to discriminate lie-tellers from 
truth-tellers whether guidance was provided (M = .55, SD = .85), t(31) = 3.63, p = .001, d = 
.64 (95% CI [.26, .1.02]), or not (M = .32, SD = .75), t(31) = 2.43, p = .021, d = .43 (95% 
CI [.063, .79]).  For children instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face, evaluators were not 
able to discriminate between children’s truths and lies when provided with guidance (M = 
.22, SD = .76), t(31) = 1.65, p = .11, nor when there was no guidance provision (M = -.38, 
SD = .63), t(31) = -3.46, p = .002, d = .61 (95% CI [.23, .98]).  That is, evaluators labelled 
the groups incorrectly (i.e. they tended to label lie-tellers as truthful and truth-tellers as 
deceitful).  Finally, when children were given no gaze instructions, evaluators were not 
able to discriminate truthful from fabricated reports, with guidance provision, (M = -.17, 
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SD = .78), t(31) = -1.25, p = .22, or without guidance provision, (M = .018, SD = .64), t(31) 
= .16, p = .88. 
2.4.2.2.2 Response bias 
Participants’ response bias (β scores) was investigated to see whether they tended 
to identify children as lie-tellers or truth-tellers in any particular condition.  A three-way 
ANOVA, with Gaze Instruction, Guidance Provision and Modality of Presentation of the 
clips as between-subjects factors, revealed significant main effects of Gaze Instruction, 
F(2, 180) = 5.05, p = .007, and Modality of Presentation, F(1, 180) = 6.55, p = .011.  First, 
responses were more biased when judging the credibility of children instructed to look at 
the interviewer’s face (M = 1.21, SD = .49) compared to children instructed to look at the 
teddy bear’s face (M = 1.02, SD = .37), p = .020, d = .46 (95% CI [.10, .81]), and children 
given no particular gaze instruction (M = 1.01, SD = .38, 95% CI [.92, 1.11]), p = .019, d = 
.45 (95% CI [.10, .80]).  Response bias did not significantly differ between evaluators 
judging child credibility in the latter two gaze conditions (p = 1.00).  Second, evaluators 
demonstrated more bias in the ‘audio-only’ condition (M = 1.16, SD = .48) than in the 
‘video-audio’ condition (M = 1.01, SD = .35), d = .36 (95% CI [.07, .64]).  There was no 
significant main effect of Guidance Provision and there were no significant interaction 
effects (p-values >.10). 
Using one-sample t tests, each β was compared to 1 (no bias).  In signal detection 
theory, β values below 1 signify a tendency to respond yes (or lie in the current study), 
whereas values above 1 signify a tendency to respond no (or truth in the current study; 
Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999).  Therefore, the subsequent analyses examined the existence 
and the nature of the bias.  With regard to Gaze Instruction, evaluators who judged the 
credibility of children instructed to look at the interviewer’s face were significantly biased 
to respond ‘truth’, t(63) = 3.46, p = .001, d = .43 (95% CI [.18, .69]), whereas no 
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significant response bias was found for evaluators who judged children instructed to look 
at the teddy bear’s face, t(63) = .35, p = .73, nor for evaluators who judged children in the 
‘no gaze instruction’ condition, t(63) = .30, p = .77.  In terms of Modality of Presentation, 
evaluators in the ‘audio only’ condition displayed a significant truth bias, t(95) = 3.18, p = 
.002, d = .33 (95% CI [.12, .53), whereas evaluators in the ‘video-audio’ condition showed 
no bias, t(95) = .17, p = .87. 
2.4.3 Discussion 
Instructing child interviewees to maintain gaze with the interviewer’s face enabled 
evaluators to discriminate between true and false reports to a better degree than when no 
Table 2.2 
Discrimination Accuracy (d') and Response Bias (β) as a Function of Gaze Instruction, 
Guidance Provision and Modality of Presentation 
 d'  β 
  M SD   M SD 
Gaze Instruction      
Look at interviewer's face .43*** .80  1.21** .49 
Look at teddy bear's face -.08 .75  1.02 .37 
No instruction (control) -.08 .71  1.01 .38 
      
Guidance Provision      
Yes .20* .84  1.12 .48 
No -.02 .73  1.05 .36 
      
Modality of Presentation      
Video-audio -.04 .77  1.01 .35 
Audio only  .22** .80    1.16**   .48 
Note. Statistical tests compared d' to 0 and β to 1. 
* p<.05  ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
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instruction was given, in spite of a significant truth bias.  However, discrimination 
accuracy was not affected when child interviewees were instructed to gaze towards the 
teddy’s bear face.  Thus, Hypothesis 3 was partially supported.  The ability to accurately 
detect deception for evaluators rating children instructed to gaze at the interviewer’s face 
may be due to differences in details provided by child truth-tellers and child lie-tellers.  
The cognitive lie detection approach posits that the ability to discriminate between truths 
and lies should increase with the activation and exaggeration of cognitive behavioural 
differences (Vrij, 2015).  Considering that significant behavioural differences were elicited 
for both children instructed to look at the interviewer’s face and children instructed to look 
at the teddy bear’s face, it is possible that the exaggeration of these cues might need to 
reach a certain threshold, beyond which they become more apparent to an evaluator.  It is 
possible that this threshold was only reached when child interviewees were instructed to 
look at the interviewer’s face, in turn, facilitating evaluators’ credibility judgments, but the 
threshold was not met when the children were asked to look at the teddy bear’s face. 
Informing evaluators that truth-tellers provide more detailed reports compared to 
lie-tellers did improve their ability to detect deception, thus supporting Hypothesis 4.  
However, it is difficult to conclude to what extent evaluators applied this guidance to the 
interview clips.  Although training in verbal content cues is recommended because it leads 
to the highest training effects, it is also important to note that false information regarding 
cues to deceit can work as effectively as true information (Hauch et al., 2014).  To 
encourage evaluators to engage more with the guidance and base their final credibility 
judgments on this specific information, it would be better to use methods such as the 
Psychologically Based Credibility Assessment Tool (Evans, Michael, Meissner & 
Brandon, 2013) that include the rating of diagnostic cues in the final credibility 
assessment. 
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Contrary to Hypothesis 5, the provision of guidance was not more beneficial when 
judging children who were instructed to maintain gaze compared to those in the ‘control’ 
condition.  Indeed, the only benefit of providing guidance was that it protected evaluators 
in the ‘teddy bear’s face’ condition from incorrectly labelling child veracity.  As children 
in this condition were neither maintaining eye contact, nor free to look where they wished, 
their ‘strange’ gaze behaviour of looking at the interviewer’s lap might have been 
interpreted incorrectly as suspicious.  Directing evaluators’ attention towards what the 
child was saying, through the use of our guidance, and encouraging them to base their 
credibility judgments on the child’s verbal behaviour, may have detracted from the 
misinterpretation of their ‘strange’ gazing towards the teddy bear. 
Finally, although we predicted in Hypothesis 6 that evaluators who watched the 
visual-audio presentations displaying the gaze maintenance behaviour would demonstrate a 
truth bias, this was not the case.  This lack of truth bias might be due to evaluators 
interpreting gaze maintenance behaviour differently from that suggested by the general 
deception literature.  On the one hand, gaze aversion is believed to be a cue to deceit 
(Global Deception Research Team, 2006), but, on the other hand, nonverbal behaviour that 
deviates from the expected norm, such as staring, can also be perceived to be ‘fishy’ (Bond 
et al., 1992).  It is not known to what extent gaze behaviour influenced evaluators’ 
judgments, or how much suspicion evaluators attached to this nonverbal cue; however, the 
lack of bias might suggest that opposing interpretations may have cancelled each other out.  
Alternatively, informing evaluators that children had been instructed to divert their gaze 
may have made them more aware of their own bias. 
For the current study evaluators were exposed to ten interview clips.  This may 
have led to evaluators comparing cues and information across interviews.  In real police 
investigations and court proceedings, it is likely that these comparisons will occur between 
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children’s statements, adult’s statements and physical evidence.  Future research should try 
to replicate this scenario to understand how a police officer or juror might judge the 
credibility of a child both in isolation and in comparison to other sources. 
2.5 General Discussion 
We conducted the first empirical investigation exploring the use of gaze 
maintenance to detect deception in child witnesses during investigative interviews.  Similar 
to Vrij et al. (2010), we predicted that the interview strategy would magnify differences in 
level of detail between children’s true and false reports.  We also expected that the 
exaggeration of this cue would facilitate evaluators’ ability to discriminate children’s lies 
from truths. 
 The present findings show that gaze maintenance can be effective for determining 
the credibility of child witnesses.  In Experiment 1, lie-tellers provided significantly fewer 
details in their reports compared to truth-tellers but only when they were instructed to look 
towards either the interviewer’s face or a teddy bear’s face.  No significant difference was 
elicited when a secondary task was absent.  In Experiment 2, we found that the 
exaggeration of this diagnostic cue facilitated evaluators’ discrimination accuracy, but this 
was only when children were instructed to look at the interviewer’s face. 
Theoretically, the effect of imposing a secondary task on interviewee performance 
remains unclear.  The findings of Experiment 2 make it difficult to discern whether the 
secondary task had any negative impact on truth-tellers’ memory or whether lie-tellers 
experienced any additional cognitive load.  The latter issue may be due to the nature of the 
secondary task in this study and the difficulty in pinning down the exact cognitive 
mechanisms involved.  As previously mentioned, the development of certain cognitive 
skills is closely linked to children’s proficiency to tell and maintain lies (Talwar & 
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Crossman, 2011).  It may therefore be wise, in future, to provide cognitive measures of the 
specific executive functions that the imposed secondary task aims to affect to be able to 
establish whether (a) there is a link between these cognitive skills and the performance on 
the tasks, and (b) whether children’s ability to perform these cognitive skills predicts the 
effectiveness of imposing cognitive load. When testing dual-task methodologies, it would 
also be beneficial to obtain baseline measures of an individual’s performance on single 
tasks (Task A only and Task B only) to which their performance on a dual-task (Tasks A 
and B simultaneously) could be compared. 
Our findings provide further support for the practical value of manipulating 
cognitive load as a potential means for discriminating between children’s true and false 
reports.  In particular, the results demonstrate that the effects of imposing cognitive load 
are not limited to asking children to tell their stories backwards.  This is beneficial because 
Saykaly et al. (2016) found that reverse order recall can adversely affect the accuracy of 
both truthful and deceptive statements, suggesting that it might not be helpful in real police 
investigations.  In our study, requiring child interviewees to perform the secondary task of 
maintaining gaze had a positive effect on truth-tellers, eliciting more information from 
them than when no gaze instruction was given.  This finding is in line with the primary 
goal of any investigative interview, which is to elicit as much information as possible from 
the interviewee.  This finding could be due the interviewer’s supportive demeanour, which 
has been found with adults to elicit more details from truth-tellers than lie-tellers (Mann et 
al., 2013).  Further investigation is required to determine whether it is the combined effect 
of a gaze maintenance instruction to witnesses and supportive interviewer behaviour that 
helps truth-tellers but not lie-tellers, rather than the technique on its own. 
A practical limitation of using gaze maintenance with child interviewees may be its 
appropriateness in certain contexts.  Maintaining gaze with an authoritative figure, such as 
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a police officer, might be an intimidating task for children.  Although none of the children 
instructed to look at the interviewer’s face reported any discomfort, the average child did 
not maintain gaze for more than half of their interview.  A recent school event is far less 
traumatic to talk about than incidents of physical and/or sexual abuse, which can be the 
main focus of police investigations involving child witnesses.  Future research must 
examine the scope of the beneficial effects elicited in this study and balance them with 
potential discomfort in certain contexts.  As such, the preliminary findings relating to an 
instruction to concentrate on the less intimidating teddy bear (or similar) should be 
extended. 
Maintaining gaze, particularly with an interviewer’s face, is an effective strategy 
for judging the credibility of children.  Future research should continue to explore the 
application of dual-task processing to child interviews by examining strategies that target 
children’s under-developed executive functioning, with a view to creating more 
appropriate secondary tasks for this potentially sensitive context. 
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Chapter 3: ‘Truly crime-relevant’: Using a 
model statement in an eyewitness context to 
differentiate between children’s true and false 
reports 
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3.1 Abstract 
Encouraging interviewee productivity using a model statement (i.e. by providing an 
example of a detailed report) elicits more truthful information as well as more verbal cues 
to veracity in adults.   The aim of this study was to investigate whether using a model 
statement could also create ‘productive’ child interviewees whilst at the same time helping 
to exaggerate differences between their true and false reports in an eyewitness context.  
Sixty-three children aged 8 to 10 years old were interviewed about the staged theft of a 
mobile phone that they had (truth-tellers), or had not (lie-tellers) witnessed.  At interview, 
children provided two free recall attempts: a baseline recall, pre-model statement, and a 
second recall, post-model statement.  Both truth-tellers’ and lie-tellers’ statements were 
longer and more detailed post-model statement than pre-model statement.  True reports 
contained a higher proportion of crime-relevant information overall, and were consistently 
more forensically useful (i.e. included a higher proportion of repeated crime-relevant 
information) than false reports.  In terms of the quality of truth-tellers’ eyewitness 
memory, there was no difference in the amount of correct information provided across 
recall attempts, but there was an increase in incorrect information, resulting in a decrease 
in memory accuracy after the model statement had been heard.  Playing child interviewees 
a model statement increases their productivity, and preserves differences in the forensic 
usefulness of the information truth-tellers and lie-tellers provide as well as the consistency 
of this information.  However, using a model statement in an eyewitness context highlights 
how children’s pursuit of being informative might cause them to sacrifice the accuracy of 
their report. 
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3.2 Introduction 
From as young as four years old, children demonstrate impressive abilities to 
provide substantial amounts of forensically relevant information during interviews (Lamb 
et al., 2003).  Nevertheless, when compared to both adolescents (14-16 years) and adults 
(25-60 years), children (9-11 years), although equally accurate, are found to provide 
statements that are significantly less detailed than their older counterparts (Jack, Leov & 
Zajac, 2014).  The brevity of children’s reports is problematic for investigators, who then 
have fewer leads to follow up. This also puts the child witnesses at a disadvantage in court, 
as statements that are richer in detail are the most likely to be believed (Bell & Loftus, 
1989; Johnson, 2006).  Inaccurate judgments of children’s credibility are a major issue in 
both police and court settings, with legal professionals experiencing much difficulty when 
it comes to determining the veracity of children’s statements (Bala, Ramakrishnan, 
Lindsay & Lee, 2005; Leach, Talwar, Lee, Bala & Lindsay, 2004).  New cognitive 
strategies, such as using a model statement, could facilitate this decision-making process 
by exaggerating the subtle differences that occur between true and false reports (Vrij, 
Fisher & Blank, 2015).  This would be particularly beneficial in the early stages of an 
investigation to save both time and resources.  Moreover, at the beginning of 
investigations, child truth-tellers’ reports are the most accurate (Bruck, Ceci & Principe, 
2006), and differences in children’s truth- and lie-telling behaviours are most likely to 
occur (Saykaly, Talwar, Lindsay, Bala & Lee, 2013). 
3.2.1 Using a model statement 
A model statement refers to a recorded statement, presented to an interviewee, of a 
spontaneous, detailed recall of another person (in this study another child) describing 
his/her experience of an event that is unrelated to the witnessed event (Leal, Vrij, 
Warmelink, Vernham & Fisher, 2015) and is a cognitive lie detection technique aimed at 
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encouraging interviewees to provide more information (Vrij, 2015).  The underlying 
assumption is that listening to a model statement will change both truth-tellers’ and lie-
tellers’ views on what is expected from them at interview.  In both an adult insurance 
context (Leal et al., 2015) and a security context (Ewens et al., 2016), model statements 
provided by a peer (i.e. another adult) have elicited more information from interviewees. 
The benefits of these more informative statements are two-fold: First, they elicit more 
truthful information, and second, false reports can become easier to detect.  For example, 
Leal et al. (2015) found that the additional detail given by the liars made them appear less 
plausible.  These findings highlight the potential for the model statement to resolve the 
aforementioned issues with child testimonies; namely, their brevity and their perceived 
credibility by legal professionals.  It also suggests that using a model statement can be an 
effective truth detection technique as well as an effect lie detection technique. 
3.2.2 Interviewee productivity 
Interviewee productivity, here, refers to an interviewee’s response length as well as 
the amount of detail they provide in their report.  When the model statement was used with 
adult interviewees, Leal et al. (2015) found that interviewee productivity increased for both 
truth-tellers and lie-tellers.  However, the effect of playing the model statement may trigger 
different processes for truth-tellers and lie-tellers. 
For truth-tellers, playing a model statement provides a good example of what is 
expected from them at interview.  According to social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) 
and social proof theory (Cialdini, 1993), in the absence of objective information, truth-
tellers would be compelled to compare themselves to similar others.  By presenting the 
person providing the model statement as a peer, truth-tellers can examine the peer 
behaviour (i.e. social proofing), determine whether their behaviour is appropriate in the 
same situation (i.e. social comparison), and, if necessary, correct their own behaviour 
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accordingly.  In other words, if interviewees do not understand what is required of them in 
an interview, they will be likely to use other sources, such as a model statement, as a point 
of reference.  Using a model statement as a benchmark, interviewees determine whether 
what they planned to tell the interviewer is more detailed (upward social comparison) or 
less detailed (downward social comparison) than the model statement (Ewens et al., 2016).  
In the case of a downward social comparison, interviewees can then adjust their response 
by increasing the length and detail in their statement to match the model statement.  For the 
current study, it was anticipated that children, who do not often know what is expected 
from them at interview (Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Esplin & Horowitz, 2007), would 
engage in this social comparison adapting their true reports by increasing their interviewee 
productivity like the adults in Leal et al.’s (2015) research. 
For lie-tellers, however, using a model statement instils an internal strategic 
conflict (Leal et al., 2015; Vrij, 2015).  On the one hand, lie-tellers wish to conceal their 
deceit by sticking to their originally planned story to prevent leakage of any incriminating 
information (e.g. contradictions, inconsistencies).  On the other hand, lie-tellers engage in 
self-presentational behaviours concerned with actively creating an honest impression 
(DePaulo et al., 2003).  Thus, they can choose to ignore the raised expectations of the 
model statement at the risk of looking incredible, or they can choose to meet the 
expectations of a longer statement at the risk of revealing their deceit.  An increase in 
interviewee productivity found by Leal et al. (2015) suggests that adult participants 
prioritised an honest impression over a well-rehearsed story.  Indeed, the lie-tellers in their 
study contradicted the typical lie-telling behaviour of saying as little as possible (Vrij, 
2015), which is counterproductive as longer responses provide more opportunity for verbal 
cues to veracity to occur; for example, CBCA and RM scores (Vrij, Mann, Kristen & 
Fisher, 2007).  Liu et al. (2010) reported similar behaviour by children who were asked 
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unanticipated questions.  Lie-tellers were significantly more likely to go beyond their 
prepared stories and answer the unexpected questions than truth-tellers. Furthermore, child 
lie-tellers have reported using the addition of Detail as a frequent verbal strategy 
(Strömwall, Granhag, & Landström, 2007).  This decision to say more might be 
particularly detrimental to child lie-tellers, who tend to reveal deceit through verbal 
behaviours (Akehurst, Manton & Quandte, 2011; Talwar & Lee, 2002).  If child lie-tellers, 
in the current study, choose to go beyond their prepared baseline response (i.e. what they 
consider to be enough deceitful information to be believed but not so much that they can’t 
remember all the details in their working memory), then this could elicit more verbal 
indicators of deceit in their false reports. 
3.2.3 Forensic usefulness 
When encouraging interviewees to provide more information (i.e. to increase their 
interviewee productivity) during an investigative interview, it is essential that this increase 
in productivity equates to an increase in information focusing on the target incident (i.e. the 
details that are forensically useful).  For application in the real world, it is important that 
children’s reports contain a high proportion of crime-relevant information thus facilitating 
an investigation, or acting as ‘best evidence’ in subsequent court proceedings.  As Leal et 
al. (2015) conducted their study in the context of insurance claimants, it is not known 
whether using a model statement, compared to not using one, will lead to more crime-
relevant details and an eyewitness account that will, therefore, be more useful in 
investigative settings.  A recent meta-analysis of the cognitive lie detection approach with 
adults (Vrij et al., 2015) revealed that interview techniques that encourage interviewees to 
provide more information are the most effective for truth detection.  This suggests that 
these techniques might exaggerate differences between truth-tellers and lie-tellers, by 
facilitating the cognitive process of truth-telling but not lie-telling.  Hence, child truth-
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tellers, who are already able to provide forensically useful information during interviews 
(Lamb et al., 2003), might, on hearing a model statement, be encouraged to give more of 
this crime-relevant information.  On the other hand, regardless of whether or not they have 
heard a model statement, lie-tellers might choose to talk about the ‘gist’ of what happened 
due to the unfamiliarity of the target incident (Michael, 2013).  False reports would, 
therefore, not be as crime-relevant as true reports. 
3.2.4 Between-statement consistency 
There are two opposing hypotheses in terms of the relationship between the 
consistency and veracity of child witnesses.  First, the Pinocchio hypothesis posits that 
child lie-tellers will continue to elaborate their story with every opportunity; so like their 
metaphoric noses, their stories continue to grow in length.  Bruck, Ceci and Hembrooke 
(2002) found support for this hypothesis when they asked children to provide either a true 
or false report of a staged event on five occasions across a six-week period.  Across recall 
attempts, child lie-tellers added in more new information (commissions) than child truth-
tellers, whereas child truth-tellers repeated more of the same details than child lie-tellers.  
Thus, the Pinocchio hypothesis predicts that children’s truthful statements will be more 
consistent (i.e. include more repetitions) than fabricated statements.  
Second, the repeat versus reconstruct hypothesis (Granhag, Strömwall & Jonsson, 
2003) postulates that child lie-tellers, more so than truth-tellers, are concerned with being 
consistent to avoid casting any doubt on their accounts.  According to this hypothesis, false 
reports will, therefore, contain more repetitions than true reports.  Furthermore, it posits 
that true reports will be affected by certain memory processes:  Memory fade may result in 
truth-tellers omitting more information than lie-tellers and reminiscence may result in more 
new details being added across truthful statements compared to lies.  Strömwall and 
Granhag (2005) found support for each of these predicted differences between children’s 
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true and false reports.  Thus the repeat versus reconstruct hypothesis predicts that 
children’s truthful statements will be less consistent (i.e. include more commissions and 
omissions) than fabricated statements.  
In the context of the current study, an increase in interviewee productivity is 
predicted for both lie-tellers and truth-tellers due to the use of a model statement.  With the 
encouragement to include more details, lie-tellers are, therefore, afforded the opportunity 
that they seek, according to the Pinocchio hypothesis, to elaborate on their initial story.  
Yet, the model statement may also promote more detailed reports from truth-tellers, who, 
according to the repeat versus reconstruct hypothesis, may enhance their account through 
reminiscence.  For both veracity groups, the addition of new information after hearing a 
model statement would result in low internal consistency.  
We were also interested to investigate how internal consistency interacted with 
forensic usefulness.  If we anticipate that child truth-tellers, upon hearing a model 
statement, will increase both the crime-relevance of their account as well as the amount of 
new information they provide, then both these increases could combine to result in a higher 
proportion of crime-relevant commissions compared to lie-tellers (who will increase the 
amount of new information provided after a model statement but won’t increase the crime-
relevance of this information). 
3.2.5 Memory accuracy 
It is important to ascertain whether longer statements elicited from truth-tellers 
result in a trade-off between quantity of information remembered and memory accuracy.  
Memory research with adults (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) as well as with children (Koriat, 
Goldsmith, Schneider & Nakash-Dura, 2001) has shown that sometimes an increase in 
quantity of reported details can result in a decrease in memory accuracy.  The use of the 
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Cognitive Interview with both children and adults has been found to lead to an increase in 
incorrect details when accounts become more detailed (Köhnken, Milne, Memon & Bull, 
1999).  However, Köhnken et al. (1999) found children reported significantly fewer 
incorrect details than adults, and that the accuracy rates (percentage of correct details out 
of all details given in an interview) remained equal to those of a standard interview.  It has 
therefore been argued that, “it is more desirable to collect 100 facts per interview at a 90% 
accuracy rate than to collect 10 facts at the same 90% accuracy rate” (McCauley & Fisher, 
1995, p. 514).  Using a model statements with truthful eyewitnesses only has found that it 
does not affect the accuracy of the information provided (Brackmann, Otgaar, Roos af 
Hjelmsäter & Sauerland, 2016).  Further support for the absence of adverse effects of using 
a model statement on truth-tellers would continue to promote its practical significance. 
3.2.6 Aims 
The aims of the current experiment were to look at the effect of using a model 
statement on (i) interviewee productivity, (ii) forensic usefulness of true and false reports, 
(iii) internal consistency of true and false reports, and (iv) memory accuracy of true 
reports.  First, it was hypothesised that, irrespective of veracity, interviewee productivity 
would increase following the model statement, resulting in longer and more detailed 
reports (Hypothesis 1).  Second, it was anticipated that there would be a higher proportion 
of crime-relevant information (i.e. forensic usefulness) in truthful accounts than in 
fabricated accounts, and that there would be an interaction whereby this veracity difference 
would be exaggerated by using a model statement (Hypothesis 2).  Third, it was expected 
that both truth-tellers and lie-tellers, having heard a model statement, would add in new 
information (commissions) during their second recall attempts.  In other words, both child 
truth-tellers and child lie-tellers would demonstrate the same level of internal consistency 
(Hypothesis 3).  However, we predicted that truth-tellers would provide a higher 
80 
 
proportion of crime-relevant commissions compared to lie-tellers (Hypothesis 4). Finally, 
we investigated whether the anticipated increase in detail given by truth-tellers post-model 
statement would have an effect on the overall accuracy of their accounts. 
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Participants 
Sixty-three children (26 males, 37 females) aged 8- to 10-years-old (M = 9.00 
years, SD = .70 years) were recruited from one primary school. The majority of the child 
participants were White/Caucasian, with the remaining minorities (less than 5% of the total 
sample) being White Asian and Black African.  Information sheets regarding the study 
were sent home to the children’s legal guardians who returned a signed written consent 
form agreeing to their children’s participation.  Verbal assent was also obtained from the 
children.  All children received a certificate and a stationery set in exchange for taking 
part. 
3.3.2 Model statement 
The model statement was an audio elicited from an interview with a ten-year-old 
girl from a previous study (Chapter 2).  This audio extract was considered a model 
statement because it was a 230-word spontaneous free recall that, through coding for 
detail, had been shown to be the most detailed account from that dataset.  Furthermore, 
following the guidance set out by Leal et al. (2015), the model statement was about an 
event (a school sports day) that was unrelated to the to-be-remembered event in question (a 
mobile phone theft).  From the perspective of a source-monitoring framework (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, Allen, Chan & Dahl, 2004), this conceptual 
dissimilarity between the ‘model statement event’ and the ‘to-be-remembered event’ 
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should reduce the risk of information from the model statement interfering with the recall 
of the witnessed event. 
3.3.3 Procedure 
The experiment took place in two quiet areas within the school and involved three 
different people: the Principal Investigator (PI), an interviewer who was blind to the aims 
and hypotheses of the study, and a confederate who committed the mock theft.  All child 
participants were naïve to the hypotheses of the study. 
First, children were randomly assigned to a Veracity condition.  Participants were 
yoked in terms of age and gender.  Truth-tellers were invited to play a short board game 
with the PI.  During the game, the PI went to the toilet and the confederate entered the 
room with the child, stole a mobile phone from a handbag nearby, and then left the room.  
The PI then returned and moments later found the phone was missing.  Upon discovering 
its disappearance, the PI told the child that they would now be interviewed about what they 
had witnessed and were given approximately five minutes to think about what they would 
like to tell the interviewer.  This procedure was standardized to enable the coding of 
correct and incorrect information.  Children were not forewarned that a theft would occur 
during the game.  The participants were then escorted to the interview room. 
  Lie-tellers, however, did not play a game with the PI, nor did they witness the 
theft of a mobile phone.  They were informed that the PI had stolen her friend’s phone and 
were asked to ‘cover up’ the transgression by providing a false account of witnessing 
someone else taking the mobile phone.  This set up reflects the ‘Child Absent’ condition in 
Talwar, Lee, Bala and Lindsay (2004)’s paradigm where the child was not present when a 
transgression took place and was later asked to cover up for the ‘perpetrator’.  To aid their 
preparation, lie-tellers were provided with a crib sheet that outlined the standardized 
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structure of the truthful event and were encouraged to think about any additional details 
they could provide to embellish their statement (e.g. how would you describe the person 
who stole the phone?).  After five minutes of preparation time for all participants, they 
were escorted to the interview room. 
In both conditions, participants were told that it was very important that the 
interviewer thought that they were telling the truth.  All participants were told that if the 
interviewer believed their story, then they would receive a certificate and a reward, but if 
they were not believed to be telling the truth, then they would have to write out their 
statement in full. 
All children underwent the same interview protocol with the same interviewer.  
This consisted of the two components of the Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 
1992) that are most frequently used by police officers; building rapport and an 
uninterrupted free narrative (Dando, Wilcock & Milne, 2008). Participants were instructed 
to refrain from guessing.  Following an initial rapport-building phase (that took place off 
camera), all participants were informed that the interviewer was there to investigate the 
theft of the mobile phone and that the purpose of the interview was to obtain as much 
information as possible regarding the theft.  Participants were then asked to provide two 
free recall attempts.  The first recall attempt acted as a baseline measure (pre-model 
statement/control) where the interviewer asked the children to tell her everything that 
happened during their time with the PI in as much detail as possible.  Following this, the 
interviewer introduced the model statement: 
“Now, I know it’s sometimes difficult to know what I mean when I ask for lots of 
detail.  So I’m going to play you a short recording of a girl talking about a school 
sports day.  Listen carefully to what she says and to all the details she includes.” 
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Once the model statement had been played, the interviewer requested a second free 
recall attempt (post-model statement), which was later compared to the pre-model 
statement recall attempt (baseline): 
“The girl you just heard included lots of detail about everything.  Please could you 
tell me again, in as much detail as you possibly can, everything that happened when 
you were playing with [PI]?  Don’t worry about repeating yourself; it’s fine to say 
what you said before and try to add in as much detail as you can.  Tell me 
everything!  Try to include as much detail as the girl you heard and tell me again 
everything that happened with you and [PI].” 
 In the final phase of the experiment, participants returned to the PI who asked them to 
state whether they had been instructed to tell the truth or tell a lie.  All participants 
successfully answered this manipulation check.  Regardless of performance, all of the 
children were given stationery sets as a reward for taking part. All interviews were 
transcribed for coding of verbal cues. 
3.3.4 Coding schemes 
For interviewee productivity, forensic usefulness and internal consistency, two 
independent raters coded all pre- and post-model statement recall attempts.  One rater 
coded all transcripts and a second rater coded a random sample of 20 transcripts (31.7% of 
the total number of statements).  For memory accuracy, the same first coder scored all 
transcripts and the second coder rated a random sample of 15 truth-tellers’ transcripts 
(46.9% of the total). 
3.3.4.1 Interviewee productivity 
First, both recall attempts were coded for total number of overall details.  To make 
the coding more precise, all transcripts were coded for five different types of details; visual 
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(e.g. “dark brown hair” contains three visual details), auditory (e.g. “she told me she was 
borrowing the phone” contains one auditory detail), spatial (e.g. “the bag was next to the 
wall” contains one spatial detail), temporal (e.g. “first she rolled the dice then she moved 
her counter” contains two temporal details), and action (e.g. “we played a game” contains 
one action detail).  Total number of details was the sum of the five types of detail per recall 
attempt. Intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs) were calculated between the two coders 
based on the coded cues in the whole transcript for each child (both pre- and post-model 
statement).  Inter-rater reliability was high, with all ICCs demonstrating high levels of 
agreement between coders (visual details, ICC = .98; auditory details, ICC = .99; spatial 
details, ICC = .93; temporal details, ICC = .97; action details, ICC = .98; and total number 
of details, ICC = .99). 
3.3.4.2 Forensic usefulness 
Each detail that was coded above was then coded as either crime-relevant (related 
to the criminal event, such as details about the perpetrator and her actions), or crime-
irrelevant (unrelated to the criminal event, such as playing the board game).  Proportions of 
crime-relevant details were calculated by dividing the total number of crime-relevant 
details by the total number of details recalled and then multiplying this by 100 for total 
number of details per recall attempt.  High percentages reflected more forensically relevant 
reports that would be more useful to a police investigation or court case. The Intra-class 
correlation coefficient (ICC) was calculated between the two coders.  Inter-rater reliability 
was high (% crime relevant details, ICC = .97). 
3.3.4.3 Between-statement consistency 
Requesting two free recall attempts from our child interviewees allowed us to 
record a baseline measure (pre-model statement) for truth-tellers and lie-tellers to which a 
second measure that had been experimentally manipulated (post-model statement) could be 
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compared.  Details that were present in both the pre- and post-model statement free recalls 
were coded as repetitions.  Commissions (information only provided post-model 
statement) were then calculated by subtracting the number of repetitions from the total 
number of details provided in the post-model statement recall attempt.  Omissions 
(information only provided pre-model statement) were also calculated by subtracting the 
number of repetitions from the total number of details provided in the pre-model statement 
recall attempt. Intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs) were calculated between the two 
coders.  Inter-rater reliability was high, with all ICCs demonstrating high levels of 
agreement between coders (repetitions, ICC = .97; commissions, ICC = .96; and omissions, 
ICC = .97).  Repetitions, commissions and omissions were further divided into crime-
relevant and crime-irrelevant categories (according to the coding in the above section). 
Intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs) were calculated between the two coders.  Inter-
rater reliability was high (% crime-relevant repetitions, ICC = .97; % crime-relevant 
commissions, ICC = .95; and % crime-relevant omissions, ICC = .90). 
3.3.4.4 Memory accuracy 
A list of information that could be provided about the perpetrator, the theft and the 
surroundings, and that could be coded as correct or incorrect with certainty, was 
constructed based on the standardized, staged theft.  Any crime-relevant information that 
participants provided that was not already on the list was added, resulting in a total number 
of eight-seven details that could be correctly reported.  The crime-relevant information 
provided in the transcripts of the thirty-two truth-tellers was scored with reference to this 
list as correct or incorrect.  Intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs) were calculated 
between the two coders.  Inter-rater reliability was high, with all ICCs demonstrating high 
levels of agreement between coders (correct details, ICC = .96; and incorrect details, ICC = 
.94).  Memory accuracy, as referred to by Koriat and Goldsmith (1996), was calculated by 
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dividing the total number of correct responses provided by the total number of details 
(correct details + incorrect details) provided for each participant, multiplied by 100. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Interviewee productivity 
A mixed MANOVA was performed to test changes in length (in words) and level 
of detail across recall attempts as a function of Veracity (Hypothesis 1).  There was a 
significant main effect of Recall Attempt on both response length, F(1, 61) = 163.49, 
p<.001, and level of detail, F(1, 61) = 45.43, p<.001.  There was no significant main effect 
of Veracity, F(1, 61) = 2.94, p = .09, and no significant interaction effects (ps >.05).  
Univariate analyses showed that the responses provided post-model statement (M = 230.83 
words, SD = 136.91) were significantly longer than those provided pre-model statement (M 
= 152.35 words, SD = 90.00), d = .62.  Interviewees also provided more details post-model 
statement (M = 58.51 details, SD = 25.11) than pre-model statement (M = 42.08 details, SD 
= 21.15), d = .69.  According to these findings and as predicted by Hypothesis 1, 
interviewee productivity increased, irrespective of veracity, following the model statement. 
3.4.2 Forensic usefulness 
A mixed ANOVA, with Veracity and Recall Attempt (pre or post-model statement) 
as the independent variables, was used to examine differences in the proportion of crime-
relevant details reported by interviewees.  There was a significant main effect of Veracity, 
F(1, 61) = 8.45, p = .005, d = .69.  Truth-tellers’ statements (M = 61.89, SD = 13.01) 
contained a higher percentage of crime-relevant details compared to lie-tellers’ (M = 49.02, 
SD = 23.24).  There was, however, no main effect of Recall Attempt, F(1, 61) = 1.65, p = 
.20, and no interaction effect, F(1, 61) = .03, p = .86. The proportion of crime-relevant 
information included in accounts before and after the model statement did not change for 
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truth-tellers, nor did it change for lie-tellers.  These findings provide partial support for 
Hypothesis 2: truth-tellers did provide more forensically useful reports than lie-tellers, but 
this difference was preserved, rather than exaggerated, by the model statement. 
3.4.3 Between-statement consistency 
A one-way MANOVA was performed with Veracity as the independent variable 
and with repetitions, commissions and omissions (coded from the post-model statement 
recall attempts) as the dependent variables.  There was no significant effect of Veracity on 
number of repetitions, F(1, 61) = .31, p = .58, commissions, F(1, 61) = 1.01, p = .32, nor 
omissions, F(1, 61) = .84, p = .36.  Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported, as there was no 
difference between true and false reports in terms of the number of commissions (pieces of 
additional information provided) post model statement.  
The crime-relevance of the children’s repetitions, commissions and omissions was 
tested using a one-way MANOVA, with Veracity as the independent variable.  There was a 
significant effect of Veracity on the proportion of crime-relevant repetitions, F(1, 61) = 
9.97, p = .002.  Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment1 showed that truth-
tellers (M = 62.31, SD = 22.40) repeated a higher proportion of crime-relevant information 
compared to lie-tellers (M = 44.12, SD = 23.32), p = .002, d = .80.  There was no effect of 
Veracity on proportion of crime-relevant commissions, F(1, 61) = 2.04, p = .14, nor on 
proportion of crime-relevant omissions, F(1, 61) = 1.33, p = .27.  These findings do not 
support Hypothesis 4, as the only difference between true and false reports was in terms of 
the proportion of crime-relevant repetitions, not commissions. 
                                                 
1 Bonferroni adjustment throughout this thesis refers to the alpha level, which is set at .05, divided by the 
number of tests performed.  This was performed to control for overall Type I error. 
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3.4.4 Memory accuracy 
Paired samples t-tests were used to investigate the effect of the model statement on 
truth tellers’ accounts in terms of correct details, incorrect details and memory accuracy.  
There was no significant difference in the number of correct details provided pre-model 
statement (M = 10.28, SD = 4.08) and post-model statement (M = 11.84, SD = 5.73), t(31) 
= 1.48, p = .15.  There was, however, a significant difference in the number of incorrect 
details, t(31) = 3.43, p = .002, d = .61.   Truth-tellers gave more incorrect information post-
model statement (M = 2.81, SD = 2.46) than pre-model statement (M = 1.72, SD = 1.42).  
As a consequence, memory accuracy, significantly decreased across the two recall 
attempts, t(29) = 2.07, p = .04, d = .30.  Truth-tellers’ recall was more accurate before the 
model statement (M = 86.02%, SD = 10.60) than after hearing the model statement (M = 
82.49%, SD = 11.95). 
3.5 Discussion 
In line with Leal et al. (2015), both truth-tellers and lie-tellers became more 
productive interviewees following the model statement.  That is, they provided longer and 
more detailed statements in their second recall compared to their baseline attempt.  No 
differences in the amount of details provided by truth-tellers and lie-tellers is surprising 
because lie-tellers only heard the story and were not exposed to other perceptual cues (e.g. 
seeing, smelling and feeling) that truth-tellers experienced.  This difference in physical 
experience is what has previously led to the construction of verbal lie detection tools, such 
as Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) and Reality Monitoring (Vrij, 2008), which 
identified verbal indicators that could only pertain to real life experiences.  In particular, 
accounts that are richer in detail have been consistently related to truthfulness (Vrij, 2005).  
In our study, lie-tellers had the challenging task to imagine the event described to them and 
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add to the information provided to put the blame on someone else.  Their ability to imagine 
could explain why they were able to provide equally detailed accounts as truth-tellers.  
Imagination, referred to in the literature as fantasy proneness can affect the level of detail 
included in false reports, with high fantasy proneness associated with more detail-rich 
accounts (Merckelbach, 2004).  Furthermore, high fantasy prone individual can even ‘fool’ 
verbal lie detection tools with their detailed false reports, achieving CBCA scores that are 
equal to and sometimes greater than those of true reports (Schelleman-Offermans & 
Merckelbach, 2010).  Lie-tellers in our study could, therefore, have been particularly 
imaginative, overcoming this deficit caused by the design.  Alternatively, poor truth-telling 
performance could also explain why lie-tellers didn’t have to perform as well to provide 
false reports that were as detailed as the true reports. 
Overall, truth-tellers provided more crime-relevant information than lie-tellers. For 
truth-tellers, the model statement did not increase, but did preserve, the high proportion of 
crime-relevant information (and thus, forensic usefulness) included in their reports.  
Similarly, for lie-tellers, the model statement did not impact upon the amount of crime-
relevant information provided; this remained significantly below the levels provided by 
truth-tellers.  These findings highlight crime-relevance as a new indicator of children’s 
veracity and suggest that children’s true reports include more forensically useful 
information than children’s false reports, regardless of interview technique. 
Our findings support the Pinocchio hypothesis (Bruck et al., 2002) for lie-tellers, 
and the repeat versus reconstruct hypothesis (Granhag et al., 2003) for truth-tellers, as 
there were no differences in the number of commissions for true and false reports.  This 
would suggest that consistency was similar for both veracity groups.  However, when 
crime relevance was taken into account across all measures of consistency, we did find that 
children’s true reports contained a higher proportion of crime-relevant repetitions 
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compared to children’s false reports.  The fact that truth-tellers demonstrated better internal 
consistency across the two recall attempts than lie-tellers for forensically useful 
information is important because witness consistency is one of the most important features 
of perceived witness credibility (Fisher, Brewer & Mitchell, 2009): Inconsistencies in 
crime-relevant information have the potential to destroy cases.  Thus, as our truthful 
children were more consistent than our lie-telling children regarding details relating to the 
theft, this could increase the likelihood that they would be perceived as truthful.  A model 
statement could, therefore, be a truth-detecting tool that can be used to elicit information 
and details from children in forensic settings. 
Finally, although truth-tellers reported more crime-relevant detail than lie-tellers, 
the quality of this information decreased as a result of using the model statement.  An 
increase in incorrect details across recall attempts, for truth-tellers, resulted in an overall 
decrease in memory accuracy, although this remained relatively high at 82%.  No 
significant change in correct details elicited could be due to the children generally recalling 
low levels of the to-be-remembered information; on average, 10 details (out of 87) before 
the model statement and 11 details after the model statement.  This could be attributed to 
truth-tellers being interviewed about something they had no forewarning would turn into 
the subject of an investigation; a common occurrence for real eyewitnesses.  This means 
that they may not have paid the to-be-remembered event (i.e. the mobile phone theft) their 
full attention.  Divided attention at encoding produces interference, leading to poor 
memory for stimuli (Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000).  These sub-optimal encoding 
conditions for truth-tellers could also explain the decrease in accuracy across the two free 
recall attempts.  If truth-tellers did not pay the theft their full attention then they may have 
found the recall task particularly difficult, creating a floor effect.  Furthermore, when they 
were later encouraged to say more after the model statement, they may have sacrificed the 
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accuracy of their statement in an attempt to be more informative (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 
2008).  Thus, even though the interview protocol discouraged child interviewees from 
guessing, they may still have offered information that they were not truly confident was 
accurate in order to help the ‘investigation’. 
A limitation of the current experiment was the absence of a ‘standard interview’ 
condition, in which children provided two free recalls without the presentation of a model 
statement between the recall attempts.  As found by McCauley and Fisher (1995), the 
repetition of a standard interview can result in new information being elicited from child 
interviewees.  In the present study, the child interviewees’ first free recall attempts were 
used as a control (baseline) to which subsequent changes in verbal behaviours were 
compared.  However, this design does not enable us to rule out the effect of simple 
question repetition on our findings, particularly for the crime-relevant repetitions.  
Previous research has shown that using a model statement does elicit more information 
compared to no model statement (Leal et al., 2015).   This now requires further evidence 
from future model statement studies in which two free recall attempts are elicited, where a 
control condition with no model statement between free recalls is tested. 
Although this study used a forensic scenario (i.e. a mobile phone theft), this does 
not mean that the results would be replicable with all crimes involving children.  For 
example, cases of alleged child sexual abuse are often characterised by the repetitive nature 
of the trauma (Lamb et al., 1997).  In the current study children were talking about one 
event that happened on one occasion.  We cannot, therefore, expect to find the same results 
when talking about one of many similar events.  For repeated abuse cases, it might be 
necessary to ask more specific questions about each of the incidents recalled (Roberts & 
Powell, 2001).  As the current study only looked at the effects of using a model statement 
on a single free recall, further testing is required to ascertain whether the same results can 
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be found through cued recall questioning.  Furthermore, the type of crime witnessed could 
also affect the perceived relevance of details relating to that crime.  In this study, relevant 
and irrelevant details were categorised according to the eyewitness literature (e.g. Gabbert, 
Hope & Fisher, 2009; Hope, Gabbert, Fisher & Jamieson, 2014; Vredeveldt et al., 2015). 
However, criminal relevance may vary and be subject to personal interpretation.  
Furthermore, it may rely upon what the victim/witness is willing to disclose about the 
incident.  Indeed, in some cases of alleged child sexual abuse, children may avoid 
disclosing central information about the incident because of the negative emotions 
associated with the disclosure, such as internal feelings of shame, guilt and self-blame 
(Leander, Christianson & Granhag, 2007; Magnusson, Ernberg & Landström, in press).  
This demonstrates that the most forensically useful information may not always be 
obtainable, even when a child is telling the truth, and, therefore, cannot be the sole cue to 
their credibility. 
Future research should also investigate the theoretical assumptions regarding the 
use of a model statement and test more directly the role that social comparison plays for 
truth-tellers in particular.  In educational settings, the nature of social comparative 
feedback can be a strong determinant of performance through personal self-efficacy 
mechanisms (Bandura, 1993).  Considering the statement as a ‘model’, therefore inferring 
it is better than their first recall attempt, could potentially lead to a downward social 
comparison by child truth-tellers.  If this is the case, truth-tellers’ ability to say more might 
be impaired by a decrease in perceived self-efficacy and poor performance (Bandura, 
1993).  This could explain why truth-tellers did not provide significantly more crime-
relevant information following the model statement and why they did not provide more 
details overall compared to the lie-tellers in our study. 
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In conclusion, we conducted the first empirical investigation of using a model 
statement with children.  Our findings highlight the downside of using this technique in an 
eyewitness scenario where the event could be poorly encoded, but also reveal that forensic 
usefulness is an important verbal marker that could help to differentiate between children’s 
true and false reports. 
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Chapter 4: ‘Don’t mess with the detail’: 
Increasing interviewee productivity using a 
model statement hinders child credibility 
judgments 
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4.1 Abstract 
Child truth-tellers provide more forensically useful reports than child lie-tellers, and repeat 
a higher proportion of crime-relevant details across recall attempts after hearing a detailed 
account (also known as a model statement) compared to lie-tellers.  However, these 
differences in verbal behaviour do not ensure that the detection of children’s true and false 
reports will be facilitated.  In the current study, 114 adult evaluators judged the credibility 
of three different children (from a pool of 57 children): one provided a pre-model 
statement free recall, one provided a post-model statement free recall, and one provided 
both pre- and post-model statement free recalls.  Detection accuracy hovered around 
chance levels regardless of the type of recall viewed by evaluators.  This poor performance 
might be due to evaluators’ final credibility judgments being informed by perceptions of 
level of detail, which was not a reliable indicator of veracity for this study.  In conclusion, 
evaluators were not good at detecting children’s deception, even when the model statement 
had elicited some differences between the true and false reports.  Evaluators were not able 
to spot these differences, or if they did, they did not interpret them correctly. 
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4.2 Introduction 
The ability to detect and interpret the presentation of deceptive cues in children’s 
investigative interviews is essential to reducing the risk of miscarriages of justice.  Yet, it 
is frequently reported that both legal professionals (e.g. police officers, customs officers, 
judges, social workers) and laypersons (i.e. potential jurors) rarely perform at above 
chance levels (50%) when judging the credibility of children’s reports (Bala, 
Ramakrishnan, Lindsay & Lee, 2005; Leach, Talwar, Lee, Bala & Lindsay, 2004).  
Furthermore, this performance level plummets significantly below chance levels when a 
parent has rigorously coached a child to give a report (Talwar, Lee, Bala and Lindsay, 
2006).  In their study, Talwar et al. (2006) showed that adults were only able to detect just 
over a quarter of false reports (25.8%) made by children aged 4 to 7 years old, and that this 
only rose to 56% following cross-examination of the witness.  These accuracy rates are 
even more disappointing when one considers that children under the age of 8 years have 
yet to develop sufficient verbal skills to conceal their lies (Talwar & Lee, 2002) and 
maintain them under questioning (Talwar & Lee, 2008).  Thus, even young children’s false 
reports, that should be easier to detect, can slip through the net.  Although children’s false 
allegations make up a small percentage of police cases (Anthony & Watkeys, 1991; 
Trocmé & Bala, 2005), it is important to recognise that, if undetected, each one of them 
could have serious, far reaching consequences for all persons involved (O’Donohue, 
Benuto & Fanetti, 2010).  Thus, any technique that could facilitate the detection of false 
allegations would be useful during investigative interviews or even later when the evidence 
is played to judge and jury in court. 
 In Chapter 3, we conducted the first investigation into the use of a model statement 
in a child eyewitness context.  With poor detection accuracy being largely attributable to 
the weak and subtle nature of naturally occurring behavioural differences between truth-
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tellers and lie-tellers (DePaulo et al., 2003), the model statement constitutes a cognitive lie 
detection approach aimed at enhancing these differences so that they are easier to detect 
(Vrij, 2015).  In Chapter 3, we found that true reports contained a higher proportion of 
crime-relevant information compared to false reports.  We also found that truth-tellers 
were more consistent in the crime-relevant information they provided (i.e. there was a 
higher proportion of crime-relevant repetitions) across recall attempts (i.e. pre- and post-
model statement) compared to lie-tellers.  This latter difference, elicited by using a model 
statement, is particularly important because testimonies that are perceived to be consistent 
are more likely to be believed as truthful (Global Deception Research Team, 2006).  So, if 
child truth-tellers provided statements that were more consistent than child lie-tellers, then 
child truth-tellers should be correctly judged as being more truthful than child lie-tellers.  
However, we cannot simply assume that eliciting one verbal difference between children’s 
true and false reports will definitely result in improved lie detection accuracy. 
 When Leal et al. (2015) played a model statement to adult insurance claimants, 
they also elicited one difference; namely, false reports were rated as less plausible than true 
reports.  Analyses revealed that listening to the example of a detailed account resulted in 
better discrimination between true and false reports.  For those who heard the model 
statement, independent raters’ plausibility scores correctly identified 80% of the reports as 
true and false overall.  On the other hand, when no model statement was played, 
independent raters’ criteria-based content analysis scores only correctly identified 62.5% 
of reports overall.  These findings show how a ‘model interview’ can help to determine 
veracity.  Broken down, the addition of the model statement made little difference to lie 
detection accuracy (72.7% for standard interview, 75% for model statement interview), but 
a big difference to truth accuracy (52.4% for standard interview, 85% for model statement 
interview).  On a larger scale, this is in line with Vrij, Fisher and Blank’s (2015) meta-
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analysis of the cognitive lie detection approach, which reported that techniques that 
encourage adult interviewees to say more are the most effective truth detection techniques.  
It remains unknown whether this will be the case with child interviewees. 
4.2.1 Lens modelling 
As part of our analyses, we used a lens model style of analysis to understand 
evaluators’ decision-making processes when judging child credibility.  Brunswik’s (1952) 
lens model has been used for over six decades to understand human judgments and what 
factors affect this process in psychological literature (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008).  This 
framework explores how cues (such as number of details included in a statement) elicited 
by the target of a judgment (e.g. a child interviewee) can both reflect a quality of that target 
(veracity of his/her statement) and the judgment itself (truth/lie judgment) using 
correlations. This analysis demonstrates which cues are facilitating accurate judgments of a 
target’s quality (i.e. veracity) more than others.  Thus, in a deception context, the lens 
model investigates not only how the behavioural cues communicated by the truth- or lie-
tellers are related to their actual credibility, but also how these same behavioural cues are 
perceived by evaluators and how they inform a correct or incorrect credibility judgment. 
The lens modelling approach has already been applied to a meta-analysis of judgments of 
deception with adult interviewees. Hartwig and Bond (2011) concluded that increasing 
behavioural differences between liars and truth-tellers more readily improves detection 
accuracy than informing evaluators about valid cues to deceit. 
4.2.2 Aims 
The main aim of this study was to test whether using a model statement would 
enable evaluators to tell the difference between children’s true and false reports.  Based on 
the findings in Chapter 3, we predicted that detection accuracy would be greater when 
evaluators judged children’s pre- and post-model statement recall attempts together 
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compared to when they simply watched either the pre-model statement recall attempt or 
the post-model statement recall attempt (Hypothesis 1).  Furthermore, we anticipated that 
using a model statement would facilitate truth detection more than when no model 
statement was used (Hypothesis 2).  Our secondary objective was to investigate how 
evaluators’ perceptions of different actual and believed cues to deceit changed across 
different recall attempts and how these perceptions were associated with actual cues to 
veracity using lens modelling. 
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Participants 
One-hundred-and-fourteen (28 males, 86 female) adult evaluators (M = 21.21 
years, SD = 6.87 years) took part in the experiment.  The majority of the participants 
(90.4%) were psychology undergraduate students recruited via a participant pool who 
received 0.5 course credit for their participation.  The remaining participants were 
psychology post-graduate students recruited via convenience sampling within the 
Psychology Department.  Regarding ethnicity, 79.8% were White/Caucasian, 7.9% were 
Black/African, 6.1% were Asian and 6.1% identified themselves as belonging to another 
ethnic group (unspecified). 
4.3.2 Video clips 
Fifty-seven of the sixty-three interviews (29 truth-tellers, 28 lie-tellers) from 
Chapter 3 were used in the current study.  Six interviews were not used due to poor quality 
of recording (i.e. loud background noise).  Each interview was edited into the three ‘recall 
attempt’ conditions to be presented: pre-model statement only, post-model statement only, 
and pre- and post-model statement together.  There was a five-second gap between recall 
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attempts in the latter condition.  Each evaluator saw one clip from each of the three ‘recall 
attempt’ conditions and the three clips they saw depicted three different child interviewees. 
Random listing was used to counterbalance truth-/lie-teller presentations (with each 
participant seeing at least one of each veracity condition).  The order of the presentation of 
truth-tellers and lie-tellers and the order of the presentation of the three ‘recall attempt’ 
conditions were counterbalanced. 
4.3.3 Response sheet for perceptual ratings 
After each video clip, evaluators completed a questionnaire before watching the 
next video clip.  Adapted from Evans, Michael, Meissner and Brandon (2013), the 
questionnaire included perceptual ratings (all with 9-point Likert scales) that related to 
both believed cues to deceit  (e.g. nervousness, gaze aversion) and actual cues to deceit 
(e.g. level of detail, plausibility, cognitive demand) from previous literature (DePaulo et 
al., 2003; Vrij, 2008).  A rating scale for perceptions of the prevalence of repeated 
information was included when evaluators were judging the pre- and post-model statement 
recall attempts to acknowledge the findings in Chapter 3.  Evaluators were also asked to 
make a dichotomous truth/lie judgment, using their perceptual ratings to inform their 
decision. 
4.3.4 ‘Coded cues’ for lens modelling 
Total number of details and consistency measures across recall attempts (i.e. 
repetitions, commissions and omissions) as well as their proportionate crime-relevance, 
which were coded for in Chapter 3, were transferred into the SPSS database created to 
perform the lens modelling.  They were used to see how they reflected the actual veracity 
of the children (already analysed in Chapter 3) and how they informed evaluators’ 
perceptual ratings that led to their final credibility judgments. 
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4.3.5 Procedure 
Once evaluators had given written consent to their participation, they were asked to 
provide demographic information.  They then received written instructions that they would 
watch three video clips of three different children being interviewed about the theft of a 
mobile phone at their school.  They were instructed to watch the entire recording of each 
video clip only once.  They were also informed that one of the children would provide two 
recall attempts and were told which clip this would be (i.e. first, second or third).  An open 
folder on the computer screen contained the three video clips (labelled 1, 2 and 3), with 
instructions to watch these in order using the headphones provided.  Participants were not 
told about the use of the model statement in the previous study.  When they were told 
about the child who would provide two recall attempts, it was simply explained that the 
second recall was another opportunity for that child to say again everything that happened.  
Finally, evaluators were told that their task was to work out which of the children were 
lying and which of the child were telling the truth. 
4.4 Results 
Preliminary analyses showed that participant demographics (i.e. their age, gender 
and ethnicity), order of the veracity of the clips, ratio of true and false clips and order of 
recall attempts did not have any effect on the inferential statistics below.  These variables 
were, therefore, collapsed in subsequent analyses. 
4.4.1 Overall accuracy rates 
The overall accuracy rate was 51% (SD = 29.49), with a one sample t test revealing 
this accuracy rate did not significantly differ from chance (50%), t(113) = .32, p = .75.  A 
repeated measures ANOVA showed that there was no main effect of Recall Attempt, F(1, 
112) = .30, p = .59, and thus overall accuracy was generally poor regardless of which part 
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of the children’s interviews the evaluators judged.  Chi-squared analyses were performed 
for each of the three ‘recall attempt’ conditions separately to see whether truth and lie 
accuracy differed from chance level.  For ‘pre-model statement only’, truth accuracy 
(56.9%) and lie accuracy (50%) did not significantly differ from chance, X2 = .55, p = .46.  
For ‘post-model statement only’, truth accuracy (59.3%) was significantly above chance 
whereas lie accuracy (38.2%) was significantly below chance level, X2 = 5.09, p = .024, V 
= .21.  For ‘pre- and post-model statement’, neither truth accuracy (56.9%), nor lie 
accuracy (42.9%) differed from chance level, X2 = 2.45, p = .13.  Judging a ‘post-model 
statement’ recall attempt was therefore the only condition where truth accuracy rose 
significantly above chance level but it was also the only condition in which lie accuracy 
decreased significantly below chance level. 
To summarise, listening to both the pre- and post-model statement free recalls 
together did not facilitate detection accuracy, contrary to Hypothesis 1.  Overall detection 
accuracy did not significantly differ from chance regardless of which type of free recall 
was judged.  Truth accuracy was, however, significantly above chance when evaluators 
assessed the credibility of a post-model statement free recall, supporting Hypothesis 2. 
4.4.2 Perceptual ratings 
Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed for each of the ‘cue’ ratings to see 
whether evaluators’ perceptions changed as a function of Recall Attempt.  Ratings for 
crime-relevant repetitions, commissions and omissions were excluded from these analyses 
because they were only perceived in the ‘pre- and post-model statement’ recall attempt 
condition.  Results showed that there was a significant main effect of Recall Attempt for 
perceptions of ‘level of detail’ only, F(2, 226) = 18.35, p<.001.  Pairwise comparisons 
using Bonferroni adjustment showed that the ‘pre-model statement only’ recall attempt (M 
= 5.10, SD = 2.25) was perceived to be significantly less detailed than ‘post-model 
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statement only’ recall attempt (M = 6.46, SD = 2.29), p<.001, d = .40, and the ‘pre- and 
post-model statement’ recall attempt2 (M = 6.81, SD = 1.86), p<.001, d = .55.  The latter 
two ‘recall attempt’ conditions were perceived to be equally detailed, p = .73.  There was 
no main effect of Recall Attempt for ratings of plausibility, F(2, 226) = 1.50, p = .23, 
nervousness, F(2, 226) = .57, p = .57, cognitive demand, F(2, 226) = 1.29, p = .28, or gaze 
aversion, F(2, 226) = .09, p = .92. 
4.4.3 Lens modelling 
As the above analyses show that Recall Attempt (viewing pre-model statement 
recall only, post-model statement recall only or pre- and post-model statement recall 
attempts) did have an effect on evaluators’ perceptions of detail, three lens models were 
created to represent each of these experimental conditions. 
 For each of the three lens models displayed in Figures 4.1-4.3, Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients were calculated between (1) the veracity of the child’s statement 
and the ‘coded cues’, (2) the ‘coded cues’ and the ‘perceptual ratings’, and (3) the 
‘perceptual ratings’ and the final credibility judgment.  Finally, the relationship between 
the veracity of the child’s statement and the final credibility judgment given by the 
evaluator was also measured to provide an indication of detection accuracy.  However, 
these correlations again showed poor accuracy for all conditions (pre-model statement only 
(r(114) = .05, p = .57), post-model statement only (r(114) = .02, p = .85) and pre- and post-
model statement (r(114) = -.02 p = .98).  Only significant (p<.05) relationships are 
displayed in Figures 4.1-4.3 to improve the clarity of the model. 
                                                 
2 When participants watched both pre- and post-model statements (i.e. both recall attempts), their judgment 
was based on their overall perception of both recall together. 
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4.4.3.1 Pre-model statement only 
Figure 4.1 shows the absence of any association between ‘coded cues’ and 
perceptual ratings.  This suggests that the perceptual ratings, which all informed the final 
credibility judgment (apart from plausibility), were not based on any of the ‘coded’ cues 
observed in Chapter 3.  The direction of the relationships between the ‘perceptual ratings’ 
and the final credibility judgment largely reflected previous literature.  Children’s 
statements that were perceived to be more detailed were more likely to be perceived as 
truthful (DePaulo et al., 2003) and children who were perceived to be more nervous and as 
having to think harder were more likely to be perceived as deceitful (Mann & Vrij, 2006; 
Vrij, 2008).  The only anomaly, for the current study, was that high levels of gaze aversion 
were associated with truthful statements. Gaze aversion is usually found to be associated 
with lie-telling in both adults (Global Deception Research Team, 2006) and children 
(McCarthy & Lee, 2009). 
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Figure 4.1 Decision-making process when evaluating ‘pre-model statement only’ 
recall attempts. Lines represent Pearson’s coefficients with a p value about .05.  For 
statement veracity and final credibility judgment, truth = 1 and lie = 0.  *p<.05 **p 
<.01 ***p<.001 
4.4.3.2 Post-model statement only 
Figure 4.2 shows that perceptions of level of detail and plausibility were correctly 
informed by the actual number of details provided by the child interviewees in their post-
model statement recall attempts, with a high number of details being perceived as more 
detailed and more plausible.  These two perceptual ratings were then related to evaluators’ 
final credibility judgments, with statements that were perceived to be more plausible and 
more detailed resulting in ‘truth’ judgments.  There was, however, a lack of continuity 
because the coded cue of ‘total details’, upon which these perceptions were based, was not 
linked to children’s actual veracity. 
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Figure 4.2 Decision-making process when evaluating ‘post-model statement only’ 
recall attempts. Lines represent Pearson’s coefficients with a p value about .05.  For 
statement veracity and final credibility judgment, truth = 1 and lie = 0.   *p<.05 **p 
<.01 ***p<.001 
4.4.3.3 Pre- and post-model statement 
Figure 4.3 shows the only instance of continuity out of the three lens models. For 
this recall condition, when evaluators were able to view the pre-and post-model statement 
recall attempts, truthful statements contained a higher percentage of crime-relevant details 
compared to deceptive statements.  The truthful statements were associated with higher 
ratings of crime-relevant repetitions, which, in turn, led to ‘truth’ judgments.  Nevertheless, 
the lack of association between statement veracity and final credibility judgment suggests 
that this continuity was insufficient in enabling evaluators to discriminate between true and 
false reports.  Similar to Figure 4.2, total number of details provided by the child 
interviewee was associated with perceptions of ‘level of detail’ and plausibility.  Children 
who provided more details were perceived to be more detailed and more plausible, 
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resulting in ‘truth’ judgments.  However, the lack of association, again, between total 
number of details and statement veracity demonstrated that this coded cue was not a 
reliable indicator.  Indeed, it is likely that the aforementioned continuity in Figure 4.3 did 
not result in accurate credibility judgments because there was a stronger correlation 
between plausibility and final credibility judgment (r(114) = .54) than between crime-
relevance of repetitions and final credibility judgment (r(114) = .22).  In other words, the 
invalid cue of ‘total details’ was more influential than the valid cue of ‘% of crime-relevant 
repetitions’.  Thus, evaluators appeared to be swayed by the inaccurate cue, similar to 
Fisher, Brewer and Mitchell (2009). 
 
Figure 4.3 Decision-making process when evaluating ‘pre- and post-model 
statement’ recall attempts. Lines represent Pearson’s coefficients with a p value 
about .05.  For statement veracity and final credibility judgment, truth = 1 and lie = 
0.   *p<.05 **p <.01 ***p<.001 
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4.5 Discussion 
Our study investigated whether using a model statement would help determine the 
veracity of children’s reports.  The prediction that detection accuracy would be greater 
when evaluators judged a child’s pre- and post-model statement recall attempts together 
compared to when they simply watched either the pre-model statement recall attempt or 
the post-model statement recall attempt was not supported (Hypothesis 1).  This is 
unexpected as watching both recall attempts revealed how children repeated a high 
proportion of crime-relevant information in their true reports but not in their false reports.  
As consistency is believed to be a key indicator of veracity (Fisher et al., 2009), but is not 
necessarily a reliable indicator of veracity (Vrij, 2008), this may explain why true reports 
were not judged to be more truthful.  An overall accuracy rate of 51% is consistent with 
previous studies that show that adult detection rates for children’s lies hover around chance 
levels (see Talwar & Crossman, 2012 for an overview).  However, using a model statement 
did facilitate truth accuracy.  Evaluator performance for detecting true reports was only 
significantly better than chance when the report had been elicited following a model 
statement, supporting Hypothesis 2.  This suggests that encouraging interviewees to say 
more might facilitate effective truth detection for children, as it does for adults (Leal et al., 
2015; Vrij et al., 2015). 
An in-depth examination of evaluators’ decision-making processes when judging 
child credibility, using lens modelling, revealed that the poor performance in our study 
might be due to a lack of continuity between behavioural cues that were indicative of 
statement veracity and perceptual ratings that subsequently informed final credibility 
judgments. 
In the literature, detail is reported as a reliable indicator of veracity because 
generally truth-tellers provide more details than lie-tellers (DePaulo et al., 2003).  
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However, in the current study, this was not the case as true and false reports contained the 
same amount of detail.  Thus, when evaluators’ credibility judgments were influenced by 
perceptions related to level of detail provided by the children, this did not result in an 
accurate judgment.  Just as the model statement encouraged truth-tellers to delve back into 
their memory, it also challenged lie-tellers to ‘up their game’.  The resulting increase in 
detail for both truth-tellers and lie-tellers may have confused evaluators and nullified the 
‘total details’ cue on which they based their judgments.  Furthermore, statements with a 
higher total number of details were also perceived to be more plausible, irrespective of 
veracity.  In their study, Leal et al. (2015) found that, although truth-tellers and lie-tellers 
provided equally detailed statements, lie-tellers’ detailed accounts were perceived to be 
more implausible.  It remains unknown whether this inconsistency is due to the general 
‘detailed’ impression of the statement or cues specific to its content.  However, the lack of 
an association between percentage of crime-relevant details and ratings of plausibility 
suggests that it is not due to how much forensically relevant content was included in the 
true or false statements. 
Across all the lens models, final credibility judgments were consistently informed 
by perceptual ratings of unreliable cues (Vrij, 2008), namely gaze aversion and 
nervousness, which are not based upon any of the cues that we coded in Chapter 3.  The 
use of invalid cues could, however, be due to participants being asked to explicitly rate 
these cues, which they might not have used otherwise.  We incorporated unreliable cues 
into our perceptual ratings to see if they influenced credibility judgments.  Previous 
research has demonstrated that people’s beliefs regarding valid cues to deceit are 
frequently erroneous (Global Deception Research Team, 2006) so we endeavoured to 
explore whether this would still be the case when given both valid and invalid cues to base 
their judgments on, similar to the Psychologically Based Credibility Assessment Tool used 
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in Evans, Michael, Meissner and Brandon (2013).  In hindsight, an alternative method for 
tracking the use of valid and invalid cues could have been to ask participants to report what 
cues their decisions were based on and ask them to rate these cues in terms of importance.  
This would have avoided experimenter bias and would have still allowed us to see whether 
evaluators used the same cues as we coded for in Chapter 3.  Furthermore, evaluators’ 
individual perceptions of what constitutes a detailed and plausible response from a child of 
a specific age might also vary.  Future research should investigate how evaluators’ 
expectations of children’s competency to report detailed and plausible reports affect their 
credibility judgments. 
Another limitation to consider is that clearly the coded cues in this work don’t 
account for all of the environmental cues to which the evaluators were exposed.  Indeed, 
evaluators watched video clips of the interviews, which also contained nonverbal 
behaviours.  Previous research, however, has often found no reliable differences in non-
verbal cues between child truth-tellers and child lie-tellers (Talwar & Lee, 2002), 
suggesting that these are poor cues for judging child credibility.  If evaluators in the current 
experiment were heavily influenced by these unreliable cues, then this would explain why 
they were unable to discriminate between true and false reports. 
In the current study we only coded verbal behaviours.  We focused on verbal 
behaviours because these are what the model statement aims to influence and these are the 
behaviours that are mostly likely to reveal child deceit (Akehurst, Manton & Quandte, 
2011; Talwar & Lee, 2002).  However, to understand fully just where evaluators are going 
wrong when judging child credibility we need to take into account in our lens model more 
of the cues that they are exposed to.  Future research should continue to use lens modelling 
to understand how decisions regarding credibility are made.  This might highlight 
behavioural cues that lead to correct credibility judgments, which should not be tampered 
118 
 
with when designing new techniques.  For example, it was demonstrated in our study that 
total number of details influenced evaluators’ perceptions and that giving lie-tellers the 
opportunity to provide as many details as truth-tellers (by using a model statement) may, in 
fact, hinder their detection.  Evaluators were blind to the interview technique used with the 
child interviewees.  If using a model statement does elicit true and false reports that are 
equally detailed on a general level but differ on a specific level (e.g. number of crime 
relevant detail repetitions), then it would be helpful to explain this to evaluators.  When 
police officers have been trained in using cognitive lie detection techniques, they first took 
part in a workshop where the rationale and results of using each technique were discussed 
(Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham & Brankaert, 2015).  In that study, the use of these techniques 
combined with their knowledge of the anticipated outcomes of the techniques resulted in 
police officers’ detection accuracy increasing from 59% to 74%.  Future research should 
investigate whether providing this information to laypersons, who are likely to be called 
for jury service, can also be beneficial. 
In conclusion, using a model statement with children can facilitate truth detection 
but at the same time significantly hinders lie detection.  This poor performance can be 
explained by insufficient behavioural differences being elicited between children’s true and 
false reports, as well as behavioural similarities in the level of overall detail provided by 
child truth-tellers and child lie-tellers.  With no forewarning that using a model statement 
results in longer and more detailed statements from both truth-tellers and lie-tellers, 
evaluators were not able to accurately determine the veracity of the child witnesses. 
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5.1 Abstract 
The effect of playing a detailed free recall (i.e. a model statement) on verbal markers (i.e. 
productivity and consistency) indicating the veracity of children’s reports was investigated.  
A theoretical model comprising social comparison, interviewee self-efficacy and 
interviewee productivity was tested.  Fifty-four children (8 to 10 years old) took part in one 
activity (true) and were told about a second activity that they did not experience (false).  At 
interview, children provided a first and second recall attempt for each activity in an attempt 
to make the interviewer believe they had taken part in both activities.  In between recall 
attempts, children heard another child’s model statement (AMS), or their own model 
statement (OMS), or they heard no model statement (NMS).  Interviewee productivity 
increased for children’s true and false reports in the AMS condition, but not for the other 
two interview conditions.  The model revealed one relationship: perceived self-efficacy 
was related to a positive change in interviewee productivity but only for the AMS 
condition.  Between-statement consistency was lowest in the AMS condition compared to 
the OMS and NMS conditions, regardless of veracity.  Memory accuracy remained 
unaffected by using model statements.  To conclude, hearing AMS encouraged the most 
detailed but inconsistent reports.  Further exploration is required to understand the socio-
cognitive mechanisms behind the effects of using model statements. 
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5.2 Introduction 
The assessment of children’s credibility in forensic settings has been widely 
acknowledged by researchers as an essential component of the justice system.  With a 
growth in already high numbers of child witnesses testifying in court, it has become 
increasingly important to determine the veracity of their accounts (Talwar & Crossman, 
2012).  On the one hand, some studies have shown that children can provide informative 
and accurate accounts (e.g. Lamb et al., 2003; McCauley & Fisher, 1995) but, on the other 
hand, some studies have highlighted children’s willingness and ability to tell lies that fool 
parents, legal professionals and laypersons (i.e. potential mock jurors) alike (Bala, 
Ramakrishnan, Lindsay & Lee, 2005; Evans, Bender & Lee, 2016; Leach, Talwar, Lee, 
Bala & Lindsay, 2004).  Consequently, child deception research now needs to focus on 
establishing interview methods to exaggerate differences between children’s truths and 
lies. 
A particular area of weakness for child lie-tellers is their poor semantic leakage 
control (Talwar & Lee, 2002).  Dependent on their developing cognitive abilities, children 
can find it difficult to tell and maintain a lie making them particularly prone to revealing 
their deceit (Gordon, Lyon & Lee, 2014; Talwar & Crossman, 2011; Talwar & Lee, 2008).  
This under-developed ability to control their verbal expressive behaviours not only reveals 
their deceit in short follow-up questions (Talwar & Lee, 2002, 2008), but also in longer 
narratives (Evans et al., 2012; Brunet et al., 2013; Williams, Talwar, Lindsay, Bala & Lee, 
2014).  It is particularly in these longer responses that verbal markers to children’s veracity 
have been found (Williams et al., 2014).  These findings are in line with adult deception 
research that shows that longer reports are more likely to contain verbal cues to deceit 
(Vrij, Mann, Kristen & Fisher, 2007).  Child lie-tellers could, therefore, be particularly 
vulnerable to cognitive lie detection techniques that encourage interviewees to say more 
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(such as using a model statement) because eliciting even longer responses should further 
exaggerate verbal differences between children’s true and false reports. 
5.2.1 Interviewee productivity 
Interviewee productivity refers to the amount of information provided by an 
interviewee and can be measured in terms of response length (number of words) or 
quantity of details.  Productive interviewees are particularly important to the criminal 
justice system because accounts that are richer in detail are more likely to be believed in 
court (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Johnson, 2006) and can also provide more leads to facilitate an 
investigation (Vrij, Hope & Fisher, 2014).  Thus, information elicitation is at the core of 
investigative interviewing. 
A model statement refers to an audio-recorded example of a detailed, spontaneous 
free recall provided by a peer about an unrelated event that is played to an interviewee.  Its 
primary aim is to encourage interviewees, both truthful and deceitful, to become more 
productive when interviewed (Vrij, 2015).  It is, therefore, an information-gathering 
procedure that should help to overcome ambiguities surrounding what level of detail is 
required from truth-tellers, whilst also challenging lie-tellers to embellish their stories.  
Based on the premise that lie-telling is more cognitively demanding than truth-telling 
(Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981), using a model statement heightens lie-tellers’ 
cognitive load further by raising the expectations of what a detailed account sounds like 
(Vrij, 2015).  Expecting more at interview creates an internal conflict in terms of how lie-
tellers decide to react; on the one hand, they could elaborate on their original story to 
mimic truth-tellers but this runs the risk of leaking incriminating information, or, on the 
other hand, they could stick to their original story but this runs the risk of looking 
suspicious (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham & Fisher, 2015). 
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All model statement studies, to date, have shown that both truth-tellers and lie-
tellers, adults and children alike, increase their interviewee productivity in equal measures 
after hearing a model statement compared to both a control condition where no model 
statement is provided (Leal et al., 2015) and a baseline measure taken before a model 
statement is played (Chapter 3; Ewens et al., 2016).  As such it was predicted, for the 
current study, that hearing a model statement would elicit a greater change in interviewee 
productivity than hearing no model statement for both children’s true and false reports. 
As increased interviewee productivity has been evidenced for both truth- and lie-
tellers, model statements do not appear to discriminate between true and false reports 
directly, but rather indirectly.  For instance, Leal et al. (2015) found that, as the longer 
reports provided by deceitful insurance claimants were judged as less plausible than those 
provided by truthful insurance claimants, 80% of reports were correctly classified.  That 
said, a significant difference in increased interviewee productivity between true and false 
reports would be most beneficial.  More specifically, a larger increase in the amount of 
information given by truth-tellers compared to that given by lie-tellers (as a consequence 
of hearing a model statement) would help both police investigations and court trials. To 
enable this, it is important to take a step back and to understand how the underlying social 
and cognitive processes at play when hearing a model statement affect truth-tellers. 
Model statements frame what constitutes a detailed account for truth-tellers.  This 
is particularly helpful for child truth-tellers who frequently do not know what is expected 
of them at interview (Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Esplin & Horowitz, 2007) and can 
make the task of providing a free recall, usually in the absence of any framework, less 
cognitively difficult (Saykaly, Crossman, Morris & Talwar, 2016).  Based on the theory of 
‘social proof’ (Cialdini, 1993), the ‘appropriate behaviour’ required in the interview 
situation is based on the behaviour of the person providing the model statement (Vrij, Leal, 
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Mann, Vernham & Brankaert, 2015).   Through the means of social comparison (Festinger, 
1954), the model statement makes the majority of participants realise that they have not 
provided the expected level of detail required (Ewens et al., 2016).  Upon making this 
downward social comparison, interviewees rectify this by adding to the information in 
their truthful accounts (i.e. increasing their interviewee productivity). 
Despite the positive relationship between making a downward comparison and a 
positive change in interviewee productivity, there is also a theoretical negative relationship 
between making a downward social comparison and perceived self-efficacy for providing 
an informative and accurate account, which would decrease the change in interviewee 
productivity.  To adjust the length and detail of their responses, truth-tellers may endeavour 
to delve back into their memory to try to recall more information that they have not already 
disclosed.  This may involve assessing the quality of that memory and, importantly, their 
confidence in their ability to provide an informative, but also accurate account (Ackerman 
& Goldsmith, 2008).  They may, therefore, reflect on their perceived self-efficacy to be 
able to carry out such a recall task.  Downward social comparisons have been associated 
with low self-efficacy beliefs in educational settings that subsequently lead to poor 
performance (Bandura, 1993).  This reflection could, therefore, create a negative effect on 
their ability to increase their interviewee productivity that opposes the positive effect of the 
downward social comparison.  In other words, truth-tellers may not be increasing the 
length and quantity of detail in their accounts as much as they can because they don’t 
believe that they are able to provide an informative and accurate account, as demonstrated 
by a model statement given by another child.  It was therefore hypothesised that the 
direction of social comparison would be skewed towards more downward social 
comparisons for children in the current study who heard another child’s model statement. 
Furthermore it was predicted that downward social comparison would be positively 
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associated with interviewee productivity but negatively related to perceived self-efficacy 
for children who heard another child’s model statement.  This latter negative relationship 
would, in turn, reduce the strength of the positive relationship between perceived self-
efficacy and change in interviewee productivity. 
An alternative solution to using another child’s model statement might be to play 
children a model statement that they themselves have provided (i.e. their own model 
statement).  In the current study, we investigated the transformation of children’s practice 
interviews (also known as practice narratives) into their own model statements.  Model 
statements and practice interviews already share the common goals of teaching truthful 
interviewees what is expected of them and of increasing retrieval performance 
(Brackmann, Otgaar, Roos af Hjelmsäter & Sauerland, 2016).  Forming part of the pre-
declarative stage in the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development 
(NICHD) Investigative Interview protocol (Lamb et al., 2007), practice interviews aim to 
prepare children to become effective informers by encouraging them to talk about 
unrelated past events in as much detail as possible.  This training in answering open-ended 
questions conveys the interviewer’s expectations for a detailed description and develops a 
lengthy responding pattern (Sternberg et al., 1997), similar to a model statement.  Whereas 
the benefits of another child’s model statement on child truth-tellers have received little 
support (Brackmann et al., 2016), the benefits of using practice interviews to elicit longer 
and more accurate reports from child interviewees are well documented (Price, Roberts, & 
Collins, 2013; Roberts, Brubacher, Powell & Price, 2011; Sternberg et al., 1997).  It was, 
therefore, anticipated that using practice narratives to act as children’s own model 
statements would have a positive effect on child truth-tellers increasing their interviewee 
productivity. 
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Playing an excerpt of their practice interviews back to child interviewees in the 
form of their own model statement might remind them of the level of detail that is 
required.  For the children who have forgotten how to give a detailed statement following 
the time delay, it might highlight that they haven’t provided enough information in their 
first free recall of the true activity (downward self-comparison) and, therefore, they should 
increase their interviewee productivity for the second recall attempt, (as was expected for 
the children who hear another child’s model statement).  However, there may not be a 
resultant negative relationship between downward self-comparison and perceived self-
efficacy because the practice interview would demonstrate each child’s potential to be 
informative and accurate and would highlight the fact that the interviewer accepts that 
level of productivity.  Thus, perceived self-efficacy has the potential to remain high and be 
positively and strongly correlated with an increase in interviewee productivity. 
A stronger, positive relationship between perceived self-efficacy and change in 
interviewee productivity for children’s true reports after hearing their own model statement 
rather than another child’s model statement should result in a greater change in interviewee 
productivity for the former group’s true reports.  This would lead to (a) a veracity 
difference for the own model statement condition whereby the increase in interviewee 
productivity would be greater for true reports than false reports, and (b) an interview 
technique difference whereby the increase in interviewee productivity would be greater for 
true reports elicited following a child’s own model statement compared to another child’s 
model statement. 
5.2.2 Between-statement consistency 
Between-statement consistency refers to the level of consistency between 
statements made by the same person.  In the context of this study, it refers to the 
consistency of the information provided in the first and second recall attempts.  Low 
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consistency is important because it is largely interpreted by laypersons as an indication of 
deceitfulness (DePaulo et al., 2003; Global Deception Research Team, 2006).  Previous 
‘consistency’ hypotheses for child deception have inferred a relationship between 
interviewee productivity and consistency.  For the Pinocchio hypothesis (Bruck, Ceci & 
Hembrooke, 2002), as lie-tellers grow their stories (like their noses), it is suggested that 
their false reports may contain more commissions (details not given before) and fewer 
repetitions when compared to true reports.  Alternatively, the repeat versus reconstruct 
hypothesis (Granhag, Strömwall & Jonsson, 2003; Strömwall & Granhag, 2005) predicts 
that as truth-tellers delve back into their memory and remember more information, their 
true reports will contain more commissions, fewer omissions (details that were given 
before but are left out in a second recall attempt), and fewer repetitions when compared to 
false reports. As such, for both hypotheses, it is suggested that longer reports become more 
inconsistent.  The findings of Chapter 3 support this relationship as an equal increase in 
productivity following the use of another child’s model statement also resulted in equal 
changes in the general consistency of true and false reports.  However, these findings were 
limited by the lack of control group to which these changes in consistency could be 
compared.  In the current study, it was anticipated that both true and false reports elicited 
using model statements (both ‘own’ and ‘other’s’) would become more inconsistent than 
true and false reports elicited without the use of a model statement due to the expected 
increases in interviewee productivity.  Further, due to the prediction that a greater increase 
in interviewee productivity will occur for children’s true reports after hearing their own 
model compared to children’s true reports after hearing another’s model statement, it was 
anticipated that truthful information provided by children who hear their own model 
statement will become more inconsistent than it will for those who hear another’s model 
statement.   Finally, in terms of consistency, a greater increase in interviewee productivity 
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for true reports, compared to false reports after hearing one’s own model statement, might, 
in turn, result in the children’s true reports being more inconsistent than their false reports. 
5.2.3 Memory accuracy 
Talwar and Crossman (2012) presented cognitive lie detection as a promising 
means for facilitating child deception detection with the proviso that any potential adverse 
effects of the techniques on truth-tellers were investigated.  As noted above, both Leal et 
al. (2015) and Chapter 3 of this thesis found that playing another’s model statement 
resulted in truth-tellers providing accounts that were significantly longer and more detailed 
than when no model statement was used. When eliciting more information from truthful 
interviewees it is important to ensure that the memory accuracy of that information is 
maintained.  It would be undesirable if there were a trade-off between quantity of detail 
and accuracy (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Koriat et al., 2001).  Other interview techniques 
that encourage longer responses, such as the Cognitive Interview, result in an increase in 
both correct and incorrect information compared to standard interview protocols 
(Köhnken, Milne, Memon & Bull, 1999; Memon, Meissner & Fraser, 2010).  However, 
this does not necessarily lead to a decrease in recall accuracy (McCauley & Fisher, 1995).  
Indeed, it is possible to increase productivity whilst also maintaining accuracy. 
There are mixed results regarding the effect of using another child’s model 
statement on children’s memory accuracy.  On the one hand, Chapter 3 shows that child 
truth-tellers’ longer, post-model statement accounts were significantly less accurate than 
their shorter, pre-model statement accounts.  This was due to a significant increase in 
incorrect information, but not a significant increase in correct information.  On the other 
hand, Brackmann et al. (2016) found that using another’s model statement had no effect on 
the accuracy of children’s eyewitness reports.  In Chapter 3, it is suggested that the 
decreased accuracy might be due to the children not receiving any forewarning that the 
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target event was going to occur resulting in poor encoding of that event.  This meant that, 
at interview, truthful children might have sacrificed their accuracy, making up detail that 
did not actually occur, in order to be perceived as informative, in line with the revised 
dual-criteria model of meta-memory processes (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008).  Although 
Brackmann et al. (2016) did not inform their child participants that they would be 
interviewed about the staged event, it was performed in front of an entire class, which 
suggests that it had the children’s full attention (i.e. an optimal encoding condition).  As 
the staged event, therefore, received all of the children’s attentional resources, it is likely 
that this facilitated encoding and increased memory quality of the event (Lane, 2006).  To 
test our model statements in a similar ‘best case’ scenario in which the witness has 
encoded the event well, the experimenter conducting the present study forewarned children 
that they would be questioned about the activities they took part in. As such, and in line 
with the findings of Brackmann et al. (2016), it was predicted that there would be no 
difference in memory accuracy across the interview conditions.  That is, it was anticipated 
that although the model statements would increase interviewee productivity when 
compared to the ‘no model statement’ condition, this would not be to the detriment of 
memory accuracy. 
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Participants 
Fifty-four children (23 boys, 31 girls) aged 8 to 10 years old (M = 9.09 years, SD = 
.73 years) were recruited from a local primary school in the United Kingdom.  Children’s 
legal guardians received an information sheet regarding the study and returned a signed 
consent form agreeing to their child’s participation.  Verbal assent was also obtained from 
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all children.  All children received a certificate and a small gift (e.g. stickers, balloons) in 
exchange for taking part. 
5.3.2 Materials 
5.3.2.1 Adapted practice interview 
Based on the NICHD interview protocol (Lamb et al., 2007), a mock practice 
interview was conducted with all children about an atypical activity that took place in the 
past nine months (e.g. attendance at a wedding).  Legal guardians were asked to provide, 
on their returned consent forms, details of an event that their children could remember well 
(similar to Brubacher, Roberts & Powell, 2011).  If an event was not provided, the PI asked 
the children if they could think of an activity that they had done for the first time within the 
last nine months.  Average delay between time of event and subsequent recall was 4.63 
months (SD = 2.49 months).  As testing occurred during school hours, measures were 
taken to limit the amount of time children spent with the researchers.  One such measure 
was to shorten the practice interview protocol.  In our adapted version, the principal 
investigator (PI) told the children that she wanted to know more about them and the things 
that they do.  It then combined lines 1a to 1c in the 2007 version of the NICHD protocol by 
asking the children to “think hard about the recent activity/event and to tell the PI what 
happened on that day from the time they got up that morning until they went to bed that 
night”.  Following this, the children were asked if they could tell the PI any more 
information about the event.  All practice interviews were audio-recorded. 
5.3.2.2 Activities 
Two activities were designed for this experiment. The activities were designed to 
be of equal length and to contain an equal amount of actions without being too similar in 
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content.  To keep the children engaged, both activities were appropriate for their age and 
were interactive. 
5.3.2.2.1 Lego activity 
Instructions for building a Lego tower firstly directed the children to open up a box 
of Lego next to them and to tip all the Lego pieces onto the floor.  Then, using a sheet with 
different coloured circles on it, they were asked to sort all the pieces into their 
corresponding colours (e.g. red bricks into the red circle).  Next the children were asked to 
build a Lego tower depicted in the instructions as fast as they could.  The children were 
told to try to copy the image as best they could (i.e. it was not necessary for the tower to be 
an exact replica).  Finally, they put together the pieces of a Lego man and put him on top 
of the tower. 
5.3.2.2.2 Dice activity 
Children who played the dice game were first instructed to find a red, foam dice 
and an orange, whiteboard marker in a bag filled with other miscellaneous items.  They 
were then asked to roll the dice twelve times.  After each roll, they were asked to write 
down the number on the top of the dice in one of the twelve boxes provided on a score 
sheet that was provided.  On this sheet, the twelve boxes were organized into four rows of 
calculations with three boxes included in each calculation.  Each row was connected to a 
different activity: star jumps, stand on one leg, claps and skip on the spot.  When all the 
boxes contained a number, the children were asked to complete the four calculations to 
find out how many times (star jumps and claps) or for how many seconds (standing on one 
leg or skipping on the spot), they would then need to do that activity.  After they had 
completed each of the activities in turn, they were instructed to roll the dice one more time.  
If they rolled an odd number, they were asked to stand up and take a bow.  If they rolled an 
even number, they were told to give themselves a pat on the back. 
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5.3.2.3 Another child’s model statement (AMS) 
This model statement was an audio-extract from an interview with a nine-year-old 
boy who attended a different school from the rest of the sample.  This was a 319-word 
(level of detail: 85, duration of statement: 145 seconds) spontaneous free recall that was 
elicited using the same instructions provided when conducting the ‘practice’ interview with 
children in the current study.  Following the guidance set out by Leal et al. (2015), the boy 
spoke about an event (a holiday) that was unrelated to the target activities.  From the 
perspective of a source-monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993; 
Lindsay, Allen, Chan & Dahl, 2004), this conceptual dissimilarity between the ‘model 
statement event’ and the ‘to-be-remembered event’ is key to reducing the risk of 
interference between the child’s own information (i.e. recall of the experienced event) and 
the information provided by an external source (i.e. the model statement). 
5.3.2.4 Own model statement (OMS) 
The ‘practice’ interview of children randomly assigned to hear his/her ‘own model 
statement’ at interview was edited to be the same length (in seconds) as the model 
statement in the AMS condition.  However, the duration of the practice interviews for three 
of these children were shorter than the model statement in the AMS condition, resulting in 
them also being significantly shorter than the other ‘own model statements’ (more than 1 
standard deviation away from the mean duration).  These three outliers consequently 
skewed the overall data, resulting in an overall mean duration for OMS that was 
significantly shorter in duration (M = 123.67 seconds, SD = 29.45 seconds), t(17) = -3.07, 
p = .007, d = .72, significantly shorter in response length (M = 265.67 words, SD = 98.86 
words), t(17) = 2.29, p = .035, d = .54, and significantly less detailed (M = 68.67 details, 
SD = 24.53 details), t(17) = 2.82, p = .012, d = .66, than the AMS.  Nevertheless, one of 
the purposes of the ‘own model statement’ condition was to demonstrate that children’s 
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individual ability to provide a detailed account might not be equal to that of another child 
providing a model statement (i.e. AMS).  Indeed, the large standard deviations for 
duration, response length and number of details for the model statements in the OMS 
condition suggest that there is much variation in children’s ability to provide a detailed 
account. 
5.3.2.5 Social/self-comparison 
Following their interviews, children in the ‘model statement’ conditions (AMS or 
OMS) were asked to compare their first and second free recalls for the true activity to the 
model statement that they heard during their interviews.  For each free recall, they were 
asked to report whether they had performed better (upward social comparison), worse 
(downward social comparison), or the same (neutral social comparison) as the person in 
the recording (i.e. themselves (OMS) or the boy they did not know (AMS)).  Type of 
comparison was coded as follows: 3 = upward, 2 = neutral and 1 = downward.  Thus, a 
high ‘score’ reflected an upward comparison and a low ‘score’ reflected a downward 
comparison.  We also asked children to rate the extent to which they compared themselves 
to the model statement that they heard (1 = did not compare themselves at all, 7 = 
compared themselves a lot). 
5.3.2.6 Perceived self-efficacy 
To measure children’s beliefs about their ability to provide an informative and 
accurate report of the true activity, children were asked to rate their level of agreement on a 
5-pt Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) with the following statements: 
(1) ‘I was able to remember everything that happened’ (informativeness), and (2) ‘I was 
able to only say things that I’m sure are correct’ (accuracy).  Higher ratings indicated 
higher self-efficacy beliefs. 
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5.3.3 Procedure 
The children were invited to take part in a science experiment that the principal 
investigator (PI) was learning to run for some of her colleagues at the university.  They 
were told that this would consist of taking part in two activities that formed the experiment 
(Testing session 1), and then being interviewed by one of her colleagues two to three days 
later about what had happened (Testing session 2).  It was explained that the purpose of the 
interview was to check that the PI was running the experiment correctly.  All children were 
tested individually. 
5.3.3.1 Testing session 1 
The PI started this session with the adapted practice interview (see details above), 
which was audio recorded.  Children were then invited to take part in the first activity, 
which was either building a Lego tower or playing a dice game.  The type of activity was 
counterbalanced.  Written instructions were provided for both activities with each activity 
being divided into four tasks.  These were read aloud by the PI to the participants.  On 
average, the activities took 323.46 seconds (SD = 41.71 seconds) to complete.  Neither 
type of activity, F(1, 50) = .31, p = .58, nor participant gender, F(1, 50) = .061, p = .81, 
affected the duration of the activity.  At the end of the first activity, the children were 
informed that the PI had forgotten to bring in the equipment necessary to complete the 
second activity and were told that the PI would get into trouble if her colleagues found out 
that she didn’t do both activities with the children.  The PI then suggested to the children 
that she could tell them all about the second activity and that they could ‘cover’ for the PI 
by making her colleague believe during their interviews that they had taken part in both 
activities as planned.  Once the children had verbally assented to providing a false report, 
the PI ran through the instructions for the activity that they had not experienced (i.e. 
playing the dice game if they had built the Lego tower or building the Lego tower if they 
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had played the dice game).  Before leaving the first testing session, the PI reiterated to the 
children that they would be interviewed and would be required to tell the truth about the 
first activity that they had actually taken part in, and that they needed to tell a lie about the 
second activity that they had not taken part in by pretending that they had actually 
conducted both activities. 
5.3.3.2 Testing session 2 
This took place 2 days after testing session 1.  To start, the PI reminded the children 
that they were only able to take part in one of the activities during the first testing session 
and would now be asked to ‘cover’ for the PI during their interviews and convince her 
colleague that they had taken part in both activities.  The children were told that it was 
therefore important to remember as many details as they could about the ‘true’ activity, as 
it was to come up with details about the ‘false’ activity based on the outline that the PI had 
given to the children in the previous testing session.   All participants were provided with 
the instructions for the ‘false’ activity that they did not experience.  They were given a 
maximum of five minutes to prepare what they wished to tell the interviewer about both 
activities.  If they were ready before the preparation time had elapsed, they notified the PI 
and were escorted to the interview room.  The children took, on average, 153.19 seconds to 
prepare for their interviews (SD = 90.05 seconds).  Neither participant gender, F(1, 50) = 
.007, p = .93, nor participant age, F(1, 50) = 1.24, p = .27, had an effect on preparation 
time.  However, type of activity did, F(1, 50) = 10.37, p = .002.  Children who prepared 
their false report about the dice activity (M = 187.36 seconds, SD = 101.30 seconds) took 
longer than children who prepared their false reports about the Lego activity (M = 116.38 
seconds, SD = 58.25 seconds), d = .85. 
 Following best practice, the interview protocol used for this experiment 
incorporated aspects of the Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992): an initial 
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rapport-building phase followed by an open request for an uninterrupted free recall of the 
two activities separately.  To improve accuracy, an instruction to try not to guess was also 
given.  Following this initial baseline recall, interview protocol changed according to the 
interview condition to which the children had been randomly allocated:  another’s model 
statement (AMS) versus own model statement (OMS) versus no model statement (NMS). 
 Children in the AMS condition were played the audio recording of the boy talking 
about his recent holiday.  Following the boy’s model statement, the interviewer 
commented that the boy in the recording had included lots of details about everything that 
had happened.  The interviewer then invited the children to provide another uninterrupted 
free recall of the two activities separately, asking them to try to add in as much detail as 
they could.  Children in the OMS condition were played the edited audio recording of their 
practice interview from Testing Session 1.  Following their own model statement, the 
interviewer commented that the children had included lots of details in their previous 
interview.  All children were told this, regardless of their performance in the practice 
interview.  This was because the practice interview represented each child’s own ability to 
be detailed and was, therefore, their own ‘model’.  The interviewer then invited the 
children to provide another uninterrupted free recall of the two activities separately, asking 
them to try to add in as much detail as they could.  Children in the ‘no model statement 
(NMS)’ condition were not played any statement and were simply invited to provide 
another uninterrupted free recall of the two activities separately.  The interviewer asked 
them to try to add in as much detail as they could. 
This interview protocol was much shorter than standard protocols used in police 
investigations due to the researchers wishing to limit the duration of the testing session.  As 
children were asked to provide four detailed, free narratives, it was also anticipated that a 
shorter interview protocol would reduce fatigue effects on their interview performance.  
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All interviews were video-recorded and later transcribed verbatim for coding purposes.  
Note that order of recall was counterbalanced and remained the same across recall attempts 
(i.e. some children talked about the ‘true’ activity first in both free recalls and some 
children talked about the ‘false’ activity first in both free recalls).   
After the interviews, children returned to the PI to rate their social comparison (if 
they were assigned to one of the ‘model statement’ conditions) and their perceived self-
efficacy.  Children then received an oral debriefing highlighting lying as an undesirable 
and discouraged behaviour.  A written debriefing was also sent home to their legal 
guardians. 
5.3.4 Coding schemes 
Two independent raters coded the children’s transcripts.  The first coder rated all 
transcripts and the second coder rated one third of transcripts (18 transcripts in total).  
Intra-class coefficients across all ‘coded’ variables were high (ICCs > .80). 
5.3.4.1 Interviewee productivity 
Participants’ four free recall attempts (first recall attempt of true activity, first recall 
attempt of false activity, second recall attempt of true activity, and second recall attempt of 
false activity) were coded separately for response length and quantity of detail.  Response 
length was represented by word count.  Any speech utterances such as hmm or uh were 
excluded.  To increase precision when coding for quantity of detail, each of the free recalls 
were coded for five different types of details: visual details (e.g. red bricks = two visual 
details), spatial details (e.g. on top of the tower = one spatial detail), temporal details (e.g. 
at the end we rolled the dice = one temporal detail), action details (e.g. I sorted the bricks 
and built the tower = two action details), and auditory details (e.g. she said that I was very 
sporty = one auditory detail).  Total number of details was then the sum of the frequencies 
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for each of these details added together.  Length of recall attempt (in words) and number of 
details being highly correlated across all conditions (rs > .62, ps < .01): as number of 
details is more important to a police investigation than number of words, this measure is 
hereafter used to represent interviewee productivity.  Finally, change in interviewee 
productivity was calculated for each participant for true and false reports separately.  This 
was calculated by subtracting the total number of details in the participants’ first recall 
attempt of the true/false activity away from the total number of details provided in their 
corresponding second recall of attempt of the true/false activity.  A positive number 
reflected an increase in interviewee productivity; a negative number reflected a decrease in 
interviewee productivity. 
5.3.4.2 Between-statement consistency 
Consistency was measured by, first, counting how many of the details provided in 
the second recall attempts of the true and false activities separately were repetitions of 
information provided in the first recall attempts of the same activity.  Second, the number 
of repeated details, for true and false activities separately, was subtracted from the total 
number of details provided in the corresponding second recall attempts to calculate the 
number of commissions (new information).  Finally, the number of repeated details, for 
true and false activities separately, was subtracted from the total number of details 
provided in the corresponding first recall attempts to calculate the number of omissions 
(omitted information). 
5.3.4.3 Memory accuracy 
A list of information that could be provided regarding each of the activities and that 
could be classified with certainty as being correct was created using the standardized 
instructions.  Each of the participants’ first and second recall attempts of the true activity 
was then coded separately.  First, each detail in the list was categorized as either 
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‘mentioned’ or ‘not mentioned’ in free recalls.  Second, all ‘mentioned’ details were coded 
as either correct or incorrect.  Finally, the number of correct details provided was divided 
by the total number of ‘mentioned’ details (correct details + incorrect details) and 
multiplied by 100 to calculate memory accuracy. 
5.4 Results 
Preliminary analyses revealed no significant effects involving participant age, 
participant gender, interviewer, true/false activity, or veracity order at recall.  Thus, all the 
data were collapsed for all subsequent analyses. 
5.4.1 Interviewee productivity 
A 2 (Veracity: True vs. false) x 3 (Interview Protocol: AMS vs. OMS vs. NMS) 
mixed ANOVA was used to test differences in change in interviewee productivity across 
recalls.  There was no significant main effect of Veracity, F(1, 51) = 1.32, p = .26.  
Children increased the amount of detail from their first recall attempt to their second recall 
attempt equally for the true (M = 3.44, SD = 11.84) and false (M = 1.52, SD = 9.11) 
activities.  There was a significant main effect of Interview Protocol, F(1, 51) = 6.95, p = 
.002.  Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment revealed that children in the 
AMS condition (M = 15.72, SD = 15.40) increased the amount of overall detail they 
provided for both activities more than those in the OMS condition (M = 2.00, SD = 11.66), 
p = .03, d = 1.00, and the NMS condition (M = -2.83, SD = 18.64), p = .002, d =1.09.  
There was no difference in the overall change in interviewee productivity for the OMS and 
NMS groups, p = 1.00.  Finally, there was no significant interaction between Veracity and 
Interview Protocol, F(2, 51) = 1.15, p = .32.  These findings partially support the 
prediction that that there would be an increase in interviewee productivity for children who 
heard a model statement compared to those who didn’t.  The prediction was correct for 
144 
 
those who heard another’s model statement but not for the children who heard their own 
model statement.  This increase in productivity for the children in the AMS condition 
occurred for both their true and false reports. 
5.4.2 Social/self-comparison, perceived self-efficacy and change in interviewee 
productivity 
These three variables were tested for the true reports provided by children in the 
AMS condition and the OMS condition separately.  First, chi-squared analyses were used 
to determine whether the three types of comparison (upward, neutral or downward) were 
equally selected.  Second, the relationships between the three pairs of variables were tested 
using Pearson’s correlation coefficients. 
5.4.2.1 Social/self-comparison and interview protocol 
Contrary to predictions, selection of comparison type (upward, neutral or 
downward) was equally distributed for the AMS condition, X2(2) = 2.33, p = .31, but not 
for the OMS condition, X2(2) = 9.00, p = .011.  When children heard AMS, 22.2% made an 
upward social comparison, 50% made a downward social comparison and 27.8% made a 
neutral comparison.  When children heard their OMS, two-thirds (66.7%) reported that 
their performance on the first recall attempt was the same as their performance in their 
practice interview, when their own model statement was recorded (neutral self-
comparison), 16.7% made an upward self-comparison and 16.7% made a downward self-
comparison. 
We looked to verify whether children’s self-reported comparisons generally 
reflected the difference, or lack thereof, between their first recall attempt and the model 
statement that they heard.  For children who heard the model statement given by another 
child, a one-sample t-test was performed to compare each participant’s average response 
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length and total details given to those of the model statement given by the other child 
(length: 319 words, details: 85).  On average, children in the AMS condition provided a 
first recall attempt of the true activity that was significantly shorter in length (M = 115.83 
words, SD = 64.81 words), t(17) = -13.30, p<.001, d = 3.21, and significantly less detailed, 
(M = 29.67 details, SD =17.26 details), t(17) = -13.60, p<.001, d= 3.13, than AMS.  For 
children who heard their OMS, paired samples t-tests were used.  On average, children in 
the OMS condition provided a first recall attempt of the true activity that was significantly 
shorter in length (M = 110.50 words, SD =46.84 words), t(17) = -7.64, p<.001, d = 1.03, 
and significantly less detailed (M = 28.61 details, SD = 9.23 details), t(17) = -6.97, p<.001, 
d = 1.64, than their OMS.  In summary, children in both ‘model statement’ conditions 
should have perceived downward social/self-comparisons. 
5.4.2.2 Social/self-comparison and change in interviewee productivity 
For the children in the AMS condition, there was no relationship between their type 
of social comparison and a change in interviewee productivity, r(16) = .07, p = .78.  
Similarly, for children in the OMS condition, there was also no relationship between 
reported self-comparison and a change in interviewee productivity, r(16) = .07, p = .77.  
Therefore no support was found for the prediction that downward comparison would spur 
on the children to increase their interviewee productivity. 
5.4.2.3 Social/self-comparison and perceived self-efficacy 
There was no relationship between reported social comparison and perceived self-
efficacy for informativeness for children in the AMS condition, r(16) = -.22, p = .37, 
neither was there a relationship between reported self-comparison and perceived self-
efficacy for informativeness for children in the OMS condition, r(16) = -.05, p = .83.  
There was also no relationship between social comparison and perceived self-efficacy for 
accuracy for children in the AMS condition, r(16) = -.06, p = .81, and again no 
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relationship between self-comparison and perceived self-efficacy for accuracy for children 
in the OMS condition, r(16) = .04, p = .89.  Therefore no support was found for the 
prediction that downward comparison would lead to reduced perceived self-efficacy. 
5.4.2.4 Perceived self-efficacy and change in interviewee productivity 
For children in the AMS condition, self-reported beliefs in their ability to provide 
an accurate report of what happened during the true activity were positively correlated with 
a change in interviewee productivity in their true reports, r(16) = .49, p = .04. There were 
no other relationships between perceived self-efficacy (neither accuracy, nor 
informativeness) and change in interviewee productivity (ps >.05). 
5.4.3 Between-statement consistency 
A 2 (Veracity: True vs. False) x 3 (Interview Protocol: AMS vs. OMS vs. NMS) 
mixed ANOVAs was used to test differences in commissions, omissions and repetitions 
during the children’s second recall attempts. 
5.4.3.1 Commissions 
There was no significant main effect of Veracity, F(1, 51) = 1.69, p  = .20, on 
commissions.  Children added the same amount of new information into their second recall 
attempt about the true activity (M = 16.02, SD = 7.56) as they did about the false activity 
(M = 14.35, SD = 9.76).  There was a significant main effect of Interview Protocol, F(2, 
51) = 4.76, p = .013.  Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment revealed that 
children in the AMS condition (M = 40.22, SD = 23.06) provided more commissions 
overall than those in the OMS condition (M = 24.50, SD = 12.48), p = .02, d = .85, and the 
control NMS condition (M = 26.39, SD = 12.20), p = .04, d = .75.  There was no difference 
between the OMS and NMS groups, p = 1.00.  Finally, there was no significant Veracity X 
Interview Protocol interaction effect, F(2, 51) = .95, p  = .39. 
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5.4.3.2 Omissions 
There was no significant effect of Veracity, F(1, 51) = .06, p  = .81, on omissions.  
Children omitted as much information overall from their true reports (M = 12.57, SD = 
8.61) as from their false reports (M = 12.83, SD = 7.48).  There was no significant effect of 
Interview Protocol, F(2, 51) = 1.08, p = .35.  Number of overall omissions did not differ 
between children who heard AMS (M = 24.50, SD = 17.24), children who heard their OMS 
(M = 22.50, SD = 8.42) and children who heard no model statement (M = 29.22, SD = 
15.07).  There was also no significant Veracity X Interview Protocol interaction effect, 
F(2, 51) = .83, p = .44. 
5.4.3.3 Repetitions 
There was a significant main effect of Veracity, F(1, 51) = 19.10, p<.001, on 
repetitions.  Children repeated significantly more details in their false reports (M = 21.44, 
SD = 7.91) than in their true reports (M = 17.69, SD = 7.56), d =.60.  There was no 
significant main effect of Interview Protocol, F(2, 51) = .17, p  = .84.  Number of overall 
repetitions did not differ between children in the AMS condition (M = 40.61, SD = 16.19), 
OMS condition (M = 38.94, SD = 13.37), and NMS condition (M = 37.83, SD = 13.32).  
There was also no significant interaction effect between Veracity and Interview Protocol, 
F(2, 51) = .95, p = .40. 
In summary, both true and false reports provided by children in the AMS condition 
contained significantly more new information than the reports of the children in the OMS 
and ‘NMS’ conditions.  We predicted that the children in both model statement conditions 
would be more inconsistent that the children who did not hear a model statement.  This 
was only the case for the children who heard another’s model statement.  Children who 
heard their own model statement were no different, in terms of consistency, from those 
who did not hear a model statement.  Furthermore, these findings do not support the 
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predictions that truthful children who heard their own model statement would be more 
inconsistent than lie-telling children who heard their own model statement nor do they 
support the prediction that children who heard their own model statement would be more 
inconsistent than those who heard another’s model statement. 
5.4.4 Memory accuracy 
A 2 (Recall Attempt: First vs. Second) x 3 (Interview Protocol: AMS vs. OMS vs. 
NMS) mixed ANOVA was performed to examine differences in total number of correct 
details, total number of incorrect details and overall memory accuracy for the truthful 
accounts. 
5.4.4.1 Correct details 
There was no main effect of Recall Attempt, F(1, 51) = .15, p = .70.  The amount 
of correct details provided did not differ from the first recall attempt (M = 13.24, SD = 
5.53) to the second recall attempt (M = 13.50, SD = 5.93).  There was no main effect of 
Interview Protocol, F(2, 51) = .38, p = .69. There was no difference in the overall number 
of correct details provided by children in the AMS condition (M = 27.78, SD = 14.75), 
OMS condition (M = 25.00, SD = 7.55), and NMS condition (M = 27.44, SD = 7.27).  
There was also no Recall Attempt X Interview Protocol interaction effect, F(2, 51) = 2.27, 
p = .11. 
5.4.4.2 Incorrect details 
There was no main effect of Recall Attempt, F(1, 51) = .51, p = .48.  Number of 
incorrect details did not change from the first recall attempt (M = 1.78, SD = 1.49) to the 
second recall attempt (M = 1.94, SD = 1.56).  There was a significant main effect of 
Interview Protocol, F(2, 51) = 3.43, p = .04.  However, pairwise comparisons using 
Bonferroni adjustment revealed no significant differences in overall number of incorrect 
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details between each of the three interview protocols.  Children in the AMS condition (M = 
4.94, SD = 2.90) did not provide significantly more or less incorrect details than those in 
the OMS condition (M = 3.06, SD = 2.07), p = .07, or the NMS condition (M = 3.17, SD = 
2.23), p = .09.  There was also no difference in incorrect details between the OMS 
condition and the NMS condition, p = 1.00.  The stricter statistical rigour imposed by using 
Bonferroni adjustment could account for the lack of any significant differences at this level 
of analysis.  There was no Recall Attempt X Interview Protocol interaction effect, F(2, 51) 
<.001, p = 1.00. 
5.4.4.3 Overall accuracy 
There was no main effect of Recall Attempt, F(1, 51) = .04, p = .84.  Children were 
equally accurate in their first recall attempt (M = 88.24%, SD = 9.28%) as they were in 
their second recall attempt (M = 87.95%, SD = 8.52%).  There was no main effect of 
Interview Protocol, F(2, 51) = 2.56, p = .087.  Children maintained high accuracy 
irrespective of the interview condition to which they were allocated (AMS, M = 85.05%, 
SD = 7.56; OMS, M = 89.33%, SD = 6.88%; NMS, M = 89.90, SD = 6.60%).  Finally, 
there was no interaction effect, F(2, 51) = .88, p = .42. 
In summary, supporting our prediction, using model statements did not make the children’s 
true reports any less accurate than those that were elicited when no model statement was 
used. 
5.5 Discussion 
The present study aimed to investigate further the effects of using model statements 
on children’s true and false reports.  It looked to extend previous research with children 
(Brackmann et al., 2016; Chapter 3) by transforming practice interviews into children’s 
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own model statements as a substitute for listening to the amount of detail another child can 
provide.  
Our findings revealed that it was only when children heard another child’s model 
statement (AMS) that their interviewee productivity increased.  Hearing an excerpt of their 
practice interview (i.e. their own model statement, OMS) had no effect on the number of 
details they provided in their second recall attempt when talking about either the true or the 
false activity.  The lack of any significant change in interviewee productivity for children 
who heard no model statement (NMS) demonstrates that an increase for the AMS 
condition is not an artefact of repeated questioning.  These findings for AMS support 
previous studies (Chapter 3; Ewens et al., 2016; Leal et al., 2015) that also found an 
increase in productivity for both true and false reports when using AMS.  Examining the 
theoretical underpinnings of AMS revealed that this positive change in interviewee 
productivity was solely related to having high perceived self-efficacy beliefs for being able 
to provide an accurate account.   Although children did report using AMS as a social proof 
(Cialdini, 1993) more often than not, social comparison type was not associated with any 
change in interviewee productivity.  This finding is contrary to that of Ewens et al. (2016).  
It might be that their type of comparison (downward, upward or neural) affected the 
current participants’ interviewee productivity in a way that was not measured in the present 
study. 
Using an extract of a child’s practice interview as his/her own model statement did 
not have the desired effect of increasing interviewee productivity, which could be due to 
no relationships being found between self-comparison, perceived self-efficacy and 
interviewee productivity.  In the field, practice interviews are typically conducted just prior 
to the substantive phase of questioning (Lamb et al., 2007).  In the present study, there was 
a two-to-three-day delay between the practice interview and the interview about the target 
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events.  This could indicate that training effects of practicing retrieval wear off in the long-
term (i.e. after 48 hours) and simply playing a reminder of how detailed the children were a 
couple of days prior to the interview is insufficient in terms of re-training.  Another 
explanation could be the brevity of the practice interviews conducted in the current 
experiment.  The benefits of conducting a practice interview can depend on the quality of 
the practice interview carried out, with only good interviews eliciting significantly more 
detail than no practice interview (Price et al., 2013).  Short practice interviews may not 
have helped build up a framework for how to answer open-ended questions, meaning that 
when they were played back the children were not reminded about techniques for 
providing a complete report, and so performed the same as children in the no model 
statement condition. 
 The between-statement consistency of children’s true and false reports was solely 
affected by the use of AMS in that the children in the AMS condition provided 
significantly more new information (commissions) in their true and false reports compared 
to the children in the OMS and NMS conditions.  This is line with previous hypotheses 
(Bruck et al., 2002; Granhag et al., 2003) that longer statements, whether truthful or 
deceitful, will be more inconsistent.  Eliciting more truthful commissions is beneficial to a 
police investigation because it provides new leads.  Moreover, in the current study, no 
omissions were made, that is, none of the original information given by the children was 
left out to make room for the new information. Increasing the level of inconsistency in 
false reports could be beneficial if the inconsistencies in these reports are accurately 
perceived by lay person juries (Fisher, Brewer & Mitchell, 2009).  An increase in 
inconsistent information, however, works to the disadvantage of truth-tellers in the 
courtroom whose more inconsistent reports might not be believed by jurors. 
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In response to Talwar and Crossman (2012), we examined the adverse effects of 
using model statements on accurate reporting.  Unlike Chapter 3 where we gave no 
forewarning that the target event would take place, we told our child participants that they 
would later be questioned about the activities.  In line with Brackmann et al. (2016) whose 
child participants were also able to give the target event their full attention, memory 
accuracy was maintained regardless of interview protocol.  Children were, therefore, able 
to become more informative following AMS without sacrificing the accuracy of the 
information they gave (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008).  In the current study, 
informativeness can be measured by quantity of detail as well as the quantity of 
correct/incorrect details.  No increase in the latter two variables runs counter to our result 
that those in the AMS condition became more productive after hearing the model 
statement.  This contradiction might be a consequence of our coding scheme: as we were 
only able to code for standardised aspects of the activities (i.e. aspects that we could code 
as correct/incorrect with certainty), there were many details that were not coded.  To carry 
out a more complete assessment of the effects of model statements on truth-tellers’ 
accuracy, the to-be-remembered event could be filmed to capture everything that 
happened.  However, this would require hidden cameras so that children’s behaviour is not 
affected. This is a commodity that was not available to us. 
 For the current study we used a short and non-elaborative interview protocol, which 
made it practically dissimilar to real police investigations where more thorough interview 
protocols are used (e.g. NICHD investigative interview protocol, Lamb et al., 2007; 
Revised Cognitive Interview, McCauley & Fisher, 1995).  The decision to only ask for free 
recalls was, first, to reduce fatigue effects on interviewee performance, and, second, to 
focus our attention on how using a model statement provides a framework for answering 
open-ended questions.  ‘Tell me everything that happened’ is an open request that children 
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can find hard to answer without guidance (Lamb et al., 2007; Saykaly et al., 2016).  The 
present study demonstrated that using AMS helped children to provide more details; 
particularly more new details in their true reports that were no less accurate than when 
responding to an initial ‘free recall’ request.  The child participants in the current study 
were telling true or false reports about enjoyable play activities, which were arguably not 
generalizable to the topics of real police investigations.  Level of stress can have a 
significant effect on the linguistic patterns in children’s true and false reports, resulting in 
different verbal predictors of veracity (Brunet et al., 2013).  Replicating the present study 
with a stressful activity could, therefore, result in different verbal behaviours.  Finally, we 
used simple self-reporting methods to evaluate comparisons to the model statements and 
perceptions of self-efficacy.  However, these ratings are not always a true reflection of the 
actual state of affairs.  In the present study, 50% of the children in the AMS condition 
reported that they performed the same or better than the child who gave the model 
statement for the AMS condition, yet analyses showed that, on average, the group 
performed significantly worse than him.  Thus, the lack of relationships between these 
variables could be due to inaccurate and unreliable measures. 
Future research should continue to examine and clarify the social and cognitive 
mechanisms that influence interviewee productivity when using model statements, such as 
perceived self-efficacy.  In the present study, all children reported high levels of self-
efficacy, thus the results are only generalisable to children who strongly believe that they 
can provide informative and accurate reports.  A more rigorous measure of self-efficacy 
needs to be established that allows for greater variations in children’s perceived beliefs in 
their recall ability to be revealed (e.g. adapted from the Self-efficacy scale in the Motivated 
Strategies for Learning Questionnaire, Pintrich & De Groot; Pintrich, Smith, Garcia & 
McKeachie, 1993).   This would help to tease apart how using a model statement creates a 
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relationship between perceived self-efficacy and increased interviewee productivity.  It 
would also be more methodologically sound to capture participants’ self-efficacy beliefs 
after hearing a model statement (but before a second recall attempt) to measure the direct 
effect of hearing a model statement on their perceived ability to provide an account of the 
target event.  In the present study, self-efficacy ratings were taken post-interview to ensure 
that children were blind to the aims and hypotheses of the study.  In addition, we could 
have gone beyond self-efficacy to investigate performance motivation and questioned 
children about their goal orientation.  In the educational literature, task-focused goals have 
been linked to high self-efficacy (Wolters, Yu & Pintrich, 1996), which could explain why 
self-efficacy was not associated with interviewee performance for all children.   
 In conclusion, there is something about the presentation of a model statement given 
by another child that makes children say more.  This effect is not present when children are 
played their own practice narrative, nor is it when they are presented with no model 
statement at all.  In the present study, interviewee productivity increased for both true and 
false reports.  The theoretical mechanisms underpinning these findings require further 
exploration. 
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6.1 Abstract 
Focus groups with police officers, who regularly interview child witnesses, were held to 
evaluate current research into cognitive lie detection strategies with children in terms of 
their relevance to child interviewing practice.  Sixteen participants across three focus 
groups provided practitioner feedback on the scope for incorporating lie detection 
techniques into child interview practice.  Conducting thematic analysis on the focus group 
transcripts revealed advantages, disadvantages and suggestions for use for some, but not 
all, of the techniques.  Further thematic analysis of the transcripts highlighted four 
endeavours that these police officers were trying to pursue in their child interviews: The 
4E’s.  First, eliciting as much information as possible remains the primary focus of 
interviews.  Second, evaluating the credibility of that information must be considered 
within the bigger picture of the incident.  Third, enabling the interviewee is important both 
before and during the interview.  Finally, producing an end product that will be accepted in 
court and will protect a child witness is key.  These broad aims provide a simple 
framework against which future lie detection techniques with children could be assessed 
when considering their transition from theory into practice. 
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6.2 Introduction 
As previously mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis (Chapter 1), the aim of 
the PhD programme was to explore the viability of cognitive lie detection techniques that 
had demonstrated promising results with adults and had yet to be tested with children.  The 
previous chapters have demonstrated that imposing cognitive load using gaze maintenance 
(Chapter 2) and encouraging interviewees to say more using model statements (Chapter 3) 
can exaggerate behavioural differences between children’s true and false reports, with 
varying effects on improving adults’ ability to determine children’s credibility.  Thus, there 
is already evidence that cognitive lie detection techniques could present a new credibility 
tool for uncovering children’s deceit.  In this chapter, we will explore the issue of 
‘practitioner use’ highlighted by the Joint Inspection conducted by Her Majesty’s Inspector 
of Constabularies and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (Criminal 
Justice Joint Inspection, 2014).  To recap, this report noted low compliance with 
techniques that are currently recommended, which aim to discourage dishonest behaviour.  
Any new technique must, therefore, be practically favourable, as well as being empirically 
supported by the literature.  Interview techniques that are unlikely to be used by child 
interviewers may not have the desired effect of facilitating child deception detection. 
 The transition from laboratory studies to practical use in the field requires a two-
way conversation between academics and practitioners.  Through this feedback loop, 
academics first explain how psychological mechanisms can be manipulated in theory, and 
practitioners then highlight aspects of the target environment that might inhibit this effect 
in practice.  Academics should then alter their research paradigms to account for these ‘real 
world’ considerations and so the conversation continues.  This feedback loop has 
facilitated the revision of many investigative interview techniques for use in the field (e.g. 
the Cognitive Interview, Dando, Wilcock & Milne, 2008; the National Institute of Child 
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Health and Human Development (NICHD) Investigative Interview Protocol, Lamb, 
Orbach, Herschkowitz, Esplin & Horowitz, 2007; the Self-Administered Interview, Hope, 
Gabbert, & Fisher, 2011).   
The practical value of using cognitive lie detection techniques with adult 
interviewees has already been evaluated.  Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham and Brankaert (2015) 
conducted training workshops with experienced police detectives in which they were 
briefly trained in how various cognitive lie detection techniques work and how best to 
utilise them effectively.  The police officers in this study were then free to interview a 
mock suspect incorporating as many of the newly learnt techniques as they wished.  Only 
7% of the questions asked during the post-training interviews were related to the taught 
techniques, and when police detectives reported that they had implemented certain 
techniques, it was not in line with the way in which they had been trained to do so.  Poor 
training effects might be due to a brief training workshop rather than poor compliance; the 
workshop only lasted 5.5 hours and covered brief descriptions of 10 techniques meaning 
that the police officers may not have fully understood the techniques.  Furthermore, the 
participants were not given the opportunity to actually practice incorporating the 
techniques into their interviews nor were they given any feedback.  Instead of disliking the 
techniques, the police detectives may have simply not understood how to implement them.  
A further limitation of the Vrij et al. (2015) study was that only quantitative performance 
measures were taken. Therefore it was not possible to ascertain the police officers’ 
perceptions of the practical value of the cognitive lie detection techniques.  As the aim of 
this study was to achieve a more in-depth appraisal of the use of cognitive lie detection 
techniques with children, a qualitative methodology was used. 
Another advantage of using a qualitative design was that it aided our understanding 
of the broader context in which child interviewing takes place. It was hoped that this might 
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help us to understand the finer details of the investigative process that would come from 
practical experience rather than a literature review.  Previous laboratory studies have aimed 
to mirror real world interviews with children as much as ethically possible.  For example, 
by using samples of maltreated children who are already witnesses/victims within the 
criminal justice system (Lyon & Dorado, 2008; Lyon, Malloy, Quas & Talwar, 2008), 
‘touching’ games whereby an adult touches parts of a child’s body (in the context of the 
game) and the children are later interviewed, (Edelstein, Luten, Ekman & Goodman, 
2006), witnessing a theft and reporting it to a ‘police officer’ (Tye, Amato, Honts, Devitt & 
Peters, 1999), and talking about true and false stories about stressful injuries (Brunet et al., 
2013).  Nevertheless, these studies can never truly reflect the diversity of the children 
interviewed and the diversity of the circumstances that led up to those children being 
interviewed, which come with real field investigations.  As strict ethical considerations 
apply when testing sensitive populations (Fisher, 2005) we must turn to the practitioners, 
who see these child witnesses’ progress from first disclosure to final verdict in court, to 
understand the intricacies of this process and how these intricacies might be in conflict 
with the methodologies that we are investigating. 
 The present study, therefore, aimed to put our child deception theory into child 
interviewing practice by asking police officers, who regularly interview children, to 
evaluate the interview techniques investigated in Chapters 2 to 5.  A secondary objective 
was to understand the broader ‘child interviewing’ context in which the interview 
techniques would be implemented.  It was hoped that this would help to identify any 
overarching compatibility issues that affect the transition from lab to field and could help 
when designing and/or adapting interview techniques in the future. 
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6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Participants 
Each focus group was made up of 5-6 police officers (N = 16, 10 females, 6 males) 
that regularly interview child witnesses.  Focus groups 1 and 3 were from the same police 
constabulary in the South of England, whilst focus group 2 was from a different police 
force in the North of England.  Overall, participants had 3 to 40 years of experience 
working for the police (M = 17.09 years, SD = 8.16) and 5 months to 22 years of 
experience interviewing children in their police role (M = 8.56 years, SD = 6.16 years).  
There were no differences between focus groups, in overall police experience, F(2, 13) = 
.10, p = .90, nor for interviewing children, F(2, 13) = .41, p = .67.  In terms of police 
ranking, 7 participants (43.8%) were detective constables, 6 (37.5%) were police 
constables and the remaining were a police staff investigator and two Tier 5 interview 
advisors.  All participants reported (except one person who didn’t respond) having 
undergone an ABE interviewing course.  The age of the children that participants routinely 
interviewed ranged from 2 to 17 years old for the majority of the sample (62.5%).  The rest 
of the sample interviewed adolescents (13 to 17 year-old children) only. 
6.3.2 Procedure 
Police officers were asked to give informed consent to their participation.  
Following this, the Principal Investigator (PI) outlined the layout of the sessions and 
ground rules for the focus group discussions.  For each session, the PI gave a 20-minute 
presentation regarding her cognitive lie detection findings with children for the following 
techniques: imposing cognitive load through gaze maintenance (Chapter 2), using a model 
statement provided by another child (Chapters 3 and 3), and using a self-generated model 
statement derived from a practice interview (Chapter 5).  For the first and second 
techniques, this involved a full explanation of the theoretical underpinnings of the studies 
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as well as the corresponding results.  As data collection had not yet been undertaken for the 
third technique (Chapter 5), only the theory behind the expected outcomes of transforming 
a practice interview into a self-generated model statement was presented. 
 The presentations were then followed by semi-structured focus group discussions 
covering the following topics: current training/techniques to assess child credibility, 
evaluation of cognitive lie detection techniques with child witnesses, the role of age in 
assessing credibility and finally the participants were asked to highlight anything else that 
the PI’s programme of research had overlooked.  The focus groups were audio-recorded 
using a Dictaphone and later transcribed verbatim. 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Analytic strategy 
The focus group transcripts were coded inductively using thematic analysis.  As the 
primary focus of the research was to gain practitioner feedback on the viability of the 
interview techniques, discussions relating to each of the three techniques were first 
analysed separately for emerging themes.  Next, all the data across all three focus groups 
was compiled to code for broader themes that represented how the police officers 
understood the process of child witness interviewing in the UK.  For both levels of 
analysis, the focus group transcripts were, firstly, summarised and reduced down to smaller 
“packets” of information, which were then analysed for themes in the data (Boyatzis, 
1998).  Emerging themes had to reflect similarities across multiple participants’ responses.  
A table displaying the number of participants who represented each theme and the overall 
contribution each participant made is displayed in Figure 6.1 on the next page. 
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Figure 6.1 Summary of themes highlighting participant contribution per them. FG = Focus group. P = Participant letter. AD = Advantages. DIS 
= Disadvantages. SUG = Suggestions for use.
  Evaluation of interview 
techniques 
Broader child-interviewing context 
  AD DIS SUG Extracting information Evaluating information 
Empowering the 
interviewee 
End product 
FG P 
O 
M 
S 
G
A
Z 
E 
A
M
S 
O
M
S 
G
A
Z 
E 
O
M
S 
Techniques 
Internal 
barriers 
How to 
assess child 
credibility 
Accounting 
for other 
factors 
Strengthen 
the 
interviewee 
Flexibility 
Preparing 
the 
evidence 
Cross-
examination 
1 
A               
B               
C               
D               
E               
F               
2 
A               
B               
C               
D               
E               
3 
A               
B               
C               
D               
E               
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For the evaluation of techniques, three themes emerged: advantages, disadvantages 
and suggestions for use.  However, these three themes were not represented across all three 
techniques (see Figure 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.2 Representation of superordinate themes by each of the interview 
techniques 
For the broader child-interviewing context, four themes emerged: eliciting 
information, evaluating information, empowering the interviewee, and the all-important 
end product.  Subsequent analysis broke these four themes down into sub-ordinate 
categories – two subordinate categories emerged from the data for each of these four 
superordinate themes (see Figure 6.3).  The thematic structure was discussed and agreed 
upon with the PI’s PhD supervisor.  For the following quotes, ‘FG’ refers to the focus 
group number and ‘P’ refers to the participant letter that was assigned to each member of 
each focus group. […] depicts the deletion of unnecessary text in the quote. 
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Figure 6.3 Superordinate and subordinate themes within the broad child-
interviewing context 
6.4.2 Evaluation of cognitive lie detection techniques 
Three main themes emerged from participants’ responses that captured their 
appraisal of the three cognitive lie detection techniques presented: Advantages, 
Disadvantages, and Suggestions for use.  Below we will present each of the superordinate 
themes with the relevant comments for the interview techniques. 
6.4.2.1 Advantages 
The first theme encompassed the advantages of using such techniques with child 
witnesses.  That said the participants discussed the benefits only relating to the use of 
children’s own model statements.  Thus, they did not identify any benefits of asking 
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children to maintain gaze nor did they speak positively about playing child witnesses 
another child’s model statement. 
6.4.2.1.1 Child’s own model statement 
Transforming a practice interview into a model statement was considered to be; 
“the most viable option” (FG2, PC), with 3 participants (19% of the sample) providing 
advantages regarding its use.  Participants commented that it would be a good reminder of 
what was expected of the children at interview; “then they would realise the detail that was 
needed” (FG1, PB), and it would also have “trained them in five/ten minutes to answer 
open questions and to give higher levels of detail” (FG2, PC).  The self-generated nature of 
using a child’s own model statement was considered to be particularly beneficial because it 
would provide a useful baseline for that child, “demonstrating that child’s cognitive ability 
to remember” (FG2, PA) and “establish[ing] before the interview what their ability is” 
(FG2, PC).  The participants couldn’t see any problems inherent in playing children’s own 
model statements back to them because “it’s self-generated… it’s always going to be age-
appropriate, development appropriate” (FG2, PC). 
6.4.2.2 Disadvantages 
This second theme encompassed participants’ perceptions of the problems inherent in 
using cognitive lie detection techniques with child witnesses.  Although participants 
discussed the disadvantages for all of the techniques presented, there were similarities and 
differences in problems highlighted across techniques. 
6.4.2.2.1 Maintaining gaze 
The disadvantages of asking child interviewees to maintain gaze could be 
summarised as: (1) inappropriate for sensitive offences, (2) in conflict with current 
practice, and (3) simply impractical.  None of these disadvantages overlapped with those of 
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using another child’s model statement or a child’s own model statement.  Firstly, 
maintaining gaze was considered inappropriate for sensitive offences.  From their practical 
experience, participants reported that when children were interviewed about a traumatic 
event, it was quite difficult to establish eye contact, even to the extent that “the only way 
she would talk to me was by doing her colouring so she wasn’t even looking at me at all” 
(FG1, PD).  This could be due to the discomfort children feel when talking about sexual 
incidents; “they can’t look you in the eye because to them they shouldn’t be saying it in the 
first place” (FG2, PB).  Feelings of embarrassment can also mean that they’ll ask to write 
words down because “there’ll just be some words that they just can’t say” (FG2, PC).  
Sometimes the trauma of the incident can be such a barrier to eliciting information from 
children that there was concern that they wouldn’t elicit “as much information from them” 
(FG1, PD) when using a gaze maintenance instruction. 
The second disadvantage was that requiring children to look at them ran counter to 
the instructions that they already gave: 
 
Quite often in the introductions we will say, “If you find it more comfortable to 
close your eyes or look somewhere else, please do so ‘cause if that helps you 
concentrate that’s better for us ‘cause we want as much information as we can get. 
(FG1, PB) 
 
On the one hand, participants could understand why asking children to maintain 
eye contact would make it harder for them to tell a lie because it would be an added 
pressure.  On the other hand, they explicitly said that this wasn’t their aim; “we’re not after 
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trying to put the child under pressure, we’re after trying to establish the truth” (FG1, PB).  
It was felt that the interviewer should never be seen to be “overpowering” (FG3, PA), and 
that maintaining gaze “would be potentially considered oppressive in a practical setting” 
(FG2, PC).  Indeed, the added burden of establishing eye contact with the interviewer 
could have an adverse effect on truth-tellers; “if they have established eye contact and they 
don’t tell us [what happened], we can’t safeguard them” (FG1, PB).  In other words, 
participants highlighted that if the techniques don’t help to elicit more information from 
children then they are counterproductive in an interview setting. 
Finally, the third disadvantage was that using gaze maintenance with children was 
impractical.  During interviews, children are often mobile; “some of them, they don’t even 
sit on their bottoms, let alone sitting there and looking at you” (FG1, PA), or completing 
other activities, like drawing pictures, that help to elicit more information; “it’s very 
difficult to maintain eye contact in a real situation because [...] they’ll describe the room 
and they’ll [the interviewers] say, “draw that for me” so then they’re drawing” (FG2, PB).  
An instruction to draw what happened would, therefore, be in conflict with an instruction 
to maintain gaze and could leave children wondering with which instruction they should 
comply.  It might also be impractical because children have short attention spans.  People 
don’t naturally maintain gaze so “you would have to repeatedly remind them” (FG2, PC) 
and even then children might not comply because “for some young children that would be 
quite hard to do it all the way through” (FG1, PB) and some children have got attention 
difficulties; “with the ADHD and Autism Asperger they’re not going to sit there and 
maintain eye contact with you” (FG3, PC).  Finally, requiring gaze maintenance was not 
considered feasible because it would increase the cognitive load experienced by the 
interviewer, which is already high: 
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The cognitive requirement of a child interviewer is unrecognised I think by a lot of 
people because, if you think, there’s you in the room with a child, you’re thinking 
about what do I know about the job, what’s my interview plan, my questioning 
style, keep them on track, encouraging them, welfare, who’s outside the room, what 
facts do I know that the child doesn’t know so that I don’t contaminate. (FG2, PC) 
 
Furthermore, it would be difficult for practitioners to maintain eye contact in return 
because they are trained to take brief notes during interviews (Marlow & Hilbourne, 2013).  
It was noted that children might find it unfair if the interviewer isn’t always looking at 
them; “every now and again you’re looking down, writing a little word and then looking 
back up at them, they’re thinking, “well you’re not maintaining eye contact with me”” 
(FG2, PC).  So, poor compliance could also be due to the children being put off by the lack 
of reciprocated gaze. 
6.4.2.2.2 Another child’s model statement 
The perceived disadvantages of playing a detailed example of another child talking 
about an unrelated (i.e. another child’s model statement) could be summarised as: (1) 
tainting, (2) longer interviews, and (3) providing an inappropriate example.  The last two 
disadvantages were also expressed in relation to the ‘child’s own model statement’ 
technique.  Firstly, participants stressed the importance of eliciting a completely untainted 
account and the criticism they could face if there were any signs of coaching; “we have to 
be totally transparent and impartial and we get criticised that we’re goading or that we’re 
influencing children or that we’re preparing them for the interview” (FG1, PA).  In 
particular, the participants would be reluctant to play an account provided by another child 
because it could contaminate their child interviewee’s account; “it could be argued by the 
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defence that the child had picked up some details from the account to embellish their own 
account” (FG1, PD).  One participant even went so far as to say that, “it would only take 
one tiny similarity for the defence to say, “ well if that’s similar, the whole thing is 
nonsensical” (FG2, PD), which demonstrates that they think that playing another child’s 
model statement is a risk that simply isn’t worth taking.  Research, into using another’s 
model statement, states that it should be unrelated to the to-be-remembered event (Leal et 
al., 2015; Vrij, 2015).  However, the effects of using another’s model statement on source 
monitoring have yet to be directly tested and, thus, cannot be assumed.  Source monitoring 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, Allen, Chan & Dahl, 2004) could be a 
potential issue.  The extent to which the ‘model statement’ event needs to be conceptually 
dissimilar to the witnessed event is likely to run along a continuum of high to low risk. 
Secondly, lengthening the interview would “eat into your best evidence” (FG1, 
PA).  As some participants had experience of interviewing young children, they reflected 
on how the children’s short attention spans already reduced the amount of time that they 
had to interview them in the first place.  Adding in a model statement section “could 
basically burst the bubble” (FG3, PB), confusing the child and resulting in less information 
being elicited before they get tired or lose concentration. 
Finally, playing another’s child model statement was considered to be inadvisable 
because it would be an inappropriate example in terms of its age appropriateness and in 
terms of giving child lie-tellers a template.  Firstly, there were concerns that another child’s 
ability to provide a detailed account may not be realistic for the child being questioned; “it 
would be inappropriate expectations for that child [truth-teller]” (FG2, PC).  In other 
words, the child being interviewed may simply not be able to give as much detail as the 
child in the model statement.  Furthermore, the length of delay between event and recall 
could be longer or shorter for the child in the model statement compared to the child 
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witness, with the effects of delay on recall ability varying from one child to the next.  Even 
playing the model statement of a child of the same age as the child interviewee would not 
be appropriate due to developmental differences; “another one recently she couldn’t string 
a sentence together and was four so even if you’re balancing it off against another four-
year-old, this little girl’s not got the capability of even saying three words in a row” (FG2, 
PB).  On the other hand, one participant questioned: 
 
Are we just giving them [child lie-tellers] more ammunition to say, “well this is 
how it’s done” so they’re already thinking and exaggerating their account a little bit 
to fill it up so that they’re giving you more detail? (FG3, PC) 
 
Overall, participants were suggesting the possibility that another child’s model 
statement, provided by another child, might raise the standards too high for child truth-
tellers but give child lie-tellers the means to achieve these higher standards. 
6.4.2.2.3 Child’s own model statement 
As previously mentioned, both ‘longer interviews’ and ‘providing an inappropriate 
example’ were disadvantages that also emerged when participants discussed using a child’s 
practice interview as their own model statement.  The concerns regarding longer interviews 
largely overlapped with previous issues for using another child’s model statement.  
Participants felt that adding this extra component into the interview protocol would take 
away precious time that could be used to gather information.  In particular, it might 
interrupt the child’s willingness to talk: 
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You take them to an interview, they’re ready and they’re eager to just […] talk to 
you. So if you then delay that by doing a little practice with them say, they might 
lose momentum. (FG3, PC) 
 
Reflecting on current practice, one participant followed up that comment by saying, 
“we can limit some just with our introductions if they’re too long.  Sometimes you’ve just 
got to let them talk straightaway” (FG3, PD). 
The participants’ concerns regarding ‘providing an inappropriate detail’ differed, 
however, from another child’s model statement when discussing its effect on truth-telling 
children.  Participants felt that practising talking about a non-traumatic event might elicit a 
detailed response but when this was used as a basis for talking about a traumatic detail, 
then the expectations of providing detail might be unachievable.  There were two ways in 
which participants thought that children might deal with unrealistic expectations; “they 
might feel that they’re letting you down and themselves down” (FG1, PD), or “they 
[might] feel that they might need to add in more detail to the incident that they don’t 
remember much about” (FG1, PC).  Either way children’s reactions might be negative.  In 
terms of their own model statement being an ‘inappropriate example’ for lie-telling 
children, the feedback, similar to that for using another child’s model statement, suggested 
that the child lie-tellers would use this to elaborate their lie: 
 
The ones that are lying, are we just giving them more ammunition to say, “well this 
is how we want the interview done” so then they’re already thinking and 
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exaggerating their account a little bit to fill it up so that they’re giving you more 
detail? (FG3, PC) 
 
The same participant also suggested that child lie-tellers might use the practice 
interview to check that they can lie convincingly by lying then too. The interviewer might 
then, inadvertently, reinforce lie-telling behaviour; “the only worry would be 
reinforcement, “oh it’s very good because you’ve lied your way through that practice 
interview and I’m telling you how perfectly you’ve done”” (FG3, PC). 
6.4.2.3 Suggestions for use 
The third theme in terms of the lie detection techniques concentrated on suggestions for 
practical use, namely ways in which the techniques could be adapted for use in real life 
investigations.  Participants did not include any suggestions for use regarding the use of 
another child’s unrelated narrative to encourage interviewees to say more. Participants did 
provide suggestions for adaptations of the use of gaze maintenance and playing a child’s 
own model statement in the field that largely linked to the disadvantages highlighted for 
those techniques. 
6.4.2.3.1 Maintaining gaze 
To combat the additional load of continually asking a child to maintain gaze on the 
interviewer, it was suggested that, “you would have to engage the help of maybe the note 
taker or the co-interviewer who sits in another room” (FG2, PC).  In other words, have a 
co-worker who is already involved in the interview to share the load.  Unrelated to the 
disadvantages mentioned, participants also suggested that asking a child to maintain gaze 
with the interviewer “could be used as a follow-up technique” when “there’s something not 
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right” (FG2, PC).  It would, therefore, not be used during the whole interview but “at 
specific parts” (FG3, PD). 
6.4.2.3.2 Child’s own model statement 
Suggestions for use for this technique divided into ‘who’ it should be used with, 
‘how long’ it should last and ‘when’ it should take place in the investigative process.  
Firstly, participants thought that, “you could do it for certain offences possibly […] if it’s 
not something so traumatic” (FG1, PB).  This would resolve the issue of children not being 
able to give as much detail as they did about the non-traumatic event in their practice 
interview when talking about the actual offence.  Other individual characteristics, such as 
age; “for the older people” (FG3, PA), or, such as disposition; “you might get a really 
nervous one you would just need to get them talking and get them to feel comfortable then 
a practice interview might be good for that” (FG3, PC), might make it more suitable for 
inclusion in child interviewing practice. 
To reduce its negative effect on the overall duration of the interview, it was 
suggested that brevity would be the aim of the game; “the practice interview is a good idea 
if it’s short and succinct” (FG1, PB), “just like a very short operation” (FG3, PA).  If it was 
kept to five or ten minutes long, then this should not affect children’s concentration.  
Furthermore, if it was not captured on the disc shown in court, then that would be 
additionally beneficial because “it’s all about time, time, time in the courts” (FG2, PA). 
Finally, in relation to keeping interviews short, it was proposed that “the best bet” 
(FG1, PA) would be for the practice interview to take place and be played back to the child 
as part of an intermediary assessment (i.e. as a separate process from the interview itself).  
At court, it could be entered as “unused material” (FG2, PC), which the judge could call 
upon if s/he wished to know how detailed the child could be (i.e. their baseline).  It was 
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further suggested that researchers should ask for intermediaries’ feedback on using a 
child’s own model statement; “perhaps use the intermediaries to say actually this would be 
a really good way to assess this child’s ability” (FG3, PD). 
6.4.3 Broader child interviewing context 
Four superordinate themes emerged from participants’ responses that revealed 
aspects of the child interview context to consider when designing new lie detection 
strategies.  These can be referred to as the 4E’s of child interviewing: eliciting information, 
evaluating information, empowering the interviewee, and the all-important end product. 
6.4.3.1 Eliciting information 
Many participants agreed that the interview was primarily an information-gathering 
procedure rather than an assessment of credibility; “it’s not our role is it to think about are 
they lying?  You know we’re just there to get the information” (FG1, PA).  Discussions 
regarding the elicitation of information from child witnesses divided into two subordinate 
themes: techniques to elicit more information and internal barriers to eliciting information. 
6.4.3.1.1 Techniques 
This sub-category referred to any methods that the interviewers use to encourage 
their child interviewees to say as much as possible.  This included encouraging the children 
to concentrate; “if they’re not looking at you they’re not concentrating […] you say their 
name […] and then you can ask them the specific question again” (FG1, PE), or to do 
whatever makes them feel most comfortable; “we will say, “if you find it more 
comfortable to close your eyes or look somewhere else, please do so ‘cause if that helps 
you concentrate, that’s better for us” ‘cause we want to get as much information as 
possible” (FG1, PB).  Participants from both focus groups in the South of England 
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mentioned a specific technique that they use at the beginning of interviews to elicit longer 
responses later on: 
 
I’ve got a cup here, for example, and I’ll give them an example of how much detail 
I need.  I might say to them, “so tell me what you see about that cup” and they’ll 
say, “oh it’s a cup, you know it’s cream in colour” and I’ll say, “but if you look at it 
now, the detail that I need is that it’s cream in colour, it’s got red writing on it, it’s 
got ‘wibble wobble’ and a picture of a jelly.  Inside it’s dirty”.  So I’d explain to 
them that that’s the detail that I’d want. (FG 1, PE) 
 
I often provide an example and I try and tailor it to the individual.  So if it’s a child, 
often I’ve picked the child up so I will talk about the journey we’ve taken to get 
there so it’s something they’ll identify with and often they’ll chip in with bits that 
I’ve missed out but I try to get them to consider all the senses and explain that as 
well […] which gives them an idea of the level of detail I’m looking for. (FG3, PD) 
 
It is notable how much this example of detail, provided by the interviewer 
him/herself overlaps with playing a model statement from another child yet the former 
does not receive any opposition.  These subtle nuances between what works with children 
and what would be inappropriate with this witness population may come from practitioners 
developing a certain sensitivity towards the difficulties experienced by children and the 
constraints of the court system.  Unlike academic researchers who are ‘non-practicing’, the 
‘practicing’ child interviewers have learnt to identify and subsequently navigate the 
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limitations of the child interviewing process, making it easier for them to highlight 
problems that are common-sense to them but not to the researcher.  Future research should 
investigate the interviewer-generated model statement as a technique to facilitate 
information elicitation. 
Overall, participants agreed that, “anything that increases the chances of that child 
disclosing more details is good” (FG2, PC).  With fewer questions being particularly 
beneficial; “the best one is where you don’t have to ask them an awful lot of questions […] 
something that would get people to give more information without asking […] too many 
questions” (FG3, PC).  Indeed, police officers do tend to ask more questions than are 
necessary during an investigative interview (Vrij et al., 2015).  Participants in the current 
study understood that they needed to juggle between creating a witness that was both 
informative and reliable.  The number of questions asked may, therefore, be dependent on 
interviewers’ intuition.  They must know when they’ve elicited enough information for 
court and they must not push the boundaries too far so that any additional information 
thereafter becomes inaccurate. 
6.4.3.1.2 Internal barriers 
This sub-category referred to any individual characteristics of the child witnesses, 
which might prevent the interviewer from getting as much information as possible.  
Forgetfulness was one internal barrier to recovering information about an incident. 
Children, particularly young children, might unintentionally begin to forget what 
happened, or they might intentionally exclude an aspect of the incident that they don’t 
want to talk about.  When considering complicating factors for disclosures of child sexual 
abuse, legal professionals have been reported to consider limited memory capacity as one 
of the least complicating factors, with emotional factors, such as guilt and shame being the 
most important (Leander, Christianson, Svedin & Granhag, 2007).  Thus, this forgetfulness 
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may not be the result of a memory error, but rather deliberately triggered to avoid negative 
emotions related to the incident in question.  Like the police officers in Leander et al. 
(2007), the participants in our study recognised several emotional factors, such as shame; 
“it’s just they’re either ashamed of what’s happened, they realise it was wrong what’s 
happened to them and they don’t want to talk about it” (FG1, PE), self-criticism; “they 
miss bits out […] where they think they may have been part of, you know, partly to blame 
or something because they put the blame on themselves” (FG1, PB), and embarrassment; 
“they’ll just be some words that they can’t say […] but we need them to actually say what 
that body part is and that’s sometimes a real barrier” (FG3, PC).  Also in terms of 
willingness and readiness to talk, children who are not the first people to disclose may not 
wish to talk about what has happened to them (Leander, Christianson & Granhag, 2007): 
 
Often the allegations that come to us haven’t come from the child themselves so it’s 
not that the child’s been ready to talk about it […] so we go out with our tick list of 
lines of inquiry […] but actually for that person, if we go in there too soon […] 
then they’ll just drip feed you a tiny bit of information and they won’t actually be 
telling you everything that’s happened to them. (FG3, PC) 
 
Indeed, more formal disclosures of child sexual abuse do occur at interview, when 
children have disclosed the alleged abuse before interview (Magnusson, Ernberg & 
Landström, in press).  Participants mentioned that it can even be difficult in the first 
instance to get children to assent to an interview; “you’ve got people that crikey it’s 
enough getting them through the door” (FG3, PA), and then actually getting them to give a 
statement is also hard because “they don’t want to be there in the first place” (FG3, PA).  A 
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reluctance to be interviewed was considered by participants to be partly attributable to 
feelings of loyalty towards the offender, who is often a close family member; “I had a 
teenage girl who was sexually abused by her biological dad […] he got convicted but she, 
all the way through, found it so difficult talking about it ‘cause she still loved her dad […] 
very loyal” (FG1, PA).  Feelings of loyalty towards a perpetrator, who is often known to 
the child (London, Bruck, Ceci & Shuman, 2005), can cause children to withhold sensitive 
information regarding the incident (Christianson, Azad, Leander & Selenius, 2013; 
Magnusson et al., in press).  Furthermore, children can also understand the consequences 
for disclosing abuse and may wish to avoid these negative outcomes by keeping quiet: 
 
Younger children, they’ll cover up for their parents […] it has happened to them 
but they don’t want to be removed and they know the consequences if they tell us 
things so they try and hide as much as possible. (FG2, PB) 
 
Whether children choose to keep quiet due to their own internal barriers, or are 
asked by the perpetrator to keep the incident a secret (Magnusson et al., in press), the 
concealment or omission of relevant information does constitute lie-telling (Vrij, 2008).  
However, children keep these secrets due their emotional cost (Last & Aharoni-Etzioni, 
1995), rather than an outright desire to convey information that is completely different 
from the truth.  It is, therefore, important to recognise these emotional barriers and to 
design better interview practices that make children feel safer and reduce this perceived 
emotional cost if they do disclose. 
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Participants in the current study suggested that children’s loyalty towards their  
peers can also produce a ‘them-and-us’ mentality towards the police creating negative 
attitudes about talking to police officers: 
 
They’ll call us pigs and they won’t talk to us and it’s how they have been brought 
up and the perception they have of police […] they won’t tell us what’s happened 
‘cause they’ve learnt from a young age, don’t talk to police officers […] it’s quite 
bizarre when we get little ones telling us to f**k off. (FG1, PA) 
 
The attitudes of parents can therefore trickle down to be the attitudes of the 
children; “it’s not the children, it’s the parental guidance. The parents are demonstrating an 
indifference to anything formal” (FG2, PC), resulting in difficulties when it comes to 
eliciting information at interview.  When asked whether a social worker could conduct the 
interview instead, the response was in line with ABE guidance (Ministry of Defence, 2011) 
that this would be a good idea if the social worker has better rapport with the interviewee 
than the police officer.  However, it was explained that social worker require much training 
to lead an interview and to be trained to “home in on that offence” (FG 1, PB).  This 
sometimes led to a reluctance from social workers to interview because “if they ask the 
wrong question they’ve got the possibility that they could be called to court to be asked 
why they asked that question” (FG, PE) so ultimately “they don’t want to put themselves at 
risk” (FG1, PD).  Furthermore, it was noted that, “with teenagers, you’ll find they quite 
often don’t get on with their social workers” (FG1, PF).  So it isn’t always an alternative 
solution. 
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This subordinate theme highlights the police officers’ knowledge of the internal 
barriers that could potentially disrupt the effectiveness of the techniques described in the 
first subordinate theme.  This level of insight enables practitioners to develop intuitive 
solutions to ensure that their interviews are conducted to the best of their ability.  This 
intuition is, however, not inherent to an academic researcher who has never interviewed 
children and wouldn’t look to incorporate these barriers into their research design.  The 
child interviewers portray the child interviewing process somewhat akin to an obstacle 
course, which stands in stark contrast to the standardised, straight forward procedure used 
in most experimental designs. 
6.4.3.2 Evaluating information 
Whilst all participants in all focus groups agreed that it was not the role of the 
police officer to judge the credibility of an individual child, there were comments that they 
might get an inkling as to whether the child is telling the whole truth or not; “we get a 
feeling straightaway when we’re interviewing children.  I had one the other day and I 
thought she’s not telling me the truth” (FG1, PA).  The question is, therefore, what 
protocol should the interviewers follow when they get this ‘gut feeling’ that they should 
evaluate the veracity of the information they are receiving?  From this superordinate 
theme, two sub-ordinate themes emerged: (1) how to assess child credibility, and (2) what 
if there are other factors to take into account when evaluating information provided by 
children. 
6.4.3.2.1 How to assess child credibility 
Although participants had not received any official training on assessing child 
credibility, there were general beliefs regarding how to determine veracity either through 
active techniques, or through passive evaluation of specific cues to deceit.  Participants 
suggested that a good indicator of deceit was a lack of detail in children’s responses.  This 
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could be a less detailed statement overall; “it is hard to get detail from someone that may 
be lying and they do sort of tie themselves up in knots and you will come out with not a lot 
of information” (FG1, PB), or few details regarding a specific aspect of the incident, “they 
can tell you details about everything around it but actually when you come to the act, that’s 
where you can often detect the lie because the detail within that is usually small” (FG3, 
PD).  This evidence is in line with previous research on the general characteristics assessed 
by Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) that shows that higher levels of detail are 
consistently more indicative of a truthful statement and vice versa (Vrij, 2005).  The 
participants in the current study, therefore, signalled a cue to deception that has been 
supported by empirical research.  On the other hand, this belief sits in contrast to the above 
subordinate theme of internal barriers whereby silence or lack of detail could be due to the 
interviewer not being able to overcome the child’s internal issues to elicit more 
information.  Moreover, if the child has been subjected to maltreatment, it could be that a 
lack of details is the result of poorly encoding the traumatic event (Gordon, Baker-Ward & 
Ornstein, 2001), and, thus not being able to recall as many details during their free recall 
(Eisen, Goodman, Qin, Davis & Crayton, 2007).  Equally, it could be due to language and 
verbal difficulties related to the age of the child in question (Magnusson et al., in press).  
Participants’ ability to navigate this minefield of reasons for less detailed reports highlights 
another nuance in interviewers’ perceptions.  It would be of interest to explore further how 
police officers differentiate between lack of detail due to internal barriers and lack of detail 
due to deception. 
Another indicator mentioned by participants was the age-appropriateness of the 
language used by children; “they might use a word that you think they wouldn’t normally 
use at their age, you know, that’s come from the mum or the dad or whoever […] it’s 
normally quite obvious” (FG1, P B).  How obvious these linguistic markers are might be a 
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product of practitioners’ sophisticated sensitivity to the language of children from different 
age groups and backgrounds, which has come from years of interviewing a variety of 
children.  However, we cannot yet know the accuracy of this assumption, since, to date, 
there are no studies that look at the effects of coaching on perceived age-appropriateness of 
language used by children in their subsequent reports.  Police officers also need to be 
aware of the language used in the home and its effects on the children’s use of language. 
In terms of active techniques to elicit these indicators and to evaluate them further, 
participants commented on “just ask[ing] the right questions” (FG1, PC).  At first glance, 
this remark appears both common sense (i.e. obviously questioning style is critical) and 
ambiguous (i.e. what is considered to be the ‘right’ question could change from person to 
person).  One participant shed light on one type of questioning style that could help: 
 
People who prepare a story that they’re prepared to give you do not anticipate us 
going into the depth we do and the finer grain detail and you sometimes see 
elements of vagueness arising […] and it does then start to initiate your thought 
process […] I find some of the techniques about detail are where I get indicators, 
where I start to become uncomfortable about what somebody’s saying. (FG2, PA) 
 
In other words, the use of probing questions following the free recall can be 
particularly revealing when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the information 
provided; “when you actually get down to the detail […] you can see it starts to unravel” 
(FG 3, PE).  Participants reported that they were taught to make brief notes during 
interviews and that it was most time-efficient to “write down some key words for myself 
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so that I know right I’m going to come back and ask about that” (FG3, PC).  Coming back 
to inconsistencies at the end of the interview was a point also stressed by the first focus 
group, who, on top of that, reinforced that “if there’s an issue it would be […] “I don’t 
quite understand, I’m a little bit confused about what you said earlier on so can we just go 
through that again” and try and clarify it, never challenge” (FG1, PB).  Participants pointed 
out that the interviewer cannot directly accuse a child of lying and cannot be biased at 
interview so it’s about “trying to test [their] account at the very end without saying, “you 
haven’t told me the truth or you’ve told me different things.” We’ve got to be very careful” 
(FG1, PA).  The interviewer has to strike that delicate balance between clarifying the 
information provided sufficiently to satisfy the prosecution but not too much that the 
defence can accuse them of treating the interviewee as if s/he was deceitful. 
Participants recognised that techniques for evaluating the information provided 
could also take place after interviews have finished.  In particular, looking at the bigger 
picture, it was considered that “credibility is corroboration basically” (FG3, PB).  Thus, 
participants were inclined to take a step back and look at all the information elicited during 
interviews with multiple people when making credibility judgments; “that’s about getting 
accounts from different people.  From the suspect, from the witness, stuff like that that and 
then it builds a bigger picture rather than trying to work out if that individual’s being 
truthful or not” (FG1, PD).  Knowing additional information regarding the case should also 
be left until after the interview has taken place so as not to taint the interview; “if you 
know too much about the investigation you will be inclined to ask questions about things 
they [the children] haven’t even told you about” (FG1, PF).  Notably, asking the ‘right 
questions’ would, therefore, seem to mean questions that are impartial and only related to 
information that the child has already mentioned but are perhaps inconsistent with their 
other reports. 
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Finally, participants explained the difficulty of evaluating children’s statements that 
appeared to contain both truths and lies; “they tell half and half.  Some of it might be true, 
some of it might not?” (FG2, PC).  Known in the literature as embedded lies, this type of 
lie appeared to be a particular issue when it came to reports of incidents of sexual assault.  
Participants in Focus Group 3 mentioned that teenage girls would report that an ex-
boyfriend, who they had recently split up with, has raped them on one occasion; “they’ll 
give you information about a time when they had sex, which you know is all truthful, and 
it’s the ‘how it was forced or ‘how they didn’t consent” […] which is the difficult bit” 
(FG3, PC).  One participant in Focus Group 2 recalled a case of another girl who reported 
a catalogue of sexual offences against her, some of which were confirmed and some of 
which were not confirmed.  However, the addition of false information discredited her 
entire account and all for the sake of more attention: 
 
She used elements of truthfulness and confabulated lies around that […] and what 
exposed her was when she was telling us about events we were then able to check 
those events and recover CCTV footage and when we viewed the CCTV what she 
was saying happened, which came across very plausible and understandable, was 
something completely different […] the frustrating thing is we believed that some 
of it was truthful but she did so much damage to the investigation by telling us stuff 
we were able to show didn’t happen […] it was deliberately false memory that she 
was giving us to try and create all the attention she was getting. (FG2, PA) 
 
In summary, embedded lies might be easy to detect from a practitioner’s 
perspective but unless the false information is verifiable, then it might be hard to prove 
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what is true and false.  Furthermore, both child truth-tellers and child lie-tellers might 
embed falsities in their accounts. 
6.4.3.2.2 Accounting for other factors 
Even though practitioners are told, “it’s an indication that if people can’t provide 
detail that it’s not truthful” (FG3, PD), there are various contextual factors to take into 
consideration when appraising the quality of the information provided by children.  Thus, 
the ‘bigger picture’ surrounding children can also be an indicator to their veracity.  Firstly, 
it was considered unlikely for very young children to be lying in the first place because 
“they don’t really know what lying is” (FG1, PF).  It was felt that as children became more 
capable of lying as they aged, they would be more likely to lie: 
 
They [young children] are often brutally honest at that age.  It’s not until they are 
sort of four/five that their minds, you know, allow them to [lie] and I think a lot of 
that comes from maybe being at school with older children that are able to lie about 
things. (FG1, PF) 
 
On their own, very young children were considered to be incapable lie-tellers who 
required more mature models to learn vicariously the ability to lie.  This idea of innocence 
for younger children was also related to them reporting on topics that were age-
inappropriate; “you know, if they’re describing seeing […] their dad’s penis or something 
and they’re saying, “well it was pointing up and doing this”, the only way they would 
know that information is if they’d seen it” (FG3, PC).  This subtle distinction between age-
inappropriate language as a sign of deceitfulness and age-inappropriate situations as a sign 
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of truthfulness is, again, a nuance that might only occur to a police officer in the field but 
not to a researcher.  That said the CBCA criterion ‘Accurately reported details 
misunderstood’ that is used as a cue to truthfulness, maps very well on to this observation 
from the field.  
Secondly, participants put forward alternative explanations for brief statements that 
lack detail.  If the children were younger, they were expected to give shorter statements 
and require more prompting compared to older children, who were expected to give “more 
self-initiated detail […] because they’re more articulate, they’re more intelligent” (FG2, 
PA).  In other words, it was suggested that it might take more questioning to elicit the same 
amount of detail from very young truth-tellers compared to when older truth-tellers were 
being interviewed.  It was also important to consider the effect of the trauma of the 
incident on the ability of the children to recall everything that happened: 
 
Given that we’re often dealing with serious sexual offences that [saying they can’t 
remember part of the incident] might be as a result of trauma.  So actually they 
can’t piece together things in a structured, chronological order, that it twists things 
in their mind or they can’t talk about it because it’s purely too traumatic. (FG3, PD) 
 
Gaps in children’s memories might, therefore, by the result of poor encoding 
caused by the trauma of the event (Gordon et al., 2001).  However, this is more likely to 
occur when children have experienced neglect in the home (Eisen et al., 2007).  
Practitioners, therefore, demonstrated an understanding of the effects of trauma on memory 
retrieval (i.e. psychology in an applied context).  However, how our participants 
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differentiate between omitted details due to memory errors caused by trauma and omitted 
details due to the internal barriers mentioned above is still unclear. 
Finally, the motivation to lie could be a result of children’s home life.  On the one 
hand, children might be motivated to escape from a negative home life by exaggerating 
their story: 
 
Every time she’s been interviewed she’s added more and added more […] she’s 
developed this thing where six different men have apparently abused her to make 
sure she never goes back in and, I’m not saying it’s a definite lie, but it’s not really 
that plausible and she’s done it because, I suppose, in her life that’s her way to get 
out. (FG2, PB) 
 
On the other hand, children might be motivated by people at home to deceive the 
police to be able to stay at home: 
 
It tends to be with different cultures where they have coached, especially if child 
services have put them with a family member and they’ll have been told not to say 
anything. (FG2, PB) 
 
 Working with children from different domestic and cultural backgrounds, who 
most likely differ a great deal from the eager school-attending children who take part in 
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scientific research, gives the practitioner an edge to understanding how some children can 
be driven to deceive in serious situations. 
6.4.3.3 Empowering the interviewee 
Many of the participants commented that the usefulness of any interview technique 
would depend on the child they were interviewing.  Participants stressed that it was very 
important to tailor their interviews to each individual child interviewee to get the most 
information from him/her: 
 
Ultimately we need to safeguard the children that we’re interviewing, and that’s the 
most important thing.  So if they want to tell [us] something, it’s got to be the way 
they want to tell us. (FG1, PB) 
 
Summarised by one of the participants; “I don’t think there’s such a thing as one size fits 
all” (FG3, PB).  Enabling the interviewee required much preparation prior to the interview 
to ascertain the best ways to strengthen the interviewee, but flexibility was also required 
during the interview to adapt to any unforeseen individual differences that may arise. 
6.4.3.3.1 Strengthen the interviewee 
Strengthening the interviewee referred to any preparation prior to the interview that 
the interviewer could undertake to tailor their interview techniques to get the best out of 
that particular interviewee.  The primary means for this was by conducting Intermediary 
assessments.  There was overall consensus that Intermediary assessments are a great source 
of information for assessing each child’s suitability for interview and how they respond to 
different questions: 
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When the intermediaries do the assessment […] we’re often present […] so you get 
a feeling as to how they respond to certain types of questions and, you know, the 
number of sort of key words you put in a question. (FG3, PC) 
 
Participants felt that an Intermediary assessment was also beneficial for 
highlighting a child’s suggestibility, “I had one the other day and there was a picture of 
summer and she [the intermediary] kept saying to the child, “in the winter so this is winter” 
and the child was just agreeing” (FG1, PA), and for recommending how best to interview a 
child with learning disabilities; “you [have] got to assess the individual […] and depending 
upon the learning disability, and perhaps in consultation with an Intermediary as well, you 
might only do five minutes ‘cause their attention span is so short” (FG3, PD).  This 
suggests that the previous comments regarding asking the ‘right’ questions may also be 
child-specific and that the interviewer requires external input from the Intermediary to 
shape what they consider to be the ‘right’ questions to that particular child interviewee. 
It was also mentioned, however, that a delay whilst waiting for the right 
Intermediary (i.e. one that is specialised in assessing a particular child interviewee) can 
have a negative effect on a young child’s recall ability: 
 
For little children, they [Intermediaries] can’t help them remember.  So we will still 
have to interview them a lot later down the process and if they’re struggling to 
remember something then the Intermediary, although they can give us how we 
should be forming our questions, it can’t help them remember. (FG1, PB) 
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Thus, intermediary assessments facilitate best practice for eliciting as much 
information from that individual child as possible but these benefits begin to wane if the 
interviewer has to wait too long for the assessment to take place.  Under these 
circumstances, it might even be justifiable to conduct an interview without performing an 
Intermediary assessment.  Here the participants in the current study demonstrated some 
knowledge about the sensitivity of memory to time delays. 
6.4.3.3.2 Flexibility 
Despite preparing for the interview, participants discussed the need to be flexible 
and be able to adapt to any individual differences that aren’t covered in an Intermediary 
assessment.  For example, the child’s background may make it difficult to predict how the 
child will behave during the interview: 
 
The kids we’re going to get, whether they’re been abused or not, whether they’re 
truth- or lie-tellers, are going to be chaotic people who are in deprived 
backgrounds, don’t know where their next meal’s coming from, no discipline. 
(FG2, PC) 
 
A chaotic person at interview can be predicted as acting unpredictably so it’s up to 
interviewers to use their expertise and experience to react accordingly.  The best advice 
from one participant was; “just roll with it” (FG3, PD), demonstrating that, to some extent, 
the interviewer should just go with how the interviewee wants to present themselves and 
their story. 
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A child’s personal disposition (i.e. “no self-esteem and lack of confidence” (FG3, 
PC)) may also mean adapting the flow of the interview to that person: 
 
We might be going in and going out of the subject, you know, if you’re seeing that 
you’re upsetting them. (FG3, PA) 
  
 The interviewer can recognise the effect of the subject of the interview on the 
interviewee and be sensitive to its effect on their willingness to recall the target incident.  
However, as much as the interviewer can try and construct a safe environment to increase 
the likelihood of disclosure, sometimes this is not always possible: 
 
I had one years ago and I did three attempts ‘cause they were just struggling to talk 
about it and they wouldn’t talk about the offence.  Like you say they would talk 
about everything around it but it was just too horrific for them to talk about.  So 
three times we tried and, in the end, we never got it. (FG1, PF) 
 
 The interviewer must, therefore, accept that being flexible to an interviewee also 
includes terminating an interview before sufficient evidence has been gathered which may 
mean that a case cannot be progressed. 
6.4.3.4 End product 
The final theme that emerged from participants’ discussions of the broad context of 
interviewing children was the importance of ensuring a good ‘end product’ that could be 
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played in court to ensure that children would be safeguarded and potentially achieve 
justice: 
 
The whole idea is we’re trying to help that child get this to courtroom and get that 
offender convicted.  If we do something wrong […] they’ll throw the interview out 
and the case is lost and we haven’t protected that child. (FG1, PB) 
 
In other words, interviewing child interviewees is a ‘high stakes’ business and if 
interviewers put a foot wrong, then there could be serious legal implications.  This 
superordinate theme was divided into two sub-ordinate categories: preparing the evidence 
so that it is admissible in court and trying to pre-empt the cross-examination when that 
evidence is presented in court. 
6.4.3.4.1 Preparing the evidence 
Across all focus groups, comments regarding evidence were mainly about the 
pitfalls of child interviewing that may render evidence inadmissible in court.  Participants 
noted that police officers must do what’s right for the children at the same time as doing 
what’s right for the court.  They, therefore, need to be in sync, and not at odds, with all of 
the components of the judicial system.  Interviews need to be conducted according to the 
guidelines; “we have to show that we did everything to the book” (FG1, PA) but, taken to 
the extreme, this resulted in some participant resentment towards the system: 
 
We avoid transporting children to interviews and having conversations with them 
in the car because […] you have to write down the whole conversation in the white 
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book so that they know.  Obviously we’re police officers, we can’t be trusted.  We 
have to write down to show what topics we’ve spoken about so that we’ve not been 
coaching them in the car. (FG3, PC) 
 
Police officers regulated their behaviour to try and avoid the mistrust of court 
officials at trial to ensure that the children’s evidence was not considered as tainted.  
However, participants did express how unnatural this regulated behaviour felt when 
confronted with children in obvious distress: 
 
They’ll [the defence lawyers] say things like […] “it’s not a fair trial”, you’ve got 
to be so careful […] and it’s awful when you’ve got a five-year-old or six-year-old 
that’s sitting there crying, especially being a female as well, you want to comfort 
that child. (FG1, PA) 
 
Indeed, this lack of comforting also extended to not giving verbal encouragements 
and basically neutralising their behaviour completely; “we’re not even allowed to say, 
“well done, thank you” nothing.  They sit in that interview and we are like a robot” (FG1, 
PD).  These comments reflect the constraints that participants perceived the court system to 
impose upon their practice.  There was also a sense of ‘walking on eggshells’, especially 
when participants did not agree with changes in procedural guidelines.  One participant 
reflected on the contrast between previous and current practice in empathic responsivity: 
 
187 
 
Before if a victim used to cry, we’d be able to put our arms around the victim and 
we’d given them a bit of comfort.  Now, it’s just about getting them a box of 
tissues, “are you okay to continue? Would you like a break? Would you like to go 
and see whoever is downstairs?” (FG 1, PA) 
 
Interviewer behaviour aside, difficulties also arose from the politics of getting 
evidence to court.  One participant described a case where a boy told a story that was only 
half supported by eyewitness evidence; other parts of the child’s account were not 
supported by other evidence. The police officer described that, in the end, the courts only 
looked to prosecute the mother for what was supported, ignoring all the other detail given 
by the child, about other crimes, that was not supported.  The participant could not 
understand what the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) used to make their credibility 
judgements: 
 
CPS […] what are their qualifications to make these decisions? ‘Cause that’s what 
they do, day in day out, is make decisions about whether a kid is telling the truth 
based on pretty much nothing I can establish. (FG2, PC) 
 
To summarise, when police officers prepare evidence, they reported that they must 
follow many ‘rules’ but these ‘rules’ are more pre-emptive of what will happen in court 
and what the CPS will accept rather than ‘rules’ that are actually written down as official 
guidance.  The fundamental issue is that police officers are information gatherers for the 
courts. 
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6.4.3.4.2 Cross-examination 
Participants spoke about their experiences in court when they are cross-examined 
about how they elicited evidence from their child witnesses.  This experience was 
resoundingly negative across all focus groups.  In particular, participants expressed a lot of 
negativity regarding defence teams: 
 
You’ve got your horrible defence barristers who will just throw anything.  They 
haven’t got to prove anything.  They’ve got that luxury where they can just stand 
there and make a suggestion. (FG3, PD) 
 
They explained how defence teams are more likely to question their interviews 
rather than the actual content of the interviews themselves: 
 
They look at procedure, not necessarily the content and product of the interview 
itself because invariably there is good material in that […] the last thing the defence 
team want to do is touch the evidence because it’s usually pretty compelling. (FG2, 
PA) 
 
Participants’ understanding of the court dynamics explains their caution when 
preparing their evidence for trial.  If they are the most likely to come under fire when 
examining child witness’ testimonies, they need to be able to demonstrate that they made 
defensible decisions throughout the investigative process to reduce any heat that they 
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might receive from the defence team.  Participants talked about trying to avoid criticisms, 
which would later occur in court, when they were interviewing children.  Anything that 
could be seen to be leading child interviewees was avoided: 
 
We have to be totally transparent and impartial and we could get criticised that 
we’re goading or that we’re influencing or that we’re preparing them for the 
interview. (FG1, PA) 
 
In addition, participants explained how they cut the length of the recorded material 
down, as this was another constant criticism from the courts, “we get criticised enough for 
how long our interviews are” (FG3, PC).  However, this isn’t always possible due to the 
nature of the incidents that the interviewee is talking about: 
 
We always argue you know if somebody has come to talk to you about a sequence 
of events that have been happening to them over a period of years, you can’t get 
that person to give you all that information in a half an hour interview, ‘cause 
somebody that’s talking about one event would come and take twenty, twenty-five 
minutes to tell you that information. (FG3, PC) 
 
In other words, it was perceived by participants that the courts were not 
sympathetic to the diversity of the children that the participants interviewed; they didn’t 
understand that one size (or duration, in this case) did not fit all.  Overall, it was very clear 
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that the cross-examination process in courts means that police officers have to conform and 
adjust to the standards of the courts and not the other way round.   
6.5 Discussion 
This qualitative study aimed to gain practitioner feedback regarding new cognitive 
lie detection techniques that could be used at interview with child interviewees, and to 
understand the child interviewing process in which these techniques would be 
implemented. 
 According to the participants in the current study, using a child’s own model 
statement stood out as the most viable option for use in real police investigations.  It was 
the only interview technique that received positive feedback alongside suggestions for 
adaptation for use in an applied setting.  At the time of the focus groups, the results of 
Chapter 5 were not available for presentation so these comments were based on the 
predicted outcomes of using a child’s own model statement as a tool for better 
discriminating between truth-tellers and lie-tellers.  Practitioners may have felt differently 
about using this interview technique in practice if they knew that ‘own model statements’ 
did not produce the same effect as using another child’s model statement.  However, their 
comments demonstrated that this technique was the most compatible with real-world 
constraints, and so future research should look to resolve the methodological problems of 
Chapter 5 to see if own model statements can be tested in a different capacity (e.g. using 
narrative elaboration techniques, Camparo, Wagner & Saywitz, 2001; Saywitz & Snyder, 
1996).  Instructing interviewees to maintain gaze came in second place, receiving some 
suggestions for use but still no mentioned benefits with child witnesses.  Finally, 
practitioners identified only disadvantages to using another child’s model statement, 
writing it off primarily due to potential issues with tainting children’s accounts.  This last 
finding is slightly perplexing as practitioners did talk about providing an example of a 
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detailed description of an object themselves to encourage more detailed reports.  The subtle 
nuance between how that does not constitute tainting but another child’s model statement 
might taint requires further investigation.  Overall, representation for each of themes within 
each technique (see Figure 6.1) ranged from 13% to 69% of participants.  Participants were 
the least in agreement regarding the suggestions for use for gaze maintenance and most in 
agreement for the disadvantages of playing another child’s model statement. 
 Discussion in the focus groups of the broader child interviewing process 
highlighted many constraints that police officers face from both the child interviewees 
themselves and the court process.  On the one hand, interviewers must adapt to the 
individual differences of child interviewees and their circumstances.  On the other hand, 
interviewers must always be careful to avoid putting children’s evidence at risk in terms of 
its admissibility for the courts.  Thus, practitioners find themselves stuck in the middle 
trying to work out the best course of action for each individual case.  This would explain 
their self-reported ability to consider the effects of different witness characteristics, such as 
age, background and trauma, on children’s verbal and nonverbal behaviour when being 
interviewed.  This sensitivity is, of course, of great value to researchers who may not be 
aware of certain effects.  The four themes that emerged – the 4 E’s – already provide a 
simple and straightforward framework against which to evaluate the viability of interview 
techniques with children.  Any interview technique should (1) elicit as much information 
from children as possible, (2) allow practitioners to accurately evaluate the credibility of 
that information, (3) empower child interviewees and be flexible to their specific needs, 
and (4) create a good end product that will stand up in court with little criticism.  Although 
the first two themes can be tested empirically, the second two themes would require the 
advice and recommendation of someone in the field who understands the nuanced 
practicalities of working with child interviewees.  We should, therefore, continue to 
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empower practitioners by seeking and valuing their feedback regarding our research at the 
early stages of research design. 
 The present study is not generalisable with only three focus groups across two UK 
police constabularies.  This means that the themes and comments made may only reflect 
the views of practitioners within these police forces.  That said, it is of interest to note that 
there was a great deal of agreement between practitioners based in the North of England 
(Focus group 2) and practitioners based in the South of England (Focus groups 1 and 3), 
which suggests that these views might be more widespread.  Another issue is that the 
participants were only presented with research issues from this PhD thesis and were not 
made aware of other uses of cognitive lie detection techniques with children (i.e. 
unanticipated questions - Liu et al., 2010; Roos af Hjelmsäter et al., 2014).  Thus, using a 
child’s own model statement was the favoured technique out of those shown but might not 
have been considered the most viable if other options were given.  This study provides a 
pilot study that shows that the academic-practitioner conversation is worth investing in to 
inform future research. 
 Indeed, future research should investigate some of the ‘intuitive’ techniques that the 
police already use to determine the veracity of a child’s statement.  For example, it would 
be of interest to know the weighting of a child’s statement in the bigger picture of the 
investigation when the case goes to trial.  If the child’s statement is in conflict with other 
key statements, then it would be of note to understand who layperson jurors are most likely 
to believe.  Further examination of the description of an object as an example of detail (i.e. 
an interviewer-generated model statement) by the interviewer, prior to interview, should 
also be conducted.  Studies should look to explore whether this helps or hinders lie 
detection, and whether children of all ages can understand this abstract concept. 
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 In conclusion, practitioners are an extremely valuable source of information who 
are arguably overlooked during the design of research programmes by academics.  They 
can provide not only insightful feedback on current research into new interview 
techniques, but also an eye-opening portrayal of the child interviewing process as a whole.  
It is likely that joint researcher-practitioner ventures are those most likely to succeed in 
developing techniques that are practical in the field as well as being supported by empirical 
evidence. 
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7.1 General Discussion Outline 
The general discussion will first provide a summary of the main findings of this 
thesis, drawing attention to the verbal markers associated with the veracity of child witness 
statements that were elicited when cognitive lie detection techniques were used (see 
Section 7.2).  Second, the theoretical implications of these new child deception research 
findings are discussed with a focus on the underlying cognitive processes targeted by 
cognitive lie detection (see Section 7.3).  Third, the practical implications of the doctoral 
research are discussed, highlighting the transition from lab to field (see Section 7.4).  
Fourth, the methodological issues are considered (see Section 7.5) followed by suggestions 
for further research (see Section 7.6).  Finally, this doctoral thesis is concluded (see 
Section 7.7). 
7.2 Overview of Main Findings 
Child deception research has highlighted adults’ difficulties in determining the 
veracity of children’s statements (Talwar & Crossman 2012; Gongola, Scurich & Quas, 
2016) as well as the ineffectiveness of current passive techniques used to deter children 
from lying in investigative interviews (Bala, Lee, Lindsay & Talwar, 2010; Lyon, Malloy, 
Quas & Talwar, 2008; Talwar, Lee, Bala & Lindsay, 2002).  The main aim of this thesis 
was to explore the use of cognitive lie detection techniques with child witnesses.  More 
specifically, this doctoral research aimed to go beyond previous studies that had used only 
unanticipated questioning with younger populations (Liu et al., 2010; Roos af Hjelmsäter, 
Öhman, Granhag & Vrij, 2014) to examine the effectiveness of (a) imposing cognitive load 
through gaze maintenance, (b) encouraging interviewees to say more using another child’s 
model statement, and (c) encouraging interviewees to say more using children’s own 
model statements.  The final purpose of this research programme was to investigate the 
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perceptions of police practitioners, working in the child-interviewing field, to survey their 
opinions with regard to applying the lab findings to the real world. 
 Two experiments examined whether imposing cognitive load through gaze 
maintenance could facilitate child deception detection (these were reported in Chapter 2).  
In the first experiment, child interviewees were instructed to either maintain gaze (towards 
an interviewer’s face or a teddy bear’s face), or not, whilst telling the truth or lying about 
taking part in a recent school event.  Overall, truth-tellers provided significantly more 
details than lie-tellers, but only when they had been given a gaze instruction to look at 
either the interviewer’s face or the teddy bear’s face.  This result is in line with adult 
cognitive lie detection literature, which has shown that imposing cognitive load can create 
significant verbal differences between true and false reports (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Mann, 
Leal & Fisher, 2010).  Furthermore, an increase in detail was only found between gaze 
conditions for truth-tellers, whereas the amount of details that lie-tellers provided was the 
same, regardless of where they looked.  In a second experiment, adult evaluators were 
asked to determine the credibility of the children’s interview clips.  Only evaluators who 
judged children that had been instructed to look at the interviewer’s face were able to 
discriminate between truth-tellers and lie-tellers.  This was also the only condition in which 
detection accuracy was significantly above chance (58%).  The lack of a beneficial effect 
when evaluating children that had been instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face could be 
a consequence of the true and false reports not being sufficiently different in detail. That is, 
what was a statistically significant difference in quantity of detail was not perceived by 
human observers. 
 The effect of hearing another child’s model statement (AMS; i.e. an example of a 
detailed recall of an unrelated event) on the elicitation of verbal differences in the reports 
of children who had, or had not, witnessed a mock mobile phone theft was investigated in 
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Chapter 3.  The interview protocol involved eliciting a baseline free recall attempt, 
followed by the presentation of AMS and then a second free recall attempt.  Building on 
the coding scheme of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 went beyond interviewee productivity (i.e. 
quantity of detail, response length) to also code forensic usefulness (i.e. crime-relevance of 
the details) and between statement-consistency.  It also investigated the memory accuracy 
of the truthful reports.  Overall, both truth-tellers and lie-tellers provided significantly more 
details after hearing AMS, similar to the adult insurance claimants in Leal, Vrij, 
Warmelink, Vernham and Fisher’s (2015) study.  When the two free recall attempts were 
compared, both truth-tellers and lie-tellers added the same amount of new information (i.e. 
commission) to their reports, as expected based on the Pinocchio hypothesis (Bruck, Ceci 
& Hembrooke, 2002) and the repeat versus reconstruct hypothesis (Granhag, Strömwall & 
Jonsson, 2003).  In addition, truth-tellers repeated a significantly higher proportion of 
crime-relevant information (i.e. information pertaining to the criminal event according to 
eyewitness literature) compared to lie-tellers.  Nevertheless, truth-tellers’ reports also 
became significantly less accurate following AMS.  Although this study used children’s 
baseline free recall attempts as a control, the lack of a control condition where no model 
statement was played in between recall attempts made it impossible to conclude that these 
findings were not simply the artefact of repeated questioning, which can result in longer 
responses (McCauley & Fisher, 1995). 
 Chapter 4, building on Chapter 3, presented a follow-up lie detection experiment 
where adult evaluators assessed the credibility of pre- and post-AMS interview clips.  
Using AMS did not facilitate the detection of children’s truths and lies.  A lens modelling 
approach, which has been used in previous lie detection research (e.g. Hartwig & Bond, 
2011), was applied to tease apart the relationship between children’s verbal behaviours and 
adults’ perceptual ratings when deciding if children were being truthful or not.  This 
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revealed that adults strongly rely on quantity of detail as a key indicator of children’s 
veracity; a believed cue that is empirically and consistently supported (Vrij, 2005).  Thus, 
the poor detection accuracy in Chapter 4 could be the consequence of both truth-tellers and 
lie-tellers increasing their interviewee productivity following AMS, meaning no 
differences in level of detail existed between the two groups.  In other words, in Chapter 3, 
quantity of detail was not a reliable indicator of deceit but this was not explained to 
participants prior to them making their judgments.  It is suggested that evaluators need to 
understand the anticipated effects of the model statement interview technique, in terms of 
its elicitation of differences between truthful and fabricated accounts, before detection 
ability will improve. 
 Chapter 5, again following on from Chapter 3, investigated the use of another 
child’s model statement (AMS) compared to a child’s own model statement (OMS).  This 
study also included a ‘no model statement’ condition (NMS) to ensure that the results were 
not an artefact of repeated questioning.  Furthermore, this study reduced the effect of 
individual differences by requiring children to tell both a true and false report at interview.  
First, we found that only children who heard AMS increased the amount of detail in their 
second recall attempt of both the true and false activities.  This is in line with the findings 
of Chapter 3 and previous studies with adults (Ewens et al., 2016; Leal et al., 2015).  This 
increase in productivity for children who heard AMS (and not for the OMS or NMS 
conditions) resulted in the children in the AMS condition providing the most new 
information (i.e. most commissions).  In addition, the new information that children who 
heard AMS included in their true reports did not affect the overall accuracy of their second 
recall attempts.  Indeed, they remained as accurate as the children in the other interview 
conditions, even though they said more; a finding that has also been found when eliciting 
longer child statements using the Revised Cognitive Interview (McCauley & Fisher, 1995).  
204 
 
None of the predictions regarding the use of OMS were supported.  The increase in 
interviewee productivity could be the consequence of shorter practice interviews that were 
conducted with a long time delay.  Overall, the study reported in Chapter 5 demonstrated 
that a change in interviewee productivity for true reports was due to listening to another 
child’s model statement and not due to repeatedly asking for two free recalls.  In addition, 
it also provided evidence that a decrease in overall accuracy highlighted in the earlier 
study, reported in Chapter 3, may have been the consequence of children poorly encoding 
the ‘to-be-remembered’ event.  In the Chapter 5 study, where children were informed that 
they would be questioned about the true activity, their accuracy was not affected.  Thus, 
they would have been aware that they should encode the event well, putting them in a 
‘satisficing knowledge’ state (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008), whereby they would not 
need to sacrifice the accuracy of the information they provided when they became more 
informative. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 reported on a qualitative study that aimed to increase our 
understanding of the transition process from laboratory to field of the cognitive lie 
detection techniques investigated in Chapters 2 to 5.  In focus groups, police officers who 
regularly interview children were presented with the interview techniques that had been 
investigated in this thesis and were asked to provide practitioner feedback on their 
relevance and feasibility for implementation in current interviewing practice.  Using a 
child’s own model statement came out as the most viable option, although this was 
selected on the basis of the theoretical findings rather than the actual findings of Chapter 5 
(which were not available at the time that the field investigation was conducted).  
However, participants stated that even this interview technique would require some 
adaptation, in terms of when it should be used, how long it should last and who it should be 
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used with, before it would be eligible for use in real police investigations involving child 
witnesses.   
 As well as evaluating the interview techniques, the police officers provided an 
insightful description of the child interviewing process and the journey from disclosure to 
court.  From this discussion, four major themes emerged (the 4E’s) that could be used as a 
basic framework for future child deception research in this area.  For an interview 
technique to be viable it needs to elicit as much information as possible, allow the 
practitioner to evaluate the credibility of that information, be flexible so that it can adapt to 
empower each interviewee, and, finally, produce a sound end product that will stand up in 
court.  The field investigation highlighted the difficult position in which child interviewers 
find themselves: Constrained by the limits of each child interviewee but also constrained 
by the standards of the court.  It also promoted the importance of empowering practitioners 
to bring to academics’ attention subtle nuances in the child interviewing process that would 
only occur to a police officer who has practical experience. 
 To summarise, cognitive lie detection can have the desired effect of exaggerating 
behavioural differences and facilitating the detection for both truthful and deceitful child 
witnesses.  However, this is not true of all techniques.  Imposing cognitive load through 
gaze maintenance achieved both goals successfully.  Yet, encouraging interviewees to say 
more using another child’s model statement in an eyewitness context elicited only verbal 
differences on a very specific level (i.e. percentage of crime-relevant repetitions) and was, 
therefore, not able to improve detection accuracy that seems to rely on more easily 
observed differences.  On the other hand, using another’s child model statement in a non-
forensic context did elicit more general differences in terms of quantity of detail and 
consistency. 
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7.3 Theoretical Implications 
7.3.1 Cognitive lie detection theory 
Cognitive lie detection is based on the premise that lie-telling is more cognitively 
complex and, thus, more cognitively demanding than truth-telling (Zuckerman, DePaulo & 
Rosenthal, 1981).  Each of the cognitive lie detection techniques put forward by Vrij 
(2015) aims to explore this difference in experiencing cognitive load by taxing lie-tellers’ 
cognitive resources even further through the manipulation of certain cognitive 
mechanisms.  In Chapter 2, additional cognitive load was imposed on child lie-tellers 
through the request to perform a dual task.  In Chapters 3 and 5, child lie-tellers’ cognitive 
resources were challenged through the use of social proof (Cialdini, 1993). That is, the 
expectations of a detailed account were presented for comparison (i.e. by playing a model 
statement) thereby encouraging child lie-tellers to say more and put further strain on their 
already under-developed verbal working memory (Alloway, McCallum, Alloway & 
Hoicka, 2015). 
7.3.1.1 Imposing cognitive load through dual task performance 
Imposing cognitive load aims to make the interview setting more difficult by 
imposing an additional request that should affect lie-tellers, who have fewer cognitive 
resources available, more so than truth-tellers.  Vrij et al. (2008) proposed two mechanisms 
of attention that might account for the debilitating effect of imposing cognitive load, on 
deceitful interviewees, through a secondary task.  First, if cognitive resources originate 
from the same limited pool, then lie-tellers will have fewer resources ‘leftover’ to attend to 
the secondary task compared to truth-tellers (Knowles, 1963).  If the second task is, 
therefore, also cognitively demanding, lie-tellers will be pushed to the limits of their 
attentional capacity, and thus experience more cognitive overload compared to truth-
tellers.  To cope with both tasks, a second mechanism of attention management must be 
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triggered whereby lie-tellers can flexibly allocate their attention between the two tasks in 
accordance with the demands of each task (Kahneman, 1973).  This, however, could cause 
dual-task interference between the tasks, as diverting attentional resources away from the 
primary task to the secondary task might increase task performance for the latter and 
decrease task performance for the former.  Prior to this doctoral research, these theoretical 
assumptions had yet to be directly tested in any study that investigated imposing cognitive 
load.  In Chapter 2, we analysed this anticipated negative relationship between the primary 
task of lie-telling (measured by number of details provided) and the secondary task of 
maintaining gaze (measured by percentage of time spent gazing towards the face stimulus).  
Our findings found no dual-task interference for either secondary task.  In fact, we found a 
small, non-significant positive association between lie-telling and maintaining gaze with 
the interviewer’s face, suggesting a beneficial effect of performing both of these tasks 
simultaneously.  Although our findings did not support the theory, this could be explained 
by the secondary task (visual) not drawing attention from the same pool of resources as the 
primary task (verbal).  Multiple resource theory (Wickens, 2002) suggests that cognitive 
resources that come from structurally dissimilar pools (i.e. verbal versus visual) are likely 
to interfere less.  Testing this theory with reverse order recall as the additional task might 
produce different results as recounting the story backwards is also a verbal task (Saykaly, 
Crossman, Morris & Talwar, 2016).  Furthermore, due to the design of Experiment 1, 
reported in Chapter 2, we were unable to account for children’s ability to perform each of 
the tasks on their own allowing us to then control for this when they performed both tasks 
together.  This method of understanding dual-task performance has been used in previous 
attention research with children and has helped to dispel some previous claims about 
children’s ability to manage their attention (Irwrin-Chase & Burns, 2000).   Implementing 
a similar design in future imposing cognitive load research would help to dig deeper into 
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the cognitive processes involved when performing a secondary task at interview alongside 
lie-telling. 
7.3.1.2 Encouraging interviewees to say more through social proof 
Using a model statement as social proof of what a truth-tellers’ detailed account 
sounds like sets the standard for what level of detail is required at interview and 
encourages both truthful and deceitful interviewees to compare their expectations to this 
standard, ultimately resulting in them saying more (Vrij, 2015; Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham 
& Brankaert, 2015).  Although these theoretical underpinnings were not directly tested in 
the study presented in Chapter 3, increases in interviewee productivity for both true and 
false reports were in line with this theory.  Chapter 5 directly investigated the relationship 
between social comparison and increased interviewee productivity for true reports by 
looking at the underlying social-cognitive processes at work when truth-tellers hear 
another’s or their own model statement.  The findings were contrary to a theory of social 
proof (Cialdini, 1993) because there was no relationship between the type of social 
comparison made by the children when comparing themselves to the model statement they 
heard (i.e. upward, downward or neutral) and their change in interviewee productivity.  
However, this may have been due to unreliable self-reports.  Children in both the AMS and 
OMS conditions did report that they compared themselves to the model statement more 
often than not.  Yet, the types of comparisons they made were not an accurate reflection of 
their performance.  Indeed, on average, both children in the AMS condition and in the 
OMS condition, performed significantly worse than the model statements they heard.  
Nonetheless, neither group was significantly skewed towards making accurate downward 
comparisons.  Social proof theory can, therefore, not be ruled out as the underlying 
mechanism for the effect of using AMS.  Indeed, our findings would suggest that future 
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research should use a different method for measuring social comparison that might be 
more accurate than self-reporting. 
7.4 Practical Implications 
As mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis (Chapter 1), techniques are required 
for use during police interviews that (1) have been empirically shown to facilitate child 
deception detection, and (2) will be used by practitioners.  In addition, any lie detection 
technique should (3) not have any adverse effects on child truth-tellers’ ability to give a 
full and accurate account (Talwar & Crossman, 2012).  It was important to ensure that the 
interview techniques investigated in this thesis could not be criticised in court for having a 
negative effect on the account of truthful child interviewees.  As noted in Chapter 6, the 
techniques should facilitate the elicitation of information from child truth-tellers.  
Moreover, as noted in Chapter 3, eliciting more information from child interviewees 
should not decrease the accuracy of that information.   
 First, imposing cognitive load by instructing interviewees to look at the 
interviewer’s face was shown to elicit significant verbal differences in general level of 
detail provided in true and false reports, which then facilitated the detection of children’s 
deceit.  Although there were no advantages highlighted in the focus group study in Chapter 
6 for using gaze maintenance, practitioners did provide some suggestions in relation to this 
technique; namely, its use in certain cases not involving serious sexual trauma and with 
older child witnesses.  Although practitioners thought that it may not elicit as much 
information from child witnesses as letting them look wherever they choose, this is in 
contrast to the findings of Chapter 2 that found truth-tellers instructed to look at the 
interviewer’s face provided the most details.  Nonetheless, the finding of Chapter 2 was 
limited by the use of a non-staged event that did not allow us to code the accuracy of the 
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children’s statements.  Staged events were, therefore, used in the subsequent chapters to 
investigate the possibility of negative effects of interventions on truth-tellers’ accuracy.  
Thus, the practical use of gaze maintenance with child interviewees is suggested with 
caution in some cases.  The technique should be subject to verification that the longer 
statements elicited, when eye contact is required, do not reduce the accuracy of children’s 
truthful reports. 
 Second, using another child’s model statement (AMS) had mixed practical 
significance.  On the one hand, it did elicit significant verbal differences between 
children’s true and false reports on both a specific level (i.e. percentage of crime-relevant 
repetitions in Chapter 3).  On the other hand, these specific differences did not translate 
into better detection accuracy in Chapter 4.  From the practitioners’ perspective, using 
AMS was seen to be disadvantageous because introducing an external source of 
information would taint child witnesses’ subsequent reporting; a seemingly valid concern.  
That said, the police officers did report using a similar technique whereby they, as 
interviewers, provide an example of giving a lot of detail (for example, by giving a lot of 
detail about the description of a mug), which could also taint children’s accounts.  This 
subtle nuance suggests that AMS could be adapted using this already existing technique to 
form a hybrid that increases productivity and would be accepted by police officers for use 
in their investigations.  Regarding the effect of AMS on truth-tellers, Chapters 3 and 5 
found that children who heard AMS provided subsequent statements that were 
significantly more productive than their control or baseline counterparts.  However, the 
effects of this increase in interviewee productivity on overall accuracy were mixed.  
Whereas Chapter 3 showed a significant decrease in the overall accuracy of true reports, 
Chapter 5 did not show any significant change in accuracy across recall attempts.  To 
understand how accuracy would be affected by AMS in police investigations, it could be 
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argued that the experimental procedure of Chapter 3 is most relevant as, like most 
eyewitness events, the children were interviewed about something they had no forewarning 
would turn into the subject of an investigation.  Under these conditions, where they may 
have viewed/heard the to-be-remembered event under sub-optimal encoding conditions, 
interference is likely to occur and very poor memory stimuli are likely to result (Fernandes 
& Moscovitch, 2000).  In this ‘unsatisficing knowledge state’, children might be inclined 
to sacrifice the accuracy of the information they provide in an attempt to be more 
informative (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008).  Thus, based on the results of the ‘model 
statement’ studies in this thesis, AMS should be recommended for use with interviewees 
who are aware of the importance of remembering the to-be-remembered event and, thus, 
encode the event well. 
 Third, transforming children’s practice narratives into ‘own model statements’ did 
not have the desired effect of eliciting any significant differences between true and false 
reports:  A lack of exaggerated differences, therefore, make it an unlikely facilitator of 
child deception detection (Hartwig & Bond, 2011).  From a theoretical standpoint, 
practitioners considered it the most viable option out of those presented.  However, it 
would still require much adaptation before it could be used as part of police investigations 
with child witnesses.  Nevertheless, the noted advantages of using OMS will help to refine 
this interview technique or, at the very least, design other interview techniques to boast the 
same benefits.  In terms of adverse effects, it did not elicit more information from child 
participants and it, therefore, did not affect the accuracy of their truthful accounts.  As it 
stands the practical significance of OMS remains low, yet, with adaptation and a stronger 
emphasis on the practice interview aspect of this technique, it is possible that future 
research could demonstrate its potential to facilitate the detection of children’s deceit by 
helping truth-tellers.  Indeed, by taking practice interviews back to their roots and using 
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narrative elaboration techniques to focus more clearly on the specific types of detail that 
are required during an investigative interview (i.e. people, objects, setting, actions, Saywitz 
& Snyder, 1996), the effect of the own model statement on true reports could be 
strengthened. 
 To conclude, instructing child interviewees to maintain gaze ticks the ‘empirically-
supported’ box, using AMS ticks the ‘anti-adverse-effects’ box (but is dependent on the 
memory encoding for that event), and using OMS ticks the ‘practitioner-friendly’ box! 
7.5 Methodological Considerations 
7.5.1 Limited age range of children 
All the children that participated in this doctoral research were aged between 8 and 
11 years.  This age group was chosen predominantly because it has been shown that, under 
the age of 8 years, children perform poorly when telling and maintaining lies (Talwar & 
Lee, 2002), and so we wanted to test the cognitive lie detection techniques with a slightly 
more challenging child population.  Furthermore, for practical reasons, we decided to stay 
within the same school grouping (i.e. up until the end of primary/junior school in the UK 
school system).  Nevertheless, reducing our samples to this specific age bracket makes it 
hard to speculate on the wider effects of age and cognitive development on the 
effectiveness of the investigated techniques.  Looking across the lifespan (6 to 77 years 
old), Debey, Schryver, Logan, Suchotzki and Verschuere (2015) found that participants’ 
ability to inhibit their behaviour followed the same pattern as their lying frequency 
behaviour.  This suggests that the development of cognitive mechanisms associated with 
‘good’ lie-telling, such as inhibitory control, promotes more engagement in being deceitful 
(Talwar & Lee, 2008).  As our participants find themselves in mid-childhood, they may 
have developed some of the cognitive skills necessary for successful lie-telling but they 
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may not have mastered the art.  As children’s cognitive ability is closely related to their 
ability to tell lies (Talwar & Crossman, 2011), it would be important for future research to 
test the interview techniques investigated in this thesis with younger children and older 
children to understand fully the impact of age and cognitive development on the 
effectiveness of the interview techniques. 
7.5.2 Absence of individual differences 
 Another important limitation is the lack of individual differences investigated in the 
studies in this doctoral thesis.  Although we did control for age and gender of the children, 
we did not look beyond demographic variables to explore cognitive and social ability as 
well as personality and deceptive strategies.  Random allocation of children to 
experimental conditions should help to control for differences in social and cognitive 
development that could influence deceptive ability (Talwar & Crossman, 2011; Talwar & 
Lee, 2008).  However, it would have been of interest to know whether theory of mind or 
executive functioning had a mediating influence on the effects of each interview technique.  
Furthermore, the effects of a particular interview technique could depend on how that 
technique is understood by child lie-tellers and what strategies they put in place to negate 
the negative impact said technique is supposed to have on their lie-telling ability.  Children 
have reported using a variety of verbal and nonverbal strategies to be successful lie-tellers 
(Strömwall, Granhag & Landström, 2007).  It would be of interest to know whether our 
child participants employed any of these strategies, and whether they significantly 
inhibited the effects of the interview techniques.  Finally, it is important to know what 
motivates children to lie and lie well when asked to in an experiment.  Anecdotally, one of 
the children reported that they would have preferred to have told the lie if they had chosen 
to do so on their own accord.  Thus, deliberately asking children to lie and allowing them 
to choose to lie might result in different levels of motivation and perhaps performance. 
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7.5.3 Irrelevance of context to target field 
The majority of our findings are also limited by the non-forensic events about 
which the children were interviewed.  Previous research on child deception detection has 
already shown the impact of context on evaluators’ perceptions of veracity.  For example, 
when they hear children talking about being touched (in the context of a game) by an 
experimenter, adults are more inclined to judge children as deceitful (Edelstein, Luten, 
Ekman & Goodman, 2006), whereas when they hear children talking about a coached, non-
forensic event, they are more inclined to judge them as truthful (Talwar et al., 2006).  This 
differentiation in the criminal relevance of context was also found between Chapters 3 
(forensic) and 5 (non-forensic) of this thesis where it affected the memory accuracy for the 
event.  To recap, reflecting a typical eyewitness event (i.e. a mobile phone theft in Chapter 
3), where the eyewitness was not informed that the event would occur, led to an increase in 
inaccurate information when the eyewitnesses were encouraged to be more informative.   
Alternatively in Chapter 5, providing the eyewitnesses with prior warning that the event 
would take place and should be remembered for later recall resulted in accuracy being 
maintained.  Accounting for more factors relating to ‘being an eyewitness’, such as not 
knowing that a to-be-remembered event will take place, and, thus, the quality of encoding 
of unexpected events would have increased the practical significance of the findings. 
7.5.4 Sole focus on verbal behaviours 
The effect of using the cognitive lie detection techniques in this thesis on 
exaggerating behavioural differences between child truth-tellers and child lie-tellers has 
solely focused on differences in their verbal behaviours.  This is due to children’s verbal 
behaviours being more indicative of their deceit than their nonverbal behaviours (Akehurst, 
Manton & Quandte, 2011; Talwar & Lee, 2002).  Nevertheless, when it comes to child 
deception detection, a combination of verbal and nonverbal cues (e.g. total CBCA + limb 
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movements + cognitive operations + speech disturbances for 5-6 year-olds) has been 
shown to be the most accurate at discriminating between their true and false reporting 
(Vrij, Akehust, Soukara & Bull, 2004).  This was highlighted in the lens model reported in 
Chapter 3 that was unable to account for all of the cues that evaluators used when making 
their final credibility judgments.  Although children as vulnerable witnesses are entitled to 
special measures in court, such as video-recorded evidence-in-chief, live video links 
(Ministry of Defence, 2011), the jurors and judge who will be determining the credibility 
of their account will still be able to see how the children behave when giving evidence and 
under cross-examination.  In Chapter 2, manipulating the presentation of the children’s 
statements (audio only versus visual and audio) resulted in a truth bias when evaluators 
only listened to the children’s testimonies (i.e. when they were not able to see the 
children), whereas they showed no response bias when they saw and heard the video clips. 
This latter finding suggests that children’s nonverbal behaviour did have an impact on 
evaluators’ credibility judgments.  We cannot, therefore, rule out that the cognitive lie 
detection techniques had an effect on our child interviewees’ nonverbal behaviour and that 
this effect did not subsequently influence adults’ credibility judgments. 
7.6 Overview of Future Research 
This doctoral thesis has scratched the surface of using cognitive lie detection 
techniques with children.  In this chapter, as well as across the Discussion sections of 
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, suggestions have been made regarding future research.  To 
summarise, the main ideas proposed throughout this thesis include: (1) Measuring how the 
mechanisms manipulated by each technique are affected by developmental differences in 
cognitive skills associated with lie maintenance (e.g. verbal working memory, inhibitory 
control, and general executive functioning); (2) Testing and clarifying the underlying 
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social and cognitive theoretical assumptions of cognitive lie detection more directly (i.e. 
dual-task interference, social proof); (3) Coding for nonverbal cues to understand all of the 
behaviours that evaluators are perceiving when making their credibility judgements and to 
identify pitfalls in their decision-making; (4) Informing evaluators about the mechanisms 
behind the interview techniques to facilitate their understanding and detection accuracy; 
(5) Continuing to examine the effects of cognitive lie detection on truth-tellers’ reports in 
terms of productivity, relevance and accuracy of information; and (6) Involving 
practitioners in the review process to ensure that all aspects of the child interviewing 
process are taken into account when redesigning and adapting the interview techniques for 
laboratory testing. 
7.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to apply two cognitive lie detection techniques 
(imposing cognitive load and encouraging interviewees to say more) to child witnesses to 
facilitate the detection of their false reports.  This thesis demonstrated that cognitive lie 
detection is a promising method that can create significant verbal differences between child 
truth-tellers and child lie-tellers that can, sometimes, improve detection accuracy.  
However, this success was largely due to the first technique of maintaining gaze, with the 
subsequent two techniques of using a model statement receiving less support.  This 
research suggests that the development of cognitive skills for lie maintenance, and the 
effects of cognitive lie detection on those skills, need to be better understood if the 
techniques are to work effectively.  It also highlights that a practical knowledge of the 
child interviewing process is necessary to transfer the findings of this doctoral research to 
the real world. 
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